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Abstract 
Utilizing effective instructional means to teach medical students how to diagnose accurately 
and successfully is a major goal of medical education. The two empirical experimental studies 
of this thesis examine how learning with cognitive modeling examples might foster diagnostic 
competences consisting of diagnostic knowledge types and meta-cognitive error detection 
skills. The first study examined if providing peer feedback and erroneous or correct cognitive 
modeling examples are effective for learning diagnostic competences. Results showed that 
errors in examples positively influenced error detection skills whereas the task to provide peer 
feedback on the examples was detrimental for both diagnostic knowledge and error detection 
skills. Based on these results, the second study examined if a variation of communication 
medium (spoken versus written) or additional incorporated expert feedback on the erroneous 
cognitive modeling examples positively influences degree of elaboration and learning. While 
expert feedback showed no effect on acquiring diagnostic competences, providing spoken 
feedback positively influenced the degree of elaboration, which positively influenced the 
acquisition of diagnostic competences. The results of both studies suggest that erroneous 
cognitive modeling examples offer advantages for learning diagnostic knowledge and error-
related skills for instructional design in medical education. The integration of the task to 
provide peer feedback on observed diagnoses in teaching should be handled with care as 
feedback medium and degree of elaboration are influential for learning outcome. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Aim of this thesis 
Clinical reasoning as part of the every-day job of physicians remains one of the most 
complex cognitive tasks (G. J. Kuhn, 2002). Due to its complexity, it is prone to errors. 
Flawed clinical reasoning comes with costly consequences, since it results in flawed 
diagnoses: 10-15% of erroneous medical diagnoses are a result of incorrect or incomplete 
reasoning (Elstein, 2009). This is why error prevention in clinical decision settings on the 
ground of scientific reasoning has gained significant attention in recent years. Researchers and 
educators have also called for interventions to decrease the number of errors that result from 
flawed reasoning processes (Brennan, 2000).  
However, designing such interventions is not an easy task, as intervention studies 
aimed at fostering diagnostic or meta-cognitive skills show inconclusive results. For instance, 
research on training of concrete diagnostic skills like overall diagnostic performance or 
knowledge, (Eva, Link, Lutfey, & McKinlay, 2010; Mamede et al., 2012; Ziv, Ben-David, & 
Ziv, 2005) and meta-cognitive skills such as cognitive forcing strategies and reflection 
(Sherbino, Kulasegaram, Howey, & Norman, 2014) yield inconclusive empirical evidence. 
These studies reflect the difficulty of developing effective trainings to teach clinical reasoning 
and to reduce errors occurring within the reasoning process. Sherbino et al. (2014) for 
example conducted a large-scale 4-weeks training with 145 medical students to teach them 
cognitive forcing strategies. Cognitive forcing strategies are meta-cognitive self-monitoring 
strategies that can be applied during diagnostic reasoning and are hypothesized to counter 
errors in diagnoses. Results, however, showed no significant impact of the training.  
Apart from the empirical research, there are suggestions based on theoretical work 
about what kinds of interventions might work (Croskerry, Singhal, & Mamede, 2013a, 2013b; 
Introduction 
 
2 
 
Sherbino, Dore, Siu, & Norman, 2011). These suggestions are yet to be empirically tested. 
One of those promising approaches is observational learning with cognitive modeling 
examples (Van Gog, 2015). The observed models, in this case physicians, can either display a 
correct performance or one that commits one or more errors. In theory, watching models 
whose performance includes errors might teach meta-cognitive negative knowledge about 
how and where errors can happen (Oser & Spychiger, 2005) – referred to as error detection 
skills (Nyssen & Blavier, 2006) – and prove effective to avoid errors in one’s own clinical 
reasoning. Hence, observing other models’ reasoning mistakes that lead to false diagnoses 
should result in a better understanding of reasoning processes and the errors that can occur 
along the way. While erroneous cognitive modeling examples have been shown effective in 
other settings (Van Gog, 2015) and seem to be a promising approach to enhance clinical 
decisions, there is a research gap with respect to testing the approach’s viability in medical 
settings. How to actively engage students into elaborating on the observed cognitive modeling 
example is open for discussion (Renkl & Atkinson, 2003). One approach might be providing 
peer feedback on the observed performance (Li, Liu, & Steckelberg, 2010).  
To summarize, this thesis investigates if observing erroneous cognitive modeling 
examples is a valid approach to teach diagnostic competences. It is further explored if and 
how the task to provide peer feedback on these examples influences the learning gain of own 
diagnostic competences. How this task should be designed in order to be effective will also be 
examined. The two main research questions of this thesis are: 
(1) Can medical students acquire diagnostic competences from providing peer feedback on 
erroneous or correct cognitive modeling examples of clinical reasoning? 
(2) Does expert feedback or the medium by which peer feedback is provided on erroneous 
cognitive modeling examples influence the degree of elaboration and the acquisition of 
diagnostic competences? 
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To give a brief overview, the following section provides an outline of the chapters of this 
thesis.  
1.2 Outline of the thesis 
The first chapters of this dissertation, Chapters 2 to 4, are dedicated to clarify and 
describe the theoretical and empirical background of important concepts that are the basis of 
the empirical studies. An overview of these studies is presented in Chapter 5 and in detail in 
chapter 6 and 7. Chapter 8 summarizes and compares both empirical studies, with a general 
discussion provided in Chapter 9. 
Chapter 2 focuses on scientific reasoning and highlights arguments why it is essential 
to emphasize the relevance of research about this skill for domains such as medicine and why 
a clinical reasoning model shows great similarity to a cross-domain model of scientific 
reasoning. For clinical reasoning, early research highlighted cross-domain scientific reasoning 
skills underlying successful diagnosis (Patel, Arocha, & Zhang, 2005). This view however, 
was challenged by multiple theories, scholars and studies in recent years (Ilgen et al., 2012). 
First, similarities of a general model of scientific reasoning and models of clinical reasoning 
are outlined. A recent cross-domain model of scientific reasoning by F. Fischer et al. (2014) is 
depicted to explain basic steps in the process of conscious scientific reasoning. Differences in 
the proposed modes of operation of reasoning by Stokes (1997) and studies emphasizing the 
importance of domain specific factors, knowledge and skills highlight the differences between 
clinical and scientific reasoning and challenge a view of domain-generality of reasoning 
(Krasne & Stevens, 2010; Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011).  
Chapter 3 describes the concept of diagnostic competences as necessary factors that 
constitute successful clinical reasoning as it relies heavily on domain specific content 
knowledge (Schmidt, Norman, & Boshuizen, 1990). As medical expertise grows, this 
knowledge changes its form of representation from basic semantic structures over more 
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elaborated knowledge networks to encapsulated illness scripts that are based on a large 
experience base (Boshuizen & Schmidt, 2008). This knowledge is divided into three main 
parts: conceptual knowledge about what to do, strategic knowledge about how to do it and 
conditional knowledge about why to do it (Van Gog, Paas, & Van Merriënboer, 2004). For 
diagnostic accuracy however, domain specific content knowledge seem to not be the only 
influential factor (Clarke et al., 2000; Graber, 2009). Most diagnostic errors are due to flaws 
in the clinical reasoning (Schiff et al., 2009). These flaws might be explained by the increased 
automatization of clinical reasoning with more expertise: experts use more automated pattern 
recognition and only use conscious clinical reasoning when the automated reasoning is likely 
to fail (Hammond, 1990; Kahneman, 2011; Moulton, Regehr, Mylopoulos, & MacRae, 2007). 
Errors do not happen less in expert clinical reasoning, but experts outperform novices in error 
detection and management (Wilkinson, Cauble, & Patel, 2011). Therefore, I propose to add a 
fourth dimension of error detection skills to a holistic framework of diagnostic competences. 
How to teach these competences however, is still debated.  
Chapter 4 focuses on how to foster diagnostic competences. Due to medical expertise 
(and illness scripts) and usable knowledge being based on experience with patient cases, case-
based learning methods are advocated to be fruitful for learning diagnostic competences 
(Schmidt & Rikers, 2007; Stark, Kopp, & Fischer, 2011). These cases can be presented as 
written worked examples (Heitzmann, Fischer, Kühne‐Eversmann, & Fischer, 2015) or video-
based as cognitive modeling examples for more authenticity (Renkl, 2014; Van Gog & 
Rummel, 2010). Correct examples are good for beginners, but for intermediate and more 
advanced learners incorporating errors in the observed performance has been shown to 
increase motivation and attention and ultimately learning gain (Große & Renkl, 2007; Renkl 
& Atkinson, 2003). These errors in cognitive modeling examples are hypothesized to be 
beneficial for learning error detection skills as they teach the student what possible error 
pitfalls might be (Blandin & Proteau, 2000; Gartmeier, Bauer, Gruber, & Heid, 2008). 
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However, these erroneous examples though need to be accompanied by instruction on how to 
reflect and elaborate on the content. Self-reflection prompts have been found to be beneficial 
to actively engage the student in the elaboration (Atkinson, Renkl, & Merrill, 2003; Craig, 
Chi, & VanLehn, 2009). For a more constructive or even interactive approach, the task to 
provide peer feedback on the observed might lead to better learning (Chi, 2009; Y. H. Cho & 
Cho, 2011; Nicol, Thomson, & Breslin, 2014). Therefore, two studies were conducted which 
are summarized in a brief overview in Chapter 5. 
The first empirical study in Chapter 6 examined the effect of erroneous (versus 
correct) examples on the acquisition of diagnostic competences and error detection skills and 
if providing peer feedback on these examples as an interactive instructional method is 
beneficial for learning diagnostic competences. This was examined with a 2x2 quasi-
experimental study with a control group with 121 medical students in the seventh semester. 
The students either provided peer feedback on or just observed three erroneous or correct 
cognitive modeling examples of peer students’ differential diagnoses. The results indicated 
that students learning with erroneous cognitive modeling examples acquire higher error 
detection skills than students learning with correct ones. No difference was found for 
knowledge parts of diagnostic competences. Against the hypotheses, providing peer feedback 
was detrimental for the acquisition of both knowledge and meta-cognitive error detection 
parts of diagnostic competences. This was explained by the unfamiliarity of the task to 
provide peer feedback and therefore too high mental effort was caused.  
Based on the results from Study 1, Study 2 in Chapter 7 examined how to alter the 
intervention to make providing peer feedback beneficial for learning as described in the 
literature. For that, the effects of different communication media through which learners 
provide spoken or written peer feedback and receiving expert feedback (or not) on the 
observed performance on degree of elaboration and acquisition of diagnostic competences 
were investigated. The design was a 2x2 quasi-experimental study with a control group as 
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well. Participants (N = 134) either provided spoken or written peer feedback on three 
erroneous cognitive modeling examples and received expert feedback or did not. Results 
showed that receiving expert feedback did not make a difference in terms of degree of 
elaboration of provided peer feedback or acquisition of diagnostic competences. Medium of 
communication did influence learning indirectly: Students providing spoken peer feedback 
provided more elaborated peer feedback, which led to a better acquisition of diagnostic 
competences.  
In Chapter 8, both studies are shortly summarized (sections 8.1 through 8.2) and then 
compared (section 8.3). Results of this comparison indicate that samples were similar in terms 
of demographics, but significantly different in terms of prior knowledge. However, this 
difference was not responsible for differences in degree of elaboration of provided peer 
feedback. An empirical comparison showed that students in Study 2 provided more elaborated 
peer feedback, which might be explained by the short peer feedback training incorporated in 
Study 2. However, the samples of Study 1 and Study 2 did not differ in terms of acquisition of 
diagnostic competences overall.  
Chapter 9 offers a general discussion with an interpretation, discussion and 
implications of the findings in section 9.1, conclusions in section 9.2, which offer answers to 
the two main research questions of this thesis, and limitations and an outlook on possible 
future research in section 9.3 in 9.4. The closing thoughts are outlined. In section 9.1 depicted 
results are shortly interpreted and discussed. First, the effects of cognitive modeling examples 
on the acquisition of diagnostic competences are discussed. However, it is questioned if the 
benefits of using cognitive modeling examples in medical education outweigh the costs. 
Using OSCE settings to create cognitive modeling examples for learning could counter high 
costs. Erroneous cognitive modeling examples were found to be beneficial for acquiring 
conceptual parts of diagnostic competences when compared to textbook learning. The impact 
of the findings of positive effects of erroneous cognitive modeling examples on meta-
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cognitive error detection skills are integrated into the existing literature. Practical implications 
for medical education are drawn: Learning with errors should be integrated into teaching 
methods to teach students error-related skills. The effects of providing elaborated peer 
feedback on (erroneous) cognitive modeling examples are then discussed: While providing 
corrective peer feedback was found to be detrimental for acquiring diagnostic competences in 
Study 1, Study 2 showed that the degree of elaboration of provided peer feedback positively 
influences learning. However, providing spoken peer feedback led to a higher degree of 
elaboration, which in turn led to more acquisition of diagnostic competences. Receiving 
expert feedback did neither influence elaboration of provided peer feedback nor acquisition of 
diagnostic competences. For educators in practice, the results imply that using peer feedback 
as intervention for learning should be done with care, as training and medium play an 
important role for the degree of elaboration, which is essential for learning gain. 
In section 9.2 answers to the two main research questions of this thesis are concluded. 
Erroneous cognitive modeling examples can be used in medical education to learn distinct 
parts of diagnostic competences. Providing peer feedback was found to be detrimental, but it 
makes a difference if it is elaborated or corrective. Research question two about the influence 
of expert feedback and medium of peer feedback provision could be answered with yes and 
no: Receiving expert feedback while providing peer feedback does not increase degree of 
elaboration or learning gain. In contrast, the medium of communication of provided peer 
feedback did have an influence. Providing spoken compared to written peer feedback 
increases degree of elaboration of peer feedback and therefore learning gain. 
The limitations presented in section 9.3 firstly address the instrument limitations: The 
pen-and-paper assessment of diagnostic competences, suggesting a multi-trait multi-method 
assessment. Performance-based assessment like OSCE or Script-concordance testing could be 
included in testing for triangulation to counter critique concerning validity. Further, error 
detection skills need to be validated with locating it empirically (e.g. by factor or function 
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analysis) in a framework of diagnostic competences and should be related to accuracy and 
performance in the clinical setting. Furthermore, the covariate of mental effort must be 
measured differently to distinguish different types of cognitive load that might be responsible 
for parts of the negative findings of peer feedback provision as discussed earlier. A limitation 
concerning learning material stems from the video-based nature of the intervention. The 
results can only be carefully transferred into real-life settings.  
Overall, future studies might explore the relationship of error detection skills and other 
knowledge types or competences in medicine, but also across domains. Further research is 
needed to entangle if and how a combination of correct erroneous cognitive modeling 
examples is better for teaching diagnostic competences than erroneous examples alone. 
Further, the effects of incorporating practice phases to rehearse the observed performances 
might be beneficial. To unveil what happens in cognition of students during providing peer 
feedback, retrospective analysis methods could be applied. The results concerning feedback 
leave the question what characteristics of providing peer feedback influence learning 
positively or negatively. Future studies might also focus on the effects of peer feedback 
trainings on elaboration to find out what influences the degree of elaboration and therefore 
learning gain. In closing, the suggestion is provided that peer feedback provision for learning 
must be adequately designed to influence learning positively. Errors in medical education 
should gain more attention as this thesis highlights possible advantages for diagnostic 
accuracy. 
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2 The Relevance of Scientific Reasoning for Medical Practitioners 
The following three sections are dedicated to explaining the importance of scientific 
reasoning in clinical contexts and showing the close link between scientific and clinical 
reasoning. While clinical reasoning shares distinct aspects with scientific reasoning, scholars 
highlight the domain-specific aspects of clinical reasoning. Hence, the coming sections not 
only draw attention to the links between these concepts, but also point out to the differences 
and the domain specific aspects of clinical reasoning. It begins with why it is important to 
study scientific reasoning for society and medicine in particular (section 2.1). A recent across-
domain model of scientific reasoning is presented (section 2.2) and domain specific aspects 
are highlighted (section 2.3) that impede the complete adaptation of a cross-domain scientific 
reasoning model for clinical reasoning. 
2.1 Importance of Scientific Reasoning in Society and Medicine 
In 1979, Daniel Kahnemann and Amos Tversky published an article in Econometrica 
about their Prospect Theory (Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) investigating the 
cognitive processes underlying decision making processes in economics. With their Nobel-
prize winning extension of the existing idea of people as irrational decision makers with 
cognitive biases, they undertook a first step in experimental psychology to see decision 
making as a multifactorial, complex endeavor, sensitive to manifold factors. A clear-cut, easy 
model of how reasoning ‘in general’ works was neglected. Decision-making and reasoning 
since then has been target of a vast amount of theoretical essays, philosophical discourses and 
empirical studies, shedding light on the processes involved. Especially scientific reasoning as 
the basis for the logic in science has been emphasized as important research topic (Popper, 
1959).  
The value of scientific reasoning as a skill derives from its imminent implications for 
individuals and society. For individuals, it serves as an important 21
st
 century skill to cope 
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with the modern world as an information society and navigate in it fluently (F. Fischer et al., 
2014; Trilling & Fadel, 2009). Since scientific reasoning is a precondition to conduct research 
and to create new knowledge, it is crucial for the development of our society (Morris, 
Masnick, Zimmerman, & Croker, 2012). Therefore, competences connected to scientific 
reasoning and argumentation, as for instance evaluating evidence or setting and testing 
hypotheses, have been the target of different educational institutions, which have been calling 
for an explicit facilitation of reasoning in schools and higher education in different domains 
such as mathematics, engineering and general science education (Hersh, 2005; KMK, 2004; 
Quinn, Schweingruber, & Keller, 2012).  
In the domain of medicine, scientific reasoning is also of major importance: During 
diagnosing, the physician engages in several scientific reasoning tasks such as identifying a 
problem, generating possible explanations and testing them (Patel et al., 2005). However, it is 
an open empirical question whether clinical reasoning is congruent to scientific reasoning in 
the field of medicine and whether rules and frameworks can be applied by with adapting a 
scientific reasoning model for this context. To examine if a domain-general scientific 
reasoning model could be suitable to explain the reasoning during the diagnostic process, a 
detailed recent domain-general scientific reasoning model by F. Fischer et al. (2014) is 
explained in the following. 
2.2 A Domain-General Model of Scientific Reasoning 
Due to the significance of understanding scientific reasoning in different domains such 
as medicine, scholars thrive for unraveling its complexity. Scientific reasoning and its 
underlying cognitive processes have been examined with multiple approaches by many 
scholars over the last decades (F. Fischer et al., 2014). The complexity of scientific reasoning 
makes it hard to grasp as it constitutes of multiple components such as problem identification, 
hypothesis generation and testing (Schunn & Anderson, 1999) in multiple domains such as 
The Relevance of Scientific Reasoning for Medical Practitioners 
 
11 
 
medicine (Patel et al., 2005), biology (Lawson et al., 2000) or physics (Bao et al., 2009). 
Therefore, many models of a general scientific reasoning process exist describing the process 
of reasoning in varying complexity and domain-specificity. 
 These conceptual frameworks aim to explain what makes a scientist successful when 
identifying and explaining a scientific phenomenon (Klahr & Dunbar, 1988). Scientific 
reasoning can be defined as reasoning that establishes hypothesis based on “intentional 
knowledge seeking to test theories and hypotheses and to evaluate evidence with respect to a 
hypothesis or theory” (F. Fischer et al., 2014, p. 30). D. Kuhn (2002) describes in a basal 
model the basic steps of scientific reasoning across domains with identification and 
investigation of the problem, access and analysis of data, inference and argument deduced 
from the observed. F. Fischer et al. (2014) reformulated and extended these steps by eight 
epistemic activities in a non-linear model of scientific reasoning. The model is one of the 
most holistic and recent ones, as it depicts the scientific reasoning process in great detail: It 
starts with (1) problem identification: Identifying a practical or scientific problem that needs 
advancement in given theories and methods to solve or explain it. After problem 
identification, (2) questions are formulated that lead to the (3) generation of hypotheses that 
already suspect a possible answer to the question based on existing knowledge, methods and 
explanations. (4) Artefacts are constructed and redesigned which are methodological tools to 
examine the generated hypotheses scientifically. Through that, (5) evidence is generated by 
(deductive) scientific inquiry which is then (6) evaluated for quality and validity with existing 
scientific standards of a field. By weighting and analyzing the significance of the evidence, 
(7) conclusions are drawn under consideration of previously established hypotheses. In a last 
step, the results are (8) communicated and scrutinized. Throughout these reasoning steps, 
domain specific knowledge is needed to perform each step successfully (Schauble, 1996), 
such as diagnostic knowledge in medicine (Norman & Eva, 2010).  
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 The framework of epistemic steps by F. Fischer et al. (2014) depicts scientific 
reasoning as a deliberate and conscious process, based on explicit knowledge. However, other 
scholars also advocate intuitive parts of decision-making within the scientific reasoning 
process: Kruglanski and Gigerenzer (2011) see scientific reasoning as relying on a two-
process model of decision-making based on intuitive and deliberate judgements. A person 
uses both heuristics for intuitive and domain-specific rules and knowledge for deliberate 
judgements. According to the person’s processing capacities, the rules and knowledge are 
matched to the existing problem. Decisions are made based on a fit or no-fit of evidence and 
knowledge with problems to advance further in the scientific reasoning process. These 
decisions during epistemic steps however are based on domain-specific knowledge to reach 
the aim of the reasoning process (Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011; Schauble, 1996). Both 
knowledge and aim can vary across domains: In medical education research, adopting a 
general scientific reasoning model for clinical reasoning has been largely challenged due to 
the importance of domain-specific factors (Ilgen et al., 2012; Patel et al., 2005). In the 
following section, this debate will be explained, drawing on two major differences between 
clinical (which is reasoning about issues connected to patient care) and a scientific reasoning 
models. 
2.3 Domain-specific aspects of scientific reasoning in medicine 
Whereas F. Fischer et al. (2014) claim that the eight epistemic steps of their scientific 
reasoning model can be found across different domains and reasoning tasks, aims of the 
scientific reasoning process can differ. This means the epistemic steps of scientific reasoning 
can be executed in different scientific modes (depending on the aim) as proposed by Stokes 
(1997), either more aiming at theoretical or practical implications. Three modes of scientific 
reasoning are described to classify scientific reasoning according to its relevance for theory 
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advancement (generalized knowledge) or practical immediate use (F. Fischer et al., 2014; 
Stokes, 1997): 
(a) Basic research with the goal to advance existing theory (generalized knowledge) about 
phenomena (Bohr’s Quadrant), 
(b) applied research with the goal to advance existing practice (Edison’s Quadrant) and 
(c) a combination of both as use-inspired basic research (Pasteur’s Quadrant). 
 
Figure 1. Epistemic modes of scientific reasoning after Stokes (1997) 
 
 To exemplify Bohr’s quadrant, basic research in how the digestive system of a specific 
breed of micromammals during ice age was functioning does not immediately impact 
humankind or a general practice but broadens the knowledge about this time. Contrary, 
research in Edison’s quadrant for immediate use might be found in engineering: A study 
about two types of engine gasket to see which one erodes slower might have an impact on car 
drivers but does not advance generalized knowledge in that area. Pasteur’s Quadrant 
combines both approaches: For example, research about how science lessons in Germany 
could be designed by examining the cognitive processes involved in science learning can be 
located in Pasteur’s quadrant as it has both relevance for generalized knowledge (theories 
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about cognition and learning) and practice use (better science classes). Davis (1997) locates 
clinical reasoning in a special paradigm of practical reasoning as it draws on basic and applied 
research but is used for the goal to heal the patient. The clinician acts as a scientist trying to 
solve a problem, but the ‘sample’ is the patient. Compared to a general concept of scientific 
reasoning, clinical reasoning of patient cases differs in terms of its aim but, due to its goal to 
heal the patient, cannot be clearly located in the proposed paradigms depicted in Figure 1. 
 Apart from the difference in modus operandi, studies examining scientific reasoning 
and its underlying processes often seem to neglect domain-inherent factors such as 
knowledge, culture, situations or problems of different domains (F. Fischer et al., 2014; 
Morris et al., 2012; Schunn & Anderson, 1999): 
“Although much of the validity in studying scientific reasoning processes lies in the real-world 
nature of the task, it is an interesting fact that the great majority of psychological research on 
scientific reasoning has studied neither actual scientists nor used actual scientific tasks. Instead 
much of the research has used undergraduates working on artificial problems” (Schunn & 
Anderson, 1999, p. 388). 
 Due to the lack of generalizability across domains, Ilgen et al. (2012) highlight the 
importance of a domain-specific clinical reasoning model for medicine that adopts parts of a 
general scientific reasoning model but also incorporates domain-specific aspects of the 
clinical reasoning task. Elstein, Shulman, and Sprafka (1978) for example found that expert 
clinicians were more efficient and accurate due to better domain knowledge, not due to better 
general problem solving abilities. An example: It is important that a physician knows that s/he 
has to base her/his hypotheses on reliable evidence and test these hypothesis based on ruling 
out alternatives, but s/he needs to be able to draw valid conclusions based on test results by 
knowing what a certain test result implies for further reasoning. 
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 To summarize, it is of major importance to keep in mind the domain-specific parts of 
scientific reasoning when studying it in specific contexts that are heavily based on specific 
content knowledge. Especially since the emergence of evidence-based medicine as “the 
conscientious, explicit and judicious use of current best evidence in making decisions about 
the care of individual patients“ (Sackett, 1997, p. 3), psychologists and educators have 
become interested in the domain-specific processes underlying clinical reasoning and how to 
foster them. A general model of scientific reasoning seems insufficient to represent clinical 
reasoning as there is important domain-specific knowledge that is essential to the reasoning 
process and that needs to be incorporated in order to understand and to enhance reasoning 
processes in clinical decision contexts. In the following chapter, clinical reasoning is first 
described from a process perspective, proposing an integrated model of diagnosing in the 
medical context, based on domain-specific factors. Then, the domain-specific competencies 
needed for successful clinical reasoning are explained. 
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3 Clinical Reasoning as a Requirement and Challenge for Physicians  
The following chapter offers a definition of clinical reasoning in section 3.1 that 
incorporates cognitive and meta-cognitive processes which are based on knowledge. The 
cognitive processes are described with three different models of scientific and clinical 
reasoning which are then compared and analogies and differences outlined in section 3.2. Due 
to the emphasis on domain-specific knowledge in both clinical reasoning models, the nature 
of diagnostic knowledge is explained in section 3.3. A three-component framework of distinct 
parts of diagnostic competences is outlined in section 3.4. This concept is expanded with 
meta-cognitive error detection skills in section 3.5 as forth component. 
3.1 Definition of Clinical Reasoning 
In the field of medical education, various names have been used to label and subsume 
this critical process involved in evidence-based medical decision-making in diagnosis with the 
most prominent being: Clinical problem solving (Elstein & Schwarz, 2002), clinical decision 
making (Gill, Miller, Boucher, & Strauss, 1986), diagnostic reasoning (Croskerry, 2009), and 
clinical reasoning (Higgs, Jones, Loftus, & Christiensen, 2008). In this work, the term clinical 
reasoning is used to describe the process behind the diagnosis made by a clinician, to 
highlight its practical implications for clinical work and differentiate ‘clinical reasoning’ from 
the term ‘diagnostic reasoning’ used in domains like teacher education (Hesse & Latzko, 
2009). 
 For advancements in teaching in medical education, scholars have been trying to 
understand the nature of the clinical reasoning process underlying successful medical 
diagnosing for several decades now (Norman, 2005). The findings that expert clinicians 
differed from novice physicians in their reasoning in the late 1970’s sparked the idea to 
examine the process of clinical reasoning what they labeled as medical problem-solving more 
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closely by observational studies (Elstein et al., 1978; Neufeld, Norman, Feightner, & 
Barrows, 1981).  
 Most of the theory that serves as a basis for clinical reasoning models evolved from 
such observational studies as evidence suggested that interviews with physicians about their 
process of clinical reasoning seemed unreliable (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Methods to unravel 
the processes of clinical reasoning have become more and more refined, from using methods 
like think-aloud protocols or observing simulation-based performance (Elstein et al., 1978; 
Kassirer & Gorry, 1978) to participatory action research with computational mapping and 
modeling (Charlin et al., 2012). Therefore, models used to describe the clinical reasoning 
process vary greatly in complexity and detail, depending on the method of assessment. A 
comprehensive definition that describes what factors constitute clinical reasoning as a multi-
level construct by Higgs et al. (2008) is:  
“Clinical reasoning (or practice decision making) is a context-dependent way of thinking and 
decision making in professional practice to guide practice actions. It involves the construction 
of narratives to make sense of the multiple factors and interests pertaining to the current 
reasoning task. It occurs within a set of problem places informed by the practitioner’s unique 
frames of reference, workplace context and practice models, as well as by the patient’s or 
client’s contexts. It utilizes core dimensions of practice knowledge, reasoning and meta-
cognition and draws on these capacities in others. Decision making within clinical reasoning 
occurs at micro, macro and meta levels and may be individually or collaboratively conducted. 
It involves metaskills of critical conversations, knowledge generation, practice model 
authenticity and reflexivity” (Higgs et al., 2008, p .4, after Higgs, 2006). [Emphasis added] 
 Thus, a holistic construct of clinical reasoning does not only describe the cognitive 
processes that happen when a physician is confronted with a complex patient case, but also 
considers other factors that influence the reasoning process. As Higgs et al. (2008) state, three 
different core dimensions are involved in successful clinical reasoning: The cognitive process 
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of reasoning, practice knowledge needed for successful reasoning and meta-cognition to 
reflect and monitor. This may serve as a basic framework of what constitutes clinical 
reasoning: It is a cognitive process, based on practical knowledge and skills which is 
monitored by metacognitive control. It is important to take into consideration the multi-
dimensional nature of clinical reasoning so that educators design effective learning methods 
for students to be good on all levels of successful clinical reasoning. To outline the basic 
construct of clinical reasoning and its components used in this thesis, the following sub-
chapter describes models of clinical reasoning from a cognitive process perspective, followed 
by a (practice) knowledge perspective of diagnostic competences needed for successful 
clinical reasoning and error-related skills of meta-cognition to monitor the diagnostic 
reasoning process. 
3.2 Clinical Reasoning as Cognitive Process: Models in Comparison 
The cognitive view on clinical reasoning regards reasoning as a precursor for a 
diagnostic decision (Simmons, 2010). It evolves around solving a problem-solving task 
(Gilhooly, 1990) and follows a hypothetico-deductive structure (Charlin, Tardif, & 
Boshuizen, 2000). This means that the physician weights different hypotheses until one can be 
selected. This is done by searching, choosing and validating a hypothesis by matching it with 
knowledge representations of illnesses. The physician then decides for the most likely disease 
explaining the symptoms and history of the patient. This is followed by further steps of 
diagnostic validation or therapy (Rajkomar & Dhaliwal, 2011; Schmidt et al., 1990). In a 
simple basal sequential model, conscious clinical reasoning of a physician can be depicted as 
consisting of three consecutive cognitive steps. First, in the step of data collection, the 
physician gathers information to perceive and identify key-features of the disease with the 
help of guiding symptoms. During the second step of clinical reasoning processing, possible 
hypotheses of diseases are generated that might explain the observed symptoms and data from 
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diagnostics tests (e.g., blood work) is interpreted. In the final step referred to as validation, the 
physician either neglects all hypotheses and begins with data collection again or accepts the 
most likely one and processes further (Graber, Gordon, & Franklin, 2002; Groves, O'rourke, 
& Alexander, 2003).  
Based on these basic steps, Bowen (2006) proposes a more explicit clinical reasoning 
model that constitutes of steps analogous to the scientific reasoning steps as proposed by F. 
Fischer et al. (2014). It highlights the dynamic hypothetico-deductive nature of the clinical 
reasoning process that scholars in medical education advocate for (Coderre, Mandin, 
Harasym, & Fick, 2003; Eva, 2005): First, the physician is (1) confronted with the patient’s 
history, which leads to immediate initial simple representations of what might be the case for 
the symptoms. Next, relatively unstructured (2) data-acquisition begins with for example 
physical examination, testing imaging and further questions to rule out some of the 
hypotheses (Rajkomar & Dhaliwal, 2011). Subsequently a more (3) accurate problem 
representation evolves and leads to the (4) generation of one or two main hypotheses 
(working diagnoses). Next, for these hypotheses, (5) matching knowledge representations in 
form of an illness script (see chapter 3.3) are selected. If this step fails and no matching illness 
script is found for the disease and the temporary working diagnoses are invalid and must all 
be neglected, the physician returns to (2) data acquisition. The emphasis of this iterative 
constant ‘jumping’ from (5) selecting a matching hypothesis to (2) multiple times during the 
process of diagnosing highlights the hypothetico-deductive nature of clinical reasoning. 
Finally, after finding a matching illness script, the validated (6) diagnosis is selected and 
communicated to colleagues for further treatment and possibly the patient. (Bowen, 2006) 
Compared to F. Fischer et al. (2014) model of scientific reasoning, the emphasis lies 
on the dynamic reshaping of the hypothesis by reoccurring of data acquisition and refinement 
or negligence of the initial hypotheses as a constant chain until a final decision is reached (see 
figure 2 for comparison). The recurring chain of reasoning steps and the meta-cognitive 
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processes involved in monitoring these steps are complex and make attempts to depict the full 
clinical reasoning process difficult. Clinical reasoning models therefore need to describe 
manifold contextual, cognitive and meta-cognitive variables involved clinical reasoning in a 
decision-dense, complex environment (Ilgen et al., 2012). 
 A recent attempt to depict the full variety of processes during clinical reasoning is the 
‘MOT Model of Clinical Reasoning’ by Charlin et al. (2012) who argue in line with Nendaz 
and Bordage (2002) that the dynamic nature of the problem representation is the core of the 
diagnostic process. The model therefore gives a multifaceted picture of clinical reasoning 
across medicine. It is analogous to the proposed model by Bowen (2006), following a circular 
reasoning process but offering a holistic, detailed structure along the shaping of a dynamic 
representation during the diagnostic process. It emphasizes the multidimensional non-linearity 
of clinical reasoning by incorporating and highlighting context variables, cognition and meta-
cognitive monitoring along the diagnosis to decide which step should follow the last one. The 
meta-cognitive processes monitoring the dynamic diagnostic process is highlighted in both 
models of Bowen (2006) and Charlin et al. (2012): The physician ‘jumps’ back and forth 
between the reasoning steps until the initial representation of the problem becomes more 
refined and further actions can be taken. This change in representation of the problem happens 
by monitoring the searching and selecting of matching illness scripts to explain the patient’s 
problems. Clinical reasoning therefore is inseparable from meta-cognition and knowledge 
(Schmidt & Boshuizen, 1992). This dynamic change in representation relies on the 
mobilization and organization of specific knowledge types (Charlin et al., 2012). Therefore, 
medical educators advocate assessing specific, action-related knowledge types to determine a 
physician’s ability to be accurate and successful in clinical reasoning (Ilgen et al., 2012; Page, 
Bordage, & Allen, 1995). 
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In summary, clinical reasoning has been a target of medical education research for 
decades now, leading to manifold synonymously used labels and different conceptualizations 
of the cognitive process. In this thesis, clinical reasoning is used to make a clear distinction 
towards reasoning in other domains such as teaching. It is the precursor to a final decision of a 
diagnosis and consists of three dimensions of cognition, (practical) knowledge and 
metacognition. The cognitive parts are often described as a process-model: it is a hierarchical 
and complex, non-linear chain of processes that involve the general steps of data collection, 
reasoning and validation. These steps have multiple sub-steps that can be depicted in varying 
detail (Bowen, 2006; Charlin et al., 2012). A domain-general model of reasoning like the one 
of F. Fischer et al. (2014) is, has similarities to a general process model of clinical reasoning 
steps. However, the two described models of clinical reasoning (Bowen, 2006; Charlin et al., 
2012) emphasize the reliance of the reasoning process on domain-specific knowledge, meta-
cognition, experience and the situation. All but the latter can be targeted by instructional 
interventions. Studies examining a domain-general reasoning model seem to try to generalize 
a process that is indisputably relying on domain and content specific characteristics (Elstein 
et al., 1978; Schmidt et al., 1990). In medicine, the strong reliance on biomedical content 
knowledge is essential for successful clinical reasoning (Ilgen et al., 2012). Therefore, the 
domain-specific knowledge and skills that enable successful clinical reasoning need to be 
addressed further (Higgs et al., 2008). The following paragraph describes a framework to 
classify the knowledge involved in diagnostic competences as prerequisite for successful 
clinical reasoning which is important to consider when aiming at interventions to foster 
clinical reasoning. 
3.3 Diagnostic Competences as Knowledge Base for Clinical Reasoning 
Early research on clinical problem solving in medical education aimed for generalizing 
the idea of a prototypical model of clinical reasoning (Elstein et al., 1978). In their study, 
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Elstein et al. (1978) compared high-performing clinicians and low-performing clinicians on 
how their clinical reasoning is shaped in terms of hypothesis generation and evidence 
generation and evaluation. They found no difference between both groups in a general 
reasoning skill but in their knowledge base across patient cases. Their results gave a clear 
answer to neglecting the hypothesis that successful clinical reasoning is relying on domain-
general reasoning skills. Clinical reasoning was found to have high content specificity as this 
reasoning process is highly dependent on biomedical knowledge. To understand how to 
support and enhance clinical reasoning, one has to understand the nature of clinical 
knowledge as prerequisite for successful, accurate clinical reasoning: 
In recent years, there have been several scholars examining the question of what 
constitutes successful clinical reasoning: To a certain extent, clinical reasoning is based on the 
general ability to reason scientifically (Krasne & Stevens, 2010). This is due to its 
hypothetico-deductive nature (Charlin et al., 2000). However, medical expertise and 
reasoning success is heavily dependent on content knowledge (Schmidt et al., 1990): Expert 
clinicians and novices do not differ much in terms of general reasoning ability but rather in 
terms of clinical knowledge and knowledge representation (Feltovich, Coulson, Spiro, & 
Dawson-Saunders, 1992; Schmidt & Boshuizen, 1992).  
 This difference is rooted in the nature of how physicians shape the initial problem 
representation during the above-mentioned dynamic reasoning: The clinician constantly 
compares his/her mental representation of the problem with his/her internal representation of 
diseases (Bowen, 2006), also called illness scripts (Schmidt & Rikers, 2007). The structural 
theory of scripts as mental representations of ‘event knowledge’ (Nelson & Gruendel, 1986) 
comes from the results of an explorative study of Schank and Abelson (1977). In their 
conceptual framework, scripts are needed to successfully handle any situation the person is 
exposed to. These scripts consist of procedural knowledge about action and behavior (Schank 
& Abelson, 1977). Scripts as representations of procedural knowledge can be general or more 
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specific towards a situation and vary in their flexibility to be reused or adapted to a similar 
(transfer) task (Schank, 1999). The more a person is exposed to a specific situation, the more 
his or her knowledge about what to do in that situation is refined and automated.  
In the field of medicine, the automatization and refinement (knowledge encapsulation) 
happens when the physician is more and more exposed to a specific disease. As mentioned 
before, illness scripts are mental representations of diseases, constituted by clinical knowledge 
and constructed from past encounters with patients (Schmidt et al., 1990). They differ from 
prototypical representations by being enriched with extensive biomedical procedural and 
declarative factual knowledge behind that representation (Schmidt & Rikers, 2007; Woods, 
2007). This elaborated knowledge about illnesses includes enabling factors (e.g., unprotected 
sexual contact for HIV), the pathophysiological processes of the illness (T-Helper cells are 
attacked by the virus, amount significantly drops, viral load increases) and the symptoms of 
the disease (fatigue, flu-like symptoms, swollen lymph nodes) (Boshuizen & Schmidt, 2008). 
The structure and complexity of illness scripts can be classified in three expertise stages: 
 Novice stage: The medical student learns biomedical conceptual knowledge about 
diseases. This knowledge is stored in a semantic network of representations. These networks 
are continuously validated and enriched. Reasoning in this stage is the inference between 
these concepts, so mostly linear and simple reasoning can successfully be accomplished. At 
the end of this stage though, linear reasoning chains become faster, concepts become more 
closely connected and indirect connections become direct connections (Boshuizen & Schmidt, 
2008; Schmidt & Rikers, 2007). 
 Intermediate stage: After building up an extensive network of biomedical knowledge 
in the novice stage of learning, this knowledge base is now more and more connected to 
clinical knowledge of features of diseases experienced by patient contact. In this stage, 
medical students during clinical reasoning still consider and are able to name elaborated 
pathophysiological knowledge behind their diagnostic decisions in contrast to novices or 
Clinical Reasoning as a Requirement and Challenge for Physicians 
 
25 
 
experts ((Rikers, Schmidt, & Boshuizen, 2000; Schmidt & Boshuizen, 1992, 1993; VanLehn, 
1996). 
 Expert stage: Biomedical knowledge and clinical knowledge are now being fully 
encapsulated and connected to experience with patients which constitute fully developed 
illness scripts. When an expert now is confronted with a patient case, one or several illness 
scripts are activated. In contrast to novices and intermediate learners, the illness script as a 
whole is activated and contains all knowledge connected to a specific disease. For finding the 
matching hypothesis, the encapsulated knowledge in the illness script is compared to the 
knowledge about the representation of the patient’s problem. Non-matching illness scripts are 
deactivated again (Boshuizen & Schmidt, 2008).  
In summary, diagnostic competences that are a prerequisite for successful clinical 
reasoning are based on domain-specific knowledge encapsulated in illness scripts. Illness 
scripts are built and extended throughout the medical expertise stages by being confronted 
with cases. Illness scripts are based on different types of knowledge. The following section 
describes the theoretical model of diagnostic competences based on three distinct types of 
knowledge. 
3.4 Knowledge Components of Diagnostic Competences 
As mentioned before, illness scripts incorporate knowledge about biomedical facts as 
well as knowledge about procedures. This is in line with a dualistic model of memory where 
knowledge is stored as different knowledge types, which are declarative and procedural 
knowledge. Declarative knowledge means knowledge about facts and is stored in a semantic 
network of propositions. Procedural knowledge means knowledge about situations and actions 
and is stored in episodic memory (Anderson, 1990). It is triggered as soon as a person enters a 
specific or a similar situation. 
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 Paris, Lipson, and Wixson (1983) describe procedural knowledge as being composed 
of strategic and conditional knowledge. They found that experts differ from novices in terms 
of the use of strategies. Experts are more advanced and efficient with the use of problem-
solving strategies than novices. This advanced use of strategies is explained by three factors. 
First, experts have a larger conceptual (or declarative) knowledge base about what or that. 
Second, they seem to be more advanced in procedural knowledge about how to do a task. This 
is referred to as strategic knowledge. However, merely the knowledge about what to do and 
how to do that is not sufficient for strategically performing a cognitive task for which 
conditional knowledge, the knowledge about the when and why an action might be successful, 
is needed. This distinction has been used to accurately describe and assess the diagnostic 
knowledge needed for diagnostic reasoning (Stark et al., 2011; Van Gog et al., 2004) and can 
be applied to any given diagnostic situation as exemplified by the following: 
 
To summarize, in the domain of medicine, domain-specific knowledge is represented 
in illness scripts. They evolve during learning from linear basic networks of biomedical facts 
that allow causal chains over a combination of clinical-situational and biomedical knowledge 
in the intermediate stage of the learner to a rich encapsulated illness script about a disease. 
A patient comes to the emergency room with heavy breathing (dyspnea) lasting for several 
days already. The doctor assesses vital parameters like breathing frequency, d-dimers, O² 
concentration and heart rate and continues with a physical examination. He/She also asks 
several questions as part of the holistic data gathering, for example if the dyspnea occurs 
only under strain or if the patient had a long flight. He/She determines due to high d-dimers 
and a long flight in connection with a slightly swollen leg pulmonary embolism as most 
prevalent diagnosis. He/She knows that a high concentration of d-dimers in a blood sample 
is a sign for a clot that is dissolved (conceptual knowledge). The swollen leg is a sign for a 
deep vein thrombosis in this leg. These two symptoms lead to the working hypothesis of 
pulmonary embolism. To validate or rule out this hypothesis, further strategic actions need 
to be taken: he orders a computer tomography (validation on the basis of strategic 
knowledge) to see if there are clots in the lung that cause the heavy breathing (conditional 
knowledge). 
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When confronted with a clinical situation, the physician activates one or more of these illness 
scripts as a whole and matches it with the characteristics of the patient’s problem. This 
knowledge can be classified as conceptual knowledge about biomedical facts, strategic 
knowledge about medical tests and treatments and conditional knowledge about why these 
medical tests and treatments need to be done. As expertise grows, illness scripts are fully 
developed and the physician is able to diagnose complex cases. However, it has been shown 
that expert diagnostic performance still is subject to errors (Clarke et al., 2000; Graber, 
Franklin, & Gordon, 2005). To understand how diagnostic errors happen, it is important to 
differentiate types of errors and what cognitive processes are responsible for erroneous 
diagnoses. The following paragraph first defines diagnostic errors, depicts a taxonomy of 
kinds of errors and outlines the cognitive processes involved in erroneous diagnosing. 
3.5 Meta-Cognition: Errors and Error Detection Skills 
Experts are believed to be faster and solve problems better in their domain, with fewer 
errors involved, when compared to novices or intermediate learners; assuming they are more 
experienced and have more action routine (Chi, Glaser, & Farr, 2014). However, diagnostic 
errors happen also in an advanced stage of expertise, but experts seem to manage errors better 
than novices (Wilkinson et al., 2011). Due to the occurrence of diagnostic errors even in 
expert diagnostic reasoning, it is essential to identify what diagnostic errors are and what 
factors contribute to these errors.  
Diagnostic errors are a subset of medical errors. Medical errors can be defined as “the 
failure of a planned action to be completed as intended or the use of a wrong plan to achieve 
an aim” (Kohn, Corrigan, & Donaldson, 2000, p. 4). The definitions of diagnostic errors 
specify that a diagnostic error is any mistake that happens during diagnosing leading to delay 
in the diagnostic process, missing a diagnose or misdiagnosing (Graber, 2005; Schiff et al., 
2009; Zwaan & Singh, 2015). 
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Diagnostic errors can be classified in three major categories: 
Non-fault errors happen if the disease is silent or masked, meaning it is hardly 
possible to diagnose it with the given data. System errors are rooted in weak spots in the 
health care system like malfunctioning communication between doctors and nurses or training 
and supervision. Mostly context accounts for this type of error. Cognitive errors are bound to 
lack of knowledge or flaws in the reasoning process within its three main steps: Data 
collection, clinical reasoning and validation. System 1 and 2 reasoning flaws account for this 
type of error mostly. In a systematic literature review about diagnostic errors, Schiff et al. 
(2009) identified system errors and cognitive errors as the most prevalent errors. Non-fault 
errors occurred the least. This is consistent with the study from Graber et al. (2005) reviewing 
erroneous patient cases to depict the following proportional share of error categories: They 
found that non-fault errors account for 7% of errors, errors that were system-related for 19%, 
errors that are based only on cognitive flaws account for 28% and both system-related and 
cognitive errors accounting for 46% of all diagnostic errors. Concluded, cognitive errors 
(alone and in combination) may be evidenced as the source in the majority of all diagnostic 
errors. 
Therefore, cognitive diagnostic errors have been target of educational strategies for 
prevention for several years now (Croskerry et al., 2013a, 2013b). However, it is important to 
examine the underlying processes of diagnostic errors and account for the sources of these 
errors. A random diagnostic error can hardly be countered. However, systematically occurring 
errors can be prevented. Systematically occurring errors are called biases and can be 
differentiated into affective and cognitive biases (Croskerry et al., 2013a). Affective biases 
refer to the influence of emotions on the decision-making process, whereas cognitive biases 
are due to cognitive flaws acquired by experience. Examples of the most common cognitive 
biases influencing decision-making in the diagnostic reasoning process according to Norman 
and Eva (2010) are  
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 availability bias: Easily recalled diagnose is preferred; 
 premature closure: Closure of the diagnose process without further tests etc.; 
 confirmation bias: Data collection to confirm an initial hypothesis; 
 base rate neglect: Ignoring the chances of different diseases and favor more unlikely ones; 
and 
 representativeness: Recognizing prototypical features of diseases more than atypical ones. 
The most common of these biases is premature closure (Graber et al., 2005). It is “the 
failure to continue considering reasonable alternatives after an initial diagnosis was reached” 
(Graber et al., 2005, p. 1493). This means that premature closure happens when the physician 
does not think about his/her reasoning process but reasons in an automated manner. 
The models shown in figure 2 depict the process of clinical reasoning as conscious 
hypothetico-deductive reasoning. This conscious reasoning consists of forward and backward 
reasoning of the clinician until the problem is solved and the diagnosis can be validated 
(Groen & Patel, 1988; Patel & Groen, 1991). However, as expertise increases, the structure of 
illness scripts changes to increase speed and efficiency (Boshuizen & Schmidt, 2008). For 
greater efficiency in diagnosing, experts seem to rely on conscious clinical reasoning but also 
on a more intuitive (reasoning) approach of the clinician enabling shortcuts: 
“The intuitive approach leans heavily on the experience of the decision maker and, 
therefore, uses reasoning that depends on inductive logic. Experienced decision makers 
recognize overall patterns (gestalt effects) in the information presented and act accordingly—
action is recognition primed” (Croskerry, 2009, p. 1022). In the frameworks of decision 
making by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Kruglanski and Gigerenzer (2011) explained 
in Chapter 2.1, they subsumed that people use a dual-system processing when deciding during 
reasoning. The conscious part of decision-making is connected to reasoning and rationale, 
interpreting values, variables and symbols, making ‘sense’ of a patient’s history and 
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symptoms: Analytic system 2 mode of reasoning following the hypothetico-deductive 
reasoning structure described in figure 2. As medical expertise grows and structure of illness 
scripts change, the conscious reasoning is complemented more and more by context-based, 
fast but non-analytic system 1 reasoning (Kahneman, 2011). Experts in medical decision 
making and clinical reasoning are making more use of system 1 reasoning system in later 
diagnosing, using more shortcuts in reasoning (Hammond, 1990; Wiswell, Tsao, Bellolio, 
Hess, & Cabrera, 2013). This rather unconscious mode of reasoning follows pattern 
recognition and is connected to associative memory (Lieberman, Gaunt, Gilbert, & Trope, 
2002). Therefore, the clinician may skip steps of reasoning described in the hypothetico-
deductive reasoning model summarized in figure 2. Both systems can operate rather 
independently and can also have different results of reasoning. When System 1 reasoning as 
the predominant reasoning strategy fails or is likely to produce erroneous results, System 2 
reasoning becomes predominant to prevent errors (Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman & Frederick, 
2002; Sloman, 1996).  
When describing the modus operandi of expert reasoning, Ericsson (2004) states that 
experts use both system 1 and 2 processes during a task of problem-solving. Clinical 
reasoning becomes more efficient by becoming less reflective and more automated and 
intuitive. Expert reasoning is based on pattern recognition, but at the same time experts 
develop a ‘sensitivity’ when analytic reasoning and time to reconsider is needed in the 
diagnostic process when an error is likely to happen (Moulton et al., 2007; Rajkomar & 
Dhaliwal, 2011).  
Even though both system 1 and system 2 reasoning are based on knowledge in an 
either implicit or explicit form, diagnostic errors cannot be countered by a large knowledge 
base alone as faulty or insufficient knowledge does merely account for diagnostic errors in an 
intermediate or expert stage (Croskerry et al., 2013a; Dror, 2011; Graber, 2009; Graber et al., 
2005). Scholars advocate that the cognitive and meta-cognitive skills of experts are 
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responsible for low diagnostic errors (Croskerry et al., 2013a, 2013b; Graber, 2009; 
Trowbridge, 2008). This might be due to the fact that the dynamic diagnostic process depicted 
in the MOT Model of diagnostic reasoning is monitored by meta-cognitive skills that monitor 
if the working diagnosis fits or needs to be neglected, an error has occurred or more data 
should be gathered (Charlin et al., 2012). This error management is connected to experts’ 
diagnostic reasoning: Experts might not be more accurate in diagnostic reasoning but better in 
error management when an error in diagnosing has happened or is about to happen (Patel & 
Cohen, 2008; Patel et al., 2011): “Experts make errors, but surpass nonexperts theoretically 
with superior error management strategies that help them detect and recover from them more 
effectively” (Wilkinson et al., 2011, p. 42). Especially error detection is hypothesized to be a 
key skill that leads to experts making fewer diagnostic errors than novices. Even though the 
outcomes of experts’ final diagnoses include fewer mistakes, they can make mistakes during 
the process of reasoning, but use (meta-cognitive) error management skills to avoid an actual 
mistake (Nyssen & Blavier, 2006; Wilkinson et al., 2011). 
Based on the idea that accurate diagnostic reasoning requires meta-cognitive error 
detection skills, I propose a framework of diagnostic competences that not only incorporates 
three different types of diagnostic knowledge (Schmidmaier et al., 2013), but also meta-
cognitive error detection skills in addition. 
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Figure 3. Holistic model of diagnostic competences. Model of diagnostic competences as proposed by 
Stark et al. (2011) with addition of meta-cognitive error detection skills for accurate diagnostic 
reasoning 
How to teach error detection (and correction) is still an open question: Interventions to 
increase meta-cognition and cognition such as teaching the use of checklists or cognitive-
forcing strategies that tried to teach students to stop and reconsider the diagnosis have been 
scarce but ineffective (Ely & Graber, 2015; Sherbino et al., 2014). Although the prevention of 
errors is of special interest in medical education, only assumptions and theories about possible 
underlying mechanisms have been discussed. Reason and Zapf (1994) argue for focusing on 
error management as a distinct key ability of experts to avoid and deal with errors in decision 
making. Error management consists of error detection and error recovery (Patel & Cohen, 
2008; Reason & Zapf, 1994; Zapf & Reason, 1994). To increase diagnostic success, 
physicians must be knowledgeable of where to switch from non-analytic system 1 reasoning 
to analytic system 2 reasoning. This switch happens when a pitfall and possible error is 
detected (Dror, 2011). This skill might be taught by erroneous examples of what not to do, 
rather than by correct examples: Gartmeier, Bauer, Gruber, and Heid (2010) argue that 
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experts excel in accuracy based on their experience with errors that enable them to perceive 
what might endanger a correct performance. 
To summarize, clinical reasoning relies on two processes: Intuitive non-analytic 
system 1 and conscious analytic system 2 reasoning. Flaws in both modes lead to cognitive 
errors. These errors are the most prevalent causes (alone and in combination with system 
errors) of misdiagnosing and are caused by cognitive biases of physicians. Premature closure 
is the most common bias and leads to finalizing the reasoning process too soon and accepting 
a false hypothesis. There have been explanations of meta-cognitive and cognitive mechanisms 
that lead to fewer mistakes such as cognitive forcing strategies. So far, interventions either 
focused on fostering diagnostic knowledge or to reduce diagnostic errors which has been 
ineffective (Sherbino et al., 2014) or hypothesized to be effective (Croskerry et al., 2013a, 
2013b). Therefore, scholars advocate error management skills consisting of error detection 
and error recovery to be the key to reducing diagnostic errors (Dror, 2011). 
The previously discussed models of clinical reasoning do not incorporate error 
management, neither when adopting a process perspective (see Bowen, 2006) nor knowledge 
perspective on clinical reasoning (Stark et al., 2011). For a holistic assessment of important 
competences for accurate diagnostic reasoning, error detection skills need to be considered – 
especially when evaluating for effectiveness of an intervention in medical education. Learning 
through erroneous examples from the past might be key element of error detection in 
diagnosing. This dimension has so far been neglected. The following paragraph describes 
research on interventions to increase diagnostic competences and error detection skills of 
young physicians with interactive, erroneous example-based methods. 
 
Fostering Diagnostic Competences and Error Detection Skills 
 
34 
 
4 Fostering Diagnostic Competences and Error Detection Skills 
The following chapter describes methods to teach diagnostic competences in medical 
education. First, section 4.1 provides existing literature on using erroneous cognitive 
modeling examples for teaching diagnostic competences. Therefore, the underlying 
assumptions of case-based learning methods are described and why it is beneficial for 
acquiring applicable, transferrable knowledge in section 4.1.1. Findings concerning 
incorporating written worked examples are outlined in 4.1.2. The advantages of case-based 
learning on the basis of cognitive load theory are explained in section 4.1.3. In section 4.1.4, 
video-based cognitive modeling examples, their use in education and influential 
characteristics are provided. These cognitive modeling examples have been assumed to be 
effective for learning correct and erroneous, which is summarized in section 4.1.5. Section 4.2 
addresses why the task for students to provide peer feedback can be good for learning. First, 
feedback and peer feedback are defined in section 4.2.1. Then, studies on the effects of 
feedback on learning are highlighted in section 4.2.2. In section 4.2.3, the assumed positive 
effects of providing peer feedback on peer cognitive modeling examples on learning 
diagnostic competences are explained with its interactive nature and summarized. 
4.1 Erroneous Cognitive Modeling Examples for Teaching 
4.1.1 Teaching complex cognitive skills with case-based methods  
The ‘structural knowledge perspective’ on clinical reasoning based on diagnostic 
competences as described before in chapter 2.2 assumes that successful clinical reasoning is 
based on clinical knowledge that is encapsulated into illness scripts (Schmidt & Rikers, 2007). 
This means an enrichment of declarative knowledge with clinical contexts of experience 
(Boshuizen & Schmidt, 2008). 
Successful reasoning of experts relies on illness-scripts based on cases from past 
experience and is described as case-based reasoning (Aamodt & Plaza, 1994). Case-based 
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reasoning means clinical reasoning that uses general clinical knowledge but incorporates case-
specific knowledge from past experienced diagnosed patient cases stored in memory. When a 
physician is confronted with a new patient case, s/he uses this context specific knowledge and 
applies it to the new context (Kolodner, 2014; Leake, 1996). 
To help students with the transition from factual declarative to practical clinical 
knowledge, educational methods that incorporate patient cases embedded in a clinical context 
should be used for teaching (Schmidt & Rikers, 2007). As expert reasoning is based on 
experienced cases in the past, it is important to use authentic patient cases in medical training. 
To ensure patient safety and avoid fatal outcomes of practicing as a physician, it is possible to 
use substitutes to real-life scenarios for learners. Early and constant exposure to patient cases 
in medical education is important for context-related reasoning abilities of medical students 
(Charlin et al., 2000). Case-based learning (CBL) proves an effective possibility to teach 
context-embedded knowledge for successful case-based reasoning (e.g. Stark et al., 2011). 
Cases are not only vignettes or anecdotes of an incident that happened in practice, but 
also follow a pedagogical taxonomy or theory – the underlying story is planned and designed 
to match a typical yet important scene of practice while important parts for learning are 
highlighted (Shulman, 1992). 
Case-based learning is a form of inquiry or problem-based learning similar in its 
constructivist nature of goals: Finding a solution to a problem. CBL is a more structured form 
of learning, guiding the learner through the problem-oriented process (Thistlethwaite et al., 
2012). In a CBL learning environment, “a case, problem, or inquiry is used to stimulate and 
underpin the acquisition of knowledge, skills, and attitudes” (Williams, 2005, p. 577). These 
case-based teaching methods are designed to lead to applicable, active knowledge. This 
means knowledge that can be used in a real-life setting. Educational methods should be 
designed to foster active and avoid inert, ‘passive’ knowledge that is not applicable in real-life 
situations (Gruber, Mandl, & Renkl, 2000). 
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CBL environments can vary in the degree of explanation given to the student. They 
can be highly structured, guiding students through the case step-by-step (Kirschner, Sweller, 
& Clark, 2006) or less structured with an inquiry or problem-based approach to learning 
(Hmelo-Silver, Duncan, & Chinn, 2007; Schmidt, Loyens, Van Gog, & Paas, 2007). An 
advantage of the highly structured approach is that learners can focus on the learning content 
and do not need to worry about structure as it is a given (see cognitive load theory, 4.1.3) 
(Kirschner et al., 2006; Mayer, 2002). A less structured approach of CBL highlights the 
importance of self-directed, constructivist knowledge building (meaning the learner constructs 
the knowledge by him/herself) during learning, leading to complex, well-connected 
contextual knowledge and other skills learnt like self-directing. Both forms need guidance and 
instruction to be effective (Hmelo-Silver et al., 2007). Depending on the prior knowledge of 
the learner, the degree of structure should be varied from high degrees of provided instruction 
for beginners to less instruction for intermediates. 
4.1.2 Incorporating worked examples in case-based learning 
A written, text-based form of case-based learning that has been shown to be effective 
for complex skills (Atkinson, Derry, Renkl, & Wortham, 2000; Sweller & Cooper, 1985) in 
domains such as mathematics, physics and programming and also in medicine for the 
acquisition of diagnostic competences (Heitzmann et al., 2015; Kopp, Stark, & Fischer, 2008; 
Kopp, Stark, Kühne‐Eversmann, & Fischer, 2009; Stark et al., 2011) is worked examples (or 
worked-out examples). They are often referred to as an “ultimate form of direct instruction” 
(Sweller, 2003, p. 250). 
Worked examples are text-based examples that begin with a problem statement and 
depict an expert model’s procedure how to solve that problem that the learner can adapt. They 
should be designed to help learners solve similar transfer problems (Atkinson et al., 2000). 
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In an unstructured problem-oriented learning environment, students might focus on 
superficial features of the problem which takes up mental effort. Worked examples are 
advantageous over problem-based learning methods because the student can focus on content 
and schema acquisition rather than superficial features or structure. The learner can focus on 
cognitive skill acquisition and is guided through that process. This frees up mental capacity by 
reducing learning-detrimental parts cognitive load for learning relevant schema acquisition 
(Atkinson et al., 2000; Paas & Van Merriënboer, 1994; Renkl, 2014).  
4.1.3 Explaining benefits of CBL with cognitive load theory 
Cognitive load means the mental effort that is caused by different characteristics and 
the content of a learning environment. According to cognitive load theory, a learner has a 
certain amount of mental capacity of working memory when learning (Sweller & Cooper, 
1985; Sweller, Van Merrienboer, & Paas, 1998). The learner is confronted with three types of 
cognitive load during learning that are limited by mental capacity: 
Intrinsic cognitive load is caused by the difficulty and complexity of the learning task 
itself. It varies depending on the task and element interactivity of it (Brünken, Moreno, & 
Plass, 2010; Sweller, 2003). Intrinsic load needs to be managed to gain an optimal learning 
environment.  
Extraneous cognitive load is caused by the design of the learning environment. 
Irrelevant or dissonant information of the presentation presented in the learning material or 
instructions that focus learners’ attention might be an example for this. This should be 
reduced to a minimum to leave mental capacity for learning-relevant processes of germane 
load (Brünken et al., 2010; Sweller & Cooper, 1985). 
Germane cognitive load refers to the cognitive load that is caused by schema 
acquisition during learning. It is the learning-relevant type of load that should be focused on 
and maximized (Brünken et al., 2010; Paas & Sweller, 2014). 
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Figure 4. Schema of three types of load and total mental capacity 
Cognitive load theory also received criticism as it seems to be impossible to falsify 
due to post-hoc explanation: The concept of a limited mental capacity is not challenged, but a 
clear distinction of different loads and how cognitive load must be reliably measured is 
criticized by scholars like De Jong (2010): Different cognitive load types are either measured 
via post-hoc explanation based on post-test performance or self-report. The bias of post-test 
performance measurement relates to an unfalsifiable explanation of performance with 
cognitive load types: If a student is well-performing, the increased load is germane whereas 
when s/he is underperforming it is extraneous load. Criticism of a self-report measurement of 
cognitive load highlights the inconsistent across studies (De Jong, 2010; Paas, Tuovinen, 
Tabbers, & Van Gerven, 2003). The debate how to measure different types of cognitive load 
is still open (Schnotz & Kürschner, 2007; Sweller, 2010), as this introspection method seems 
to be adding to the problems of subjectivity of perceived cognitive load by the students and 
differentiation in three distinct types of load: While some studies suggest a distinct three-
factor structure of cognitive load in intrinsic, extraneous and germane load (Hadie & Yusoff, 
2016; Leppink, Paas, Van der Vleuten, Van Gog, & Van Merriënboer, 2013), others argue for 
a reconceptualization of the construct in a two-factor construct with intrinsic and extraneous 
load (Leppink, Paas, Van Gog, van Der Vleuten, & Van Merrienboer, 2014; Sweller, 2010). 
Others argue that cognitive load measured with subjective introspection that cannot be 
Germane Load 
Intrinsic Load 
Extraneous Load 
Free Capacity 
Total Mental Capacity 
Fostering Diagnostic Competences and Error Detection Skills 
 
39 
 
differentiated should be labeled mental effort which is the perceived engagement in a task 
determined by self-efficacy, demand characteristics of the task and depth of processing 
(Kirschner & Kirschner, 2012). 
4.1.4 Cognitive modeling examples 
Based on cognitive load theory, educators should design the example-based learning 
environment so that working memory capacity is used optimally to increase learning gain. An 
important factor for this can be using a medium that is most suitable for the domain and 
learning task (Chandler & Sweller, 1991). Renkl (2014) distinguishes written worked 
examples, video-based modeling examples and analogic reasoning (i.e., comparing cases). 
While written worked examples are effective for learning in early stages, they lack 
authenticity when depicting patient cases and advanced students might lose motivation and 
attention (Van Gog & Rummel, 2010). Video based modeling examples are similar to written 
worked examples but differ in terms of format. They are videos of an agent performing a 
cognitive task and explaining the rationale behind the task (Hoogerheide, Loyens, & Van 
Gog, 2014). Video-based modeling examples can be used to increase the attention of both 
novice and non-novice learners and can offer high realism and authenticity of presented cases 
which is beneficial for learning (Große & Renkl, 2007; Renkl, 2014; Scheiter, Gerjets, Huk, 
Imhof, & Kammerer, 2009; Valmont, 1995; Van Gog & Rummel, 2010). Multi-modality of 
splitting up information in spoken text and video might enhance this effect: Due to auditory 
and visual working memory being autonomous, presenting information on both processing 
channels might reduce cognitive load that might overload the student when it is presented in 
just one medium (Leahy & Sweller, 2011). Lastly, video-based modeling examples show 
another person performing the task which might be used to compare one’s own performance 
with the performance of another person similar to oneself, leading to higher self-efficacy and 
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an expectation to be able to perform the task as well (Bandura, 1981; Hoogerheide et al., 
2014). 
There are at least six important design options that need to be taken into account when 
creating modeling examples for learning, as each of them can differentially affect learning: (a) 
Form of presentation, (b) visibility of the agent, (c) hierarchical position of the model, (d) 
gender of the model and (e) model-observer-similarity, and (f) perceived expertise. The 
modeled task can be (a) live or on video, for increased accessibility and productivity 
(Blomberg, Renkl, Sherin, Borko, & Seidel, 2013). (b) The modeling agent performing the 
task can be visible or not visible. Van Gog, Verveer, and Verveer (2014) found that the 
visibility of the performing model can be important as it can serve as a cue for important 
features such as gestures. (c) The model depicted can be either a peer or an expert. While 
there is evidence that expert models should be used to teach skills that do not differ much in 
terms of automatization, abstraction and vocabulary (Boekhout, Gog, Wiel, Gerards‐Last, & 
Geraets, 2010), Van Gog and Rummel (2010) argue that peer students should be used as a 
model to teach skills where experts and students differ in terms of automatization, vocabulary 
and knowledge structure – such as diagnostic competences. However, the task needs to match 
the age of the depicted model, leading to a better learning outcome: For example a young 
student performing a complex heart surgery process might not match (Hoogerheide, van 
Wermeskerken, Loyens, & van Gog, 2016). (d) The gender of the model on the other hand 
was not connected to identification or learning outcome (Hoogerheide, Loyens, & Van Gog, 
2016). (e) Contrary to the assumption by various scholars that model-observer-similarity 
positively influences learning (Bandura, 1986; Schunk, 1987; Schunk, Hanson, & Cox, 1987), 
Hoogerheide, Loyens, Jadi, Vrins, and van Gog (2015) found no effect for a similarity of 
observer and model for modeling examples compared to similarity of an author of a written 
worked example.  
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 Content-wise, Braaksma, Rijlaarsdam, and Van den Bergh (2002) found that (f) 
perceived competence of the model is important for a student to identify with the model. In 
their study, high-performing students learnt more from a high-performance model whereas 
weaker students learnt more from a weak model. This seems to be true for students who did 
not acquire high levels of prior knowledge before observing the performance. However, 
advanced prior knowledge conflicts with correct examples: When students already have 
acquired cognitive schemata on how to solve a problem, but the presented step-by-step 
solution of the example conflicts with their own knowledge, learning gain decreases 
(Kalyuga, 2007; Kalyuga, Ayres, Chandler, & Sweller, 2003; Renkl & Atkinson, 2003). 
Therefore, errors can be integrated into the examples to increase motivation and gain attention 
from advanced students to decrease conflict and redundancy of the observed performance and 
own prior knowledge (Große & Renkl, 2007). 
4.1.5 Errors in cognitive modeling examples 
The positive effects of incorporating errors in worked examples have been exemplified 
in several empirical studies by for example Große and Renkl (2007), Siegler (2002) or Stark 
et al. (2011). Erroneous worked examples are engaging for intermediate learners when the 
expertise reversal effect would decrease learning gain from worked examples (Kalyuga et al., 
2003): The expertise reversal effect means that with increased expertise, high-structured 
learning environments lose effectiveness: In a novice stage of learning, problem-solving 
activities impose high amounts of cognitive load to the learner and step-by-step worked-out 
solutions are highly useful to guide through the process. In an intermediate stage of 
knowledge, a presented step-by-step solution with correct worked examples is not as 
beneficial as it is for beginners. Intermediate learners were found to profit more from 
problem-oriented learning tasks the higher their prior knowledge is (Große & Renkl, 2007; 
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Kalyuga et al., 2003; Renkl & Atkinson, 2003). Therefore, problems in form of for example 
errors integrated into worked examples offer problem-solving learning benefits. 
 Große and Renkl (2007) point out that learning from erroneous examples offers three 
advantages. First, being exposed to an error can engage the learner in reflection of what s/he 
has observed. Second, presence of errors can lead to cognitive conflicts of existing knowledge 
and what has been observed, enriching or even correcting existing knowledge (Kapur, 2008). 
Third, errors can decrease the probability of making this error yourself (Gartmeier et al., 
2008; Siegler, 2002). This effect can be explained as follows: Being exposed to errors during 
learning leads to the acquisition of negative knowledge (knowledge needed for error detection 
skills described in chapter 3.5), which is knowledge about how to detect and avoid errors 
(Gartmeier et al., 2008). Observing erroneous motor skill execution has been shown to lead to 
a decrease of errors in own motor abilities in a post-test transfer task (Blandin & Proteau, 
2000). Observing an erroneous performance of another person was found to be as beneficial 
as making the error oneself for decreasing the likelihood of these errors in one’s own later 
performances (Badets, Blandin, Wright, & Shea, 2006).  
These findings support the hypothesis of the crucial beneficial effects of learning by 
observing erroneous modeling examples to increase future correct own performance and 
decrease future incorrect own performance via error detection skills. This, however, is only 
true if the error is found and triggers elaboration to be correcting the error (Renkl & Atkinson, 
2003). There are guidelines how to guide students through observing erroneous performance 
in order to be effective for learning: The first step of finding the error can be supported by 
providing the learner with correct knowledge of results (KR – knowledge of results) when 
being exposed to erroneous examples (Badets & Blandin, 2004, 2005).  
When the error is found, the second step of learning-relevant elaboration of the error is 
also not intuitively done by the learner: VanLehn (1999) highlights the importance of 
instruction to elaborate on erroneous learning material as otherwise learners follow shallow 
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processing strategies. Elaboration of learning content does not happen automatically when the 
learner is confronted with the learning material. In order to construct sound knowledge from 
the erroneous examples, guiding learners to self-explain on the rationale behind the error was 
found to be beneficial for learning. Self-explanation can be achieved either via training or 
prompting students to do so, ultimately leading to deeper elaboration and therefore higher 
learning gain (Atkinson et al., 2003; Chi & Wylie, 2014; Renkl, 2002, 2014; Renkl & 
Atkinson, 2003; Renkl, Stark, Gruber, & Mandl, 1998; Stark et al., 2011).  
On the basis of the results of the effectiveness of self-explanation on learning, there 
might be similar or higher effects of explaining the observed to others, based on a taxonomy 
by Chi (2009) of activity and interactivity. She points out in her ICAP-Framework that the 
engagement and learning outcome varies according to certain activity modes triggered by a 
learning activity that are linked to different cognitive processes: These modes range from the 
least effective passive over active and constructive to most effective interactive (Chi, 2009; 
Chi & Wylie, 2014). Passive learning offers the least outcome and means that the learner just 
passively is presented with learning material. Active learning means active engagement of the 
learner and promotes learning better than passiveness as it incorporates learning new 
knowledge and activating own prior knowledge. Constructive learning is more effective as it 
means higher-order cognitive processes such as newly producing something own which 
involves integrating, re-organizing or repairing own knowledge. Interactive learning activities 
are proposed to be the most effective as they are similar in nature as constructive ones but 
incorporate the partner’s contribution as well (Chi, 2009). This beneficial effect is based on 
the idea of Vygotsky (1987) that a learner in a social situation learns more than learning alone 
by being provided by another person with a ‘zone of proximal development’. By having 
differences in prior knowledge and approach to learning, building on each other’s’ ideas and 
elaborating on the topic, students during interaction learn not only from the content but from 
each other (Weinberger, Ertl, Fischer, & Mandl, 2005). As described earlier, just exposing 
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students to this zone of proximal development is not enough for learning as the learner might 
still remain in a passive mode. Instructing the learner to engage in a constructive or interactive 
task might lead to higher-order cognitive processes. One effective approach to engage 
students in interactive learning activities and therefore better elaboration of the observed 
example is the task to provide peer feedback on the observed student’s performance (Narciss, 
2008; Nicol et al., 2014). This might trigger reflection and deeper elaboration which then 
might lead to more learning gain (K. Cho & MacArthur, 2011). Therefore, the following 
paragraph examines the beneficial effect of feedback on the provider. 
4.2 Learning by Providing Feedback on Peer Modeling Examples 
4.2.1 Definition of peer feedback 
Feedback on students’ performances in (for example simulation-based) medical 
education methods is an essential practice to foster learning (McGaghie, Issenberg, Petrusa, & 
Scalese, 2010). It was even referred to as the “heart of medical education” (Branch & 
Paranjape, 2002, p. 1185). Feedback means “information provided by an agent (e.g., teacher, 
peer, book, parent, self, experience) regarding aspects of one’s performance or understanding” 
(Hattie & Timperley, 2007, p. 81). Peer feedback in that respect means that a student judges 
another student’s performance. This can happen either as score (summative) or qualitatively 
(formative) with oral or written feedback (Strijbos & Sluijsmans, 2010; Topping, 1998). Peer 
feedback tasks interactively engage students to reflect and collaborate (Strijbos & Sluijsmans, 
2010). Peer feedback and peer assessment are sometimes differentiated. Liu and Carless see 
peer feedback as the process of giving detailed comments without grades while peer 
assessment involves grading (Falchikov, 2001; Liu & Carless, 2006). Topping (1998, 2009) 
uses the term peer assessment to describe the task, while peer feedback is the outcome of 
assessment task. A distinction of peer assessment and feedback varies across studies and is 
not consistently done (Liu & Carless, 2006), leading to a synonymous use in this thesis.  
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4.2.2 Effects of (peer) feedback on learning 
Hattie and Timperley (2007) suggest that feedback should aim towards positive and 
negative aspects of performance and ideally offer suggestions for improvement. A review by 
Van Zundert, Sluijsmans, and Van Merriënboer (2010) about the beneficial conditions and the 
effect of peer feedback shows that most studies focus on fostering skills related to peer 
feedback and very few on the effect of peer feedback on the acquisition of domain-specific 
skills. The five studies that did examine the effect on domain-specific skills demonstrate the 
potential of peer feedback for learning. They conclude that there is a clear lack of studies 
examining the added benefit of peer feedback as interactive learning opportunity for domain-
specific skills. Out of the studies they reviewed, only one examined the effect of learners’ 
thinking style on the process of feedback reception during peer feedback rounds (Lin, Liu, & 
Yuan, 2001). K. Cho and MacArthur (2011) emphasize the beneficial learning effect of 
receiving peer feedback over expert feedback if quality criteria are met. Gielen, Peeters, 
Dochy, Onghena, and Struyven (2010) found that feedback with justification (elaboration) 
enhanced learning compared to feedback without justification – with accuracy of the peer 
feedback playing a minor role. This is contrary to the findings by Strijbos, Narciss, and 
Dünnebier (2010) who found beneficial effects of receiving general over-elaborated feedback, 
possibly due to perceived competence level of the provider. The results of quality criteria for 
receiving peer feedback are mixed (Kollar & Fischer, 2010; Topping, 2010). The studies 
depicted mostly focused on peer feedback reception. However, few studies examine the 
isolated effect of providing peer feedback as interactive task for learning described in the 
following. 
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4.2.3 Effects of providing peer feedback on learning 
Concerning the effects of peer feedback on the provider, studies that only investigated 
the effects of feedback provision isolated from reception are scarce, even though there is 
evidence that the provision of feedback as an interactive learning activity is claimed to be 
fruitful for own learning gain (Nicol et al., 2014). Providing peer feedback can provoke higher 
level thinking processes such as diagnosing and correcting errors in assessed performance 
(Patchan & Schunn, 2015) with deeper elaboration and judgement of the assessed 
performance (Nicol et al., 2014) by comparing the peer’s performance with internal quality 
criteria and own performance (Topping, 1998). 
Studies that investigate the isolated effect of providing peer feedback found that it 
positively influences learning under certain circumstances. For example, Althauser and 
Darnall (2001) found that the quality of provided peer feedback on the essay of a peer has a 
positive effect on the quality of the student’s own work. Davies (2000) found similar results 
on subjective gain of own domain-specific skills through the process of peer feedback 
provision. Li et al. (2010) and Y. H. Cho and Cho (2011) both examined the effect of 
providing peer feedback on the development of the providing students’ own abilities to design 
technical research drafts. Both studies found a beneficial effect of providing feedback to 
peers’ research drafts on the providing students’ performance if the student was engaged and 
provided high quality (elaborated) feedback. High quality of peer feedback in both studies 
meant degree of elaboration, incorporating both positive and negative aspects while giving 
constructive feedback about what to improve. Low quality meant superficial comments with 
no explanation. Providing superficial peer feedback was not found to be fruitful for learning 
due to the assumed lack of engagement and elaboration by the provider. They concluded that 
providing feedback on a weak peer performance plays a major role in reviewing one’s own 
weaknesses and to be(come) able to avoid own errors (Y. H. Cho & Cho, 2011) – which is in 
line with the assumption that weak (peer) models lead to the acquisition of negative 
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knowledge to avoid errors (see chapter 4.1.2) if students really engage in the feedback task 
and elaborate on strengths and weaknesses. 
The results by Li and colleagues (2010) and Y. H. Cho and Cho (2011) are in line with 
the ICAP Framework about interactive learning activities in the sense that the added value of 
interactive learning environments depends on students’ elaboration and engagement (Chi & 
Wylie, 2014). Students lack the ability to engage in essential collaboration activities (such as 
constructive elaboration) in interactive learning environments and need external guidance 
how to do so (Kollar, Fischer, & Slotta, 2007; Rummel & Spada, 2005; Weinberger, 
Stegmann, Fischer, & Mandl, 2007). Prins, Sluijsmans, and Kirschner (2006) found that 
medical students lack the ability to give elaborated, high-quality feedback, lacking structure, 
reflection and suggestions for improvement. They advise educators to train providing peer 
feedback beforehand with clear quality criteria or prompt reflective feedback activities to 
increase the quality of provided peer feedback during the provision task. 
In summary, case-based learning activities in medical education are necessary and 
have been shown to be effective to teach diagnostic competences for successful clinical 
reasoning. Worked examples that are integrated in case-based learning offer an effective way 
to teach these skills. Authentic, video-based cognitive modeling examples could be a tool to 
teach diagnostic competences in a live-like setting as they have been used successfully in 
other domains already. Erroneous cognitive modeling examples might prove to be 
advantageous over correct cognitive modeling examples as advanced students benefit more 
from learning with them. Additionally, error detection skills could be fostered by being 
exposed to negative knowledge about diagnostic errors in erroneous examples. A downside of 
example-based learning that was highlighted is that students tend to be passive and do not 
actively elaborate on the examples without (inter-)active tasks given to them. This elaboration 
though is necessary in order to learn effectively. Students’ elaboration can be triggered by 
self-explanation prompts. However, the interactive task to providing peer feedback on the 
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observed model peer could yield higher learning gains due to an assumed advantage of 
interactive over active learning. The effect of providing peer feedback on cognitive modeling 
examples for learning complex cognitive skills in a domain such as medicine is yet to be 
tested. If and how an instructional intervention based on these assumptions can be used, is 
target of two empirical studies conducted. The following paragraph gives an overview of both 
studies. 
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5 Overview of the empirical studies of this thesis 
Based on the theoretical assumptions of the beneficial effects of erroneous cognitive 
modeling examples and providing peer feedback on learning gain, two empirical studies were 
conducted which examined how providing peer feedback on observed erroneous cognitive 
modeling examples of complex differential diagnoses influences the providers’ acquisition of 
diagnostic competences.  
Study 1 examined if and how cognitive modeling examples could be used for acquiring 
diagnostic competences in medical education. Therefore, it was investigated if (a) erroneous 
or correct cognitive modeling examples are better for learning diagnostic competences and if 
(b) providing peer feedback on the examples adds to this assumed beneficial effect. 
Diagnostic competences were operationalized as diagnostic conceptual, strategic and 
conditional knowledge and error detection skills.  
The hypotheses were created based on the theoretical foundation in chapter 4.1 that 
erroneous examples are better than correct examples for acquiring diagnostic competences. 
Further, it was assumed that students providing peer feedback to the peer students in the 
cognitive modeling examples show higher gains of diagnostic competences. To examine the 
relation to mental effort and degree of elaboration, post-hoc analysis of the provided peer 
feedback was related to acquiring diagnostic competences. The sample consisted of 121 
medical students in their seventh semester randomly assigned to five groups in a 2x2 plus 
control group design. The groups either only watched erroneous (group 1) or correct examples 
(group 2), or provided peer feedback on erroneous (group 3) or correct examples (group 4). A 
control group learning with a textbook (group 5) did not watch any of the cognitive modeling 
examples. 
The results of Study 1 indicated that cognitive modeling examples were better for 
acquiring conceptual knowledge parts of diagnostic competences compared to the control 
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group, with no overall increase in diagnostic competences. Erroneous cognitive modeling 
examples were better than correct ones for acquiring error detection skills. Providing peer 
feedback on cognitive modeling examples led to a detrimental effect on the acquisition of 
overall diagnostic competences. Students providing peer feedback reported more mental 
effort. The degree of elaboration of peer feedback was only related to the acquisition of 
diagnostic competences when students learned with erroneous cognitive modeling examples. 
However, this was not the case for correct examples. It was hypothesized that the task to 
provide peer feedback led to higher mental effort which was detrimental for learning. 
Due to the surprising negative influence of providing peer feedback on the acquisition 
of diagnostic competences and the positive relationship between the degree of elaboration of 
the provided peer feedback on erroneous cognitive modeling examples and the acquisition of 
diagnostic competences in Study 1, a follow-up study was conducted. It was examined how 
the task to provide peer feedback on erroneous cognitive modeling examples can be designed 
to be beneficial for acquiring diagnostic competences based on theoretical assumptions of 
possible influential factors for peer feedback provision.  
In Study 2, a short training how to effectively provide peer feedback was integrated at 
the start of the intervention that was assumed to increase degree of elaboration of peer 
feedback. Further, the effects of written versus spoken medium of expert feedback and 
receiving expert feedback or not were examined. We contrasted the task to provide (a) written 
or spoken peer feedback on erroneous cognitive modeling examples and (b) students received 
– or did not – a written expert feedback on the observed diagnosis after each peer feedback 
provision task. The sample in Study 2 consisted of 134 students from seventh to eleventh 
semester. They were randomly assigned to four experimental and a control group. All four 
groups watched erroneous cognitive modeling examples and either provided spoken peer 
feedback (group 1), written peer feedback (group 2), or provided spoken peer feedback and 
received expert feedback (group 3) or provided written peer feedback and received expert 
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feedback (group 4). The control group in Study 2 watched the erroneous cognitive modeling 
examples and did not provide peer feedback. Results revealed that receiving expert feedback 
had no effect on degree of elaboration or the acquisition of diagnostic competences, which 
might have been due to redundancy or inadequate timing of expert feedback. A significant 
main effect of communication medium was found for spoken peer feedback provision on the 
acquisition of diagnostic competences. This effect was explained by the degree of elaboration: 
students providing spoken peer feedback provided more elaborated feedback, which 
influences the acquisition of diagnostic competences.  
In the following Chapter 6, the first empirical study is described in detail. In Chapter 
7, the second empirical study is explained, followed by a comparison of both studies in 
Chapter 8. 
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6 Study 1: Watching People Fail 
Improving Diagnostic Competences by Peer Feedback on Erroneous 
Modeling Examples 
Context: Fostering diagnostic competences is a major concern in medical education. 
Effective interventions to foster diagnostic competences to decrease errors in diagnosing need 
to be examined. Interactive learning with video examples is hypothesized to be effective for 
learning these competences. 
Objectives: This study investigated whether students learn more from providing 
feedback (vs. just observing) on erroneous or correct video examples of clinical reasoning. 
Methods and Sample: The sample consisted of advanced medical students (N = 121) 
randomly assigned to the four conditions of a 2x2 factorial design and a control condition. It 
was investigated if (a) erroneous or correct video examples of diagnosing a patient with acute 
dyspnea and (b) the students providing peer feedback on the observed reasoning process in 
the examples increased their diagnostic competences which consist of conceptual, strategic 
and conditional diagnostic knowledge as well as error detection skills. 
Results: Video-based cognitive modeling examples across experimental groups were 
superior for learning relative to a control group that learned by textbook reading, t(40) = 
2.651 p = .011, d = .84. Observing erroneous examples was more effective for the acquisition 
of error detection skills than observing correct examples. F(1,95) = 4.290, p = .041, ηp² = 
.046. Surprisingly, students who provided peer feedback acquired less overall diagnostic 
competences than students who just observed the model, F(1,95) = 5.066, p = .027, ηp² = 
.014. A negative main effect of the provision of peer feedback on modeling examples 
(compared to observing the modeling examples) was found for conceptual, F(1,95) = 6.546, p 
= .012, ηp² = .068, and strategic parts of diagnostic knowledge, F(1,95) = 8.827, p = .004, ηp² 
= .089. There was no difference for conditional knowledge and no interaction effect between 
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the factors for any outcome. Unlike for error detection skills, it made no difference for the 
three diagnostic knowledge components whether examples were erroneous or correct.  
Conclusions: Erroneous examples of diagnoses deserve a standing in medical 
education practice and should be incorporated into medical education because they help 
students acquire error detection skills. Providing peer feedback as a learning intervention 
should be used carefully as the results of this study show a detrimental effect for the provider 
on error detection skills, conceptual knowledge and strategic knowledge – which is possibly 
due to cognitive overload. Training in feedback provision might decrease this effect.  
6.1 Theoretical Framework 
6.1.1 Diagnostic competences: Diagnostic knowledge in medical education 
A recent study about the estimates of annually serious medical diagnostic errors 
reports that 5% – 12 million US adults – experience misdiagnosing in outpatient care (Singh, 
Meyer, & Thomas, 2014). Diagnosing is a difficult, complex and error-prone task for 
physicians in their everyday work (G. J. Kuhn, 2002). Reducing errors with educational 
means is emphasized as the key (Norman & Eva, 2010). How to effectively teach against 
errors is still an open question: Successful, accurate diagnostic reasoning relies on diagnostic 
competences: Diagnostic competences consist of diagnostic knowledge and meta-cognitive 
skill (Higgs et al., 2008). Gaining diagnostic knowledge means the acquisition of advanced 
illness scripts, i.e. representations of knowledge about facts and procedures connected to 
patient cases and situations (Mamede et al., 2012). Advanced illness scripts consist of 
conceptual knowledge and procedural (strategic and conditional) knowledge on how to apply 
the known concepts (Schmidmaier et al., 2013). Conceptual knowledge refers to knowledge 
about biomedical facts, strategic knowledge to knowledge about procedures to validate or 
reject possible hypotheses and conditional knowledge to knowledge about the reasons behind 
these procedures (Kopp et al., 2009; Stark et al., 2011). However, increased accuracy of 
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expert physicians might not be just a function of superior knowledge, but also be related to 
advanced error-related meta-cognitive skills that make experts calibrate their error-prone 
decision making patterns (Graber, 2005). 
6.1.2 Error detection skill as part of diagnostic competences 
In addition to the diagnostic knowledge types proposed by Stark et al (2011), 
diagnostic competences involve meta-cognitive skills (Higgs et al., 2008). I propose a holistic 
diagnostic competences framework with meta-cognitive ‘error detection skills’ as depicted in 
Figure 3 based on knowledge about possible pitfalls that may lead to errors during diagnosing 
(Dror, 2011). Scholars like Wilkinson et al. (2011) and Nyssen and Blavier (2006) claim that 
error detection skills are a distinct set of subskills of medical expertise, leading to less errors 
and more accurate and successful diagnostic reasoning. 
The assumption that there is more involved in accurate diagnosing than diagnostic 
knowledge can be based on the process idea of diagnostic reasoning: Conscious diagnostic 
reasoning follows typical hypothetico-deductive reasoning steps: (1) (data) collection of the 
most important features of the patient case, (2) reasoning and creating hypotheses about 
underlying diseases on the basis of medical knowledge, and (3) validating these hypotheses 
by testing them (Lawson & Daniel, 2011). 
As expertise increases, diagnostic reasoning process becomes more and more 
automated by pattern recognition for more efficiency (Anderson, 1987; VanLehn, 1996; 
Wiswell et al., 2013). Nonanalytic, (automated) system 1 processing is the predominant 
reasoning strategy. Physicians use a more analytic reasoning mode (system 2) when 
nonanalytic processing as predominant strategy is insufficient and leads to incorrect results. 
To switch from a rather nonanalytic to analytic reasoning mode, a physician must become 
aware that an error is likely to happen and automated processing might fail (Kahneman, 
2011). Meta-cognitive error detection skills are required to ‘assist’ nonanalytic reasoning 
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(system 1) with conscious hypothetico-deductive analytic reasoning (system 2) at the right 
time when an error might happen or has happened (Dror, 2011; Mamede et al., 2010). Studies 
examining medical expertise have shown advanced error detection skills in expert clinicians 
compared to novices (Gartmeier et al., 2010; Wilkinson et al., 2011). To my knowledge, 
medical educational studies have so far not focused on fostering error detection skills with 
interventions. 
In summary, it is important to teach diagnostic competences. To reduce diagnostic 
errors, both knowledge and meta-cognition must be taught. Meta-cognitive error detection 
skills are needed to know when to use analytic reasoning based on negative knowledge during 
automated diagnostic reasoning. The meta-cognitive part has mostly been neglected in 
frameworks depicting diagnostic competences as a three component knowledge construct 
(Stark et al., 2011). Therefore, educational methods that focus on this part of diagnostic 
competences need to be examined. Especially interactive learning interventions (Chi & Wylie, 
2014) with feedback rounds (Hattie & Timperley, 2007; Vollmeyer & Rheinberg, 2005) and 
model learning (Hoogerheide et al., 2014) were proven to be strong educational methods in 
other domains. Situations such as OSCE assessments, simulation training or medical 
clerkships, which are often used in medical training, might be video recorded and utilized as 
cognitive modeling examples for learning. 
6.1.3 Teaching diagnostic competences with cognitive modeling examples 
Experts use case-based reasoning as a predominant strategy to solve problems 
effectively by using past experience to solve newly presented problem cases (Aamodt & 
Plaza, 1994; Riesbeck & Schank, 2013). To develop essential medical reasoning skills, 
students should be exposed to authentic case-based learning scenarios so that they acquire 
knowledge in a clinical setting where they later have to apply and transfer it (Schmidt & 
Rikers, 2007). Learning scenarios which are based on real-life cases help students acquire 
Study 1: Watching People Fail 
 
56 
 
knowledge needed for solving similar transfer cases and situations (Gruber et al., 2000; Stark, 
Mandl, Gruber, & Renkl, 1999). However, current medical education has been shown to 
expose students far too little to clinical cases (Schmidt & Mamede, 2015; Wimmers, Schmidt, 
& Splinter, 2006). Such lack to exposure leads to inert (passive) knowledge, which is 
knowledge that is remembered but cannot be applied in a practical situation (Gruber et al., 
2000). Example-based instructional methods use real patient cases to teach students active 
knowledge that is applicable in practical situations without imposing too much cognitive load 
on the students (Cooper & Sweller, 1987; Stark et al., 2011). This means that students have 
more cognitive resources available for relevant processes during learning. Examples can be 
text-based written worked examples. For more authenticity, fidelity and increased focus of 
attention, video-based cognitive modeling examples can be utilized (Renkl, 2014). Cognitive 
modeling examples show a real or fictional agent performing a cognitive task while 
explaining the rationale behind it (Hoogerheide et al., 2014). Such videos have been used 
successfully to foster various behavioral and meta-cognitive skills such as self-regulation, 
self-assessment and task-selection skills (Braaksma et al., 2002; Kostons, Van Gog, & Paas, 
2012; Van Gog et al., 2014; Zimmerman & Kitsantas, 2002). The educational use of cognitive 
modeling examples has not yet been examined for complex cognitive skills such as diagnostic 
competences necessary for accurately diagnosing complex medical problems.  
6.1.4 Learning from errors in cognitive modeling examples  
A cognitive modeling example shows an agent performing a cognitive task while 
explaining the rationale behind it. This real or fictional agent can be an expert (Boekhout et 
al., 2010) or a peer (Van Gog & Rummel, 2010). Cognitive modeling examples can be 
erroneous or correct when utilized for learning. A correct example (i.e., a well-performing 
model) should be used when teaching novice students, because correct examples do not 
confuse the student with conflicting information and leave cognitive resources to be used for 
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learning. An erroneous example (i.e., a weak-performing model) should be used for students 
who are on an advanced level of knowledge to increase their engagement, motivation and 
learning gain (Van Gog & Rummel, 2010). Stark and colleagues (Stark et al., 2011) report 
beneficial effects of learning from erroneous examples for both conceptual and procedural 
diagnostic knowledge, whereas effects on reduced errors in own performance have been 
hypothesized but not yet studied. Furthermore, Gartmeier et al. (2010) claim that being 
exposed to erroneous cases might create negative knowledge about how not to diagnose and 
detect and avoid these errors in the future. Especially differential diagnosis of pulmonary 
embolism and similar respiratory diseases are error-prone and difficult to diagnose and 
therefore need educational attention (Schiff et al., 2009). 
Erroneous modeling examples are beneficial for knowledge acquisition when the 
learner recognizes the error and elaborates on them (Renkl & Atkinson, 2003). Such 
elaboration leads to a contrasting of the observed erroneous example with internal standards 
of a correct procedure for the observed performance or external standards provided by a 
teacher or expert (Van Gog, 2015). Elaboration can be achieved via active self-explanation 
(Renkl, 2002) or explaining it to others. Explaining it to others might be a beneficial approach 
to engage students in interactive-constructive elaboration which leads to better learning (Chi 
& Wylie, 2014). 
6.1.5 Learning through providing peer feedback on modeling examples 
Explaining important aspects of an observed performance to someone else leads to 
engagement and elaboration (Topping, 1998). Providing peer feedback is challenging as 
medical students often face problems to give useful, elaborated feedback (Prins et al., 2006). 
Studies examining the beneficial effects of feedback rounds on learning found that feedback-
provision can enhance one’s own learning gain (Y. H. Cho & Cho, 2011; Li et al., 2010; 
Rouhi & Azizian, 2013). Students providing peer feedback elaborate more on the content than 
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when receiving it, because they have to diagnose weaknesses in the performance (Lundstrom 
& Baker, 2009; Patchan & Schunn, 2015): They compare the peer’s performance with the 
criteria for successful performance and then compose and deliver a synthesis to the peer 
receiving the feedback. This active comparison should lead to an in-depth elaboration of the 
observed behavior which should interact with the beneficial aspects of elaborating on 
erroneous cognitive modeling examples. For example, when asked to provide feedback to  
video-based cognitive modeling examples, learners with sufficient prior knowledge are more 
likely to recognize errors in the examples and elaborate more deeply which leads to better 
learning (Renkl & Atkinson, 2003). However, the quality of the provided peer feedback in 
terms of elaboration is a key characteristic of peer feedback as a learning-enhancing activity 
(Y. H. Cho & Cho, 2011). Such elaboration can be that the peer-feedback provider offers 
reasons and further explanations for remarks, critique or suggestions (Strijbos et al., 2010). 
The degree of elaboration is important because providing elaborated peer feedback was found 
to be learning-enhancing, whereas providing shallow peer feedback has been shown to have a 
detrimental effect on the providers’ learning (Y. H. Cho & Cho, 2011; Gielen et al., 2010). 
6.2 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
This study investigates the effects of video-based erroneous and correct cognitive 
modeling examples and provision of peer feedback on the development of diagnostic 
competences consisting of conceptual, strategic and conditional knowledge and error 
detection skills. 
To examine whether learning with cognitive modeling examples is superior to learning 
without cognitive modeling examples (RQ1), all groups learning with cognitive modeling 
examples were compared to a group that learned by reading a textbook chapter about dyspnea. 
The hypothesis is that video-based cognitive modeling examples are superior to learning 
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without such cognitive modeling examples for the acquisition of diagnostic competences 
(hypothesis 1). 
To examine the beneficial characteristics of cognitive modeling examples and the 
provision of peer feedback, research question two focuses on what the differences in effects 
are of watching correct versus erroneous examples, providing feedback to the video example 
(or not) and the possible interaction between these variations on the acquisition of diagnostic 
competences (RQ2). 
It was hypothesized that erroneous cognitive modeling examples will lead to a higher 
learning outcome than correct cognitive modeling examples when acquiring diagnostic 
competences (hypothesis 2a). When students provide feedback on the performances by the 
peers in the examples, they should learn more from it than by just observing them (hypothesis 
2b). Furthermore, I hypothesized an interaction effect: Provision of feedback might further 
enhance the effectiveness of erroneous cognitive modeling examples for the acquisition of 
diagnostic competences (hypothesis 2c). 
To explore possible explanations for the effects of the two factors on the acquisition of 
diagnostic competences,  two potential moderating processes and their relation to learning 
outcomes in two exploratory research questions were analyzed: If mental effort is related to 
providing peer feedback, type of cognitive modeling examples, and the acquisition of 
diagnostic competences (RQ3) and if content and degree of elaboration of provided peer 
feedback statements influence the acquisition of diagnostic competences (only for the 
conditions in which students were asked to provide feedback) 
6.3 Method 
6.3.1 Participants and design  
One hundred twenty five advanced medical students in the seventh semester (70 
females) participated in the study. Participation was voluntary, with informed consent and 
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approved by the ethics committee of the medical faculty. Four students were removed due to 
language problems and incomplete data, leaving 121 valid cases. The mean age of the 
remaining 121 participants was 24.38 (SD = 2.80). They were randomly assigned to four 
conditions of a 2x2 factorial design (Table 1) and an additional control condition of 24 
students.  
Table 1 
Design of the study  
 Providing Peer-
Feedback 
yes no 
Type of  
modeling example 
erroneous 23 25 
correct 24 25 
  
The first factor refers to the comparison between erroneous and correct modeling 
examples. The second factor refers to whether the students only observed the videos or 
whether they were asked to provide peer feedback to the student they observed after watching 
each video. Therefore, five groups are compared: providing peer feedback on correct 
examples (CMF+), observing erroneous modeling examples without providing peer feedback 
(CMF-), providing peer feedback on erroneous examples (EMF+), observing erroneous 
examples without providing peer feedback (EMF-), and a control group (CG). 
6.3.2 Learning environment  
The participants watched three videos of students diagnosing dyspnea on the 
computer. The three (erroneous or correct) cognitive modeling examples were embedded into 
the CASUS online learning environment, which has been effectively used for case-based 
learning and video-based examples (M. Fischer, 2000). CASUS includes the possibility to 
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administer surveys and assignments such as peer feedback provision and this feature was used 
in the present study. CASUS also allows for experimenter control over the pacing of the 
materials and when participants can proceed to the next case. 
6.3.3 Materials 
The three cognitive modeling examples showed a fictional peer medical student 
performing differential diagnoses, one senior physician introducing the patient with symptoms 
of dyspnea, and a standardized patient in a hospital bed describing his/her symptoms. Next, 
the fictional peer medical student compiled a patient history and performed a differential 
diagnosis in front of the senior physician. 
The video-based cognitive modeling examples for the experimental groups were 
generated from real-life cases of the most common misdiagnosed illnesses causing dyspnea: 
pulmonary embolism, pneumonia, COPD, cardiac failure and myocardial infarct. Two 
clinicians selected ten common cases for which scripts were written. The ten scripts were 
cross-reviewed by the authors and five selected for filming. A pilot was conducted among 
twelve advanced medical students with these five video-based cognitive modeling examples 
(length ranged 5.43 to 8.37 minutes) who rated the videos on a scale of 0 (= not) to 5 (= very 
high) for each of the following criteria: difficulty, authenticity, distractors and knowledge 
contained. The three videos with the highest score were selected for the study. Next, two 
versions were created of each of the three examples: one, where the fictional peer medical 
student arrived at an erroneous diagnosis and one with a correct diagnosis. 
A 15-page textbook chapter about differential diagnoses of dyspnea was provided to 
the control group (Füeßl & Middeke, 2010). In all conditions, a paper guidance sheet on 
diagnosing dyspnea was provided (see Appendix G). 
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6.4 Independent Variables 
6.4.1 Erroneous cognitive modeling examples 
In the erroneous cognitive modeling examples condition, the fictional peer medical 
student considered several possible diagnoses such as pulmonary embolism, pneumonia, 
COPD, cardiac insufficiency, and myocardial infarction, but set up an erroneous working 
hypothesis by weighting the wrong symptoms and not following up on possible other 
explanations. In the correct cognitive modeling examples condition the fictional peer medical 
student compiled the same patient history, but set up the correct working hypothesis by also 
including other possible explanations for the symptoms rather than the most prevalent one. 
6.4.2 Providing peer feedback 
In the peer feedback provision condition the participants were asked to provide 
feedback on the fictional medical peer’s performance in the videos. Students who provided 
peer feedback received a note pad with two prompts asking them to write down at least two 
sentences on (a) “what was good, what was bad, and where was the error” and (b) “what 
could be improved” (see Appendix A). The prompts were based on Hattie and Timperley’s 
(2007) criteria for learning-enhancing feedback. After the participants wrote their feedback in 
the text boxes, the CASUS system allowed them to proceed to the next video. In the condition 
where participants were not asked to provide peer feedback, they just observed the cognitive 
modeling examples but were allowed to take notes while watching the cognitive modeling 
examples.  
6.5 Dependent Variables 
6.5.1 Diagnostic competences – diagnostic knowledge 
Diagnostic knowledge was assessed via 15 Multiple-choice items for conceptual 
knowledge (1 out of 5 answering options was correct; α = .51), 15 open key-feature items for 
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strategic knowledge (α = .58), and six problem-solving tasks for conditional knowledge (α = 
.59) (see Appendix B). The test format assesses a holistic concept of diagnostic competences 
with largely varying knowledge domains connected to dyspnea, which is reflected in a high 
variance of difficulty to discriminate high and low performing students, and which results in a 
corresponding moderate Cronbach’s Alpha (Heitzmann et al., 2015).  
Key-feature and problem-solving items were rated by one expert clinician from 
incorrect (0), mostly incorrect (1), partially correct (2), mostly correct (3) and fully correct (4) 
(M = 3.0, SD = 1.0). Interrater reliability was checked with Intra-Class Correlation for 30% of 
all items by a second expert clinician (ICC = .90). The three knowledge types were first z-
transformed and then transformed to a percentage value ranging from 0 to 100. The three 
knowledge types were weighted equally (1/3) as part of a composite score for diagnostic 
knowledge. 
6.5.2 Diagnostic competences – error detection skills 
Error detection skills were assessed with two erroneous worked examples with 15 
detectable reasoning errors (α = .61) in 28 possible locations where an error could occur. The 
two examples were created by an expert clinician and validated by another expert clinician 
(see Appendix B). 
6.5.3 Mental effort 
Mental effort was assessed via a self-report scale based on Paas and Kalyuga (2005) 
(See Appendix C). The scale consisted of eight items to assess difficulty during learning. 
Each item was rated on a 7 point Likert scale ranging from very easy (1) to very difficult (7). 
One example question is: ‘How easy or hard was it for you to understand the content of the 
videos you watched?’ The scale was used to depict an overall mental effort without 
differentiating between types of effort. Cronbach’s alpha was sufficient (α = .83). 
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6.5.4 Elaboration of provided peer feedback 
The degree of elaboration of provided peer feedback was assessed with a coding 
scheme based on Strijbos, Van Goozen, and Prins (2012). Written peer feedback was 
segmented into propositional units. A unit was identified when a statement could be 
meaningful for itself. The units were categorized in three mutually exclusive dimensions: 
corrective feedback, elaborated feedback and off-topic. Corrective feedback units referred to 
propositional units that were based on proper medical knowledge without giving reasons or 
further explanations. When the propositional unit included reasons and further explanations, 
that unit was coded as an elaborated feedback unit. Off-topic units did not relate to medical 
content. A higher degree of elaboration of the overall feedback means that more propositional 
units were elaborated and included a rationale or reason. The number of elaborated 
propositional units divided by the total number of propositional units in the entire feedback 
served as measurement for the degree of elaboration. For the detailed coding scheme, see 
Appendix D. The intra-class-correlation of two independent coders who were blind to 
condition was .90. 
6.6 Control Variables  
6.6.1 Prior knowledge 
Prior knowledge was assessed with six multiple-choice questions (1 out of 5 
answering options was correct) and six open key-feature questions high in difficulty about the 
main differential diagnoses of dyspnea (Cronbach’s α = .57). Due to the length of the 
intervention, the knowledge pre-test was not differentiated into the three different knowledge 
types. Multiple choice questions had a format of pick-N with six possible choices (see 
Appendix B). The multiple choice questions were created by two expert clinicians and 
evaluated by two other experts. The open key-feature questions were evaluated and 
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independently coded by two independent expert clinicians who were blind to condition 
yielding an intra-class-correlation coefficient of .90. 
6.6.2 Learning time 
Learning time was automatically assessed via the CASUS learning platform. It is the 
duration for which the participants worked on the video-based cognitive modeling examples 
in the four experimental groups or read the textbook chapter in the control group. 
6.7 Procedure 
Participants entered the computer room and were introduced in terms of 
confidentiality, terms of participation and procedure (5 min.). Then they received the pretest 
(20 min.), worked on the three cognitive modeling examples and in some research conditions 
provided peer feedback (60 min.), answered the posttest (35 min.). Overall duration ranged 
between 90 and 140 minutes. Participants were group tested in eleven sessions with ten to 
twelve students per session. Sessions contained an equal mix of conditions with two to three 
students each.  
6.8 Statistical Analyses 
An independent t-test with all parts of diagnostic competences as dependent variables 
was used to compare the cognitive modeling examples conditions and the textbook condition 
(RQ1). A multivariate ANCOVA with diagnostic knowledge and error detection as dependent 
variables and prior knowledge and learning time as covariates was conducted to compare the 
four experimental conditions that worked with cognitive modelling examples (RQ2). The 
assumptions for a multivariate ANCOVA were met. The relationship of degree of elaboration 
of provided peer feedback (RQ3) and mental effort (RQ4) with gained diagnostic 
competences was examined by Pearson correlations. The effect of providing peer feedback 
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and erroneous cognitive modeling examples on mental effort was examined by univariate 
ANOVA (RQ4).  
6.9 Results 
6.9.1 RQ 1 Acquisition of diagnostic competences with cognitive modeling 
examples 
Prior knowledge between all five groups did not differ significantly (see Table 2 for 
descriptives). An independent t-test showed a significant difference in conceptual knowledge 
acquisition between all cognitive modeling examples groups combined (M = 76.49, SD = 
12.00) and the text book control group (M = 70.08, SD = 10.10), t(40.4) = 2.651 p = .011, d 
= .57. No significant differences were found for the other knowledge types. 
Table 2 
Mean and standard deviation for prior knowledge, diagnostic knowledge, knowledge types 
and error detection skills for all five conditions in percentage (0-100) 
Note. Abbreviations: EMF-: Erroneous modeling examples without feedback-provision; CMF-: 
Correct modeling examples without feedback-provision; EMF+: Erroneous Modeling Examples with 
Feedback-Provision; CMF+: Correct modeling examples with feedback-provision; CG: Control group 
 
 EMF- CMF- EMF+ CMF+ CG 
 
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Prior Knowledge 80.20 (13.72) 83.30 (12.35) 78.51 (17.12) 80.80 (15.31) 80.49 (11.25) 
Error Detection 49.22 (12.94) 47.00 (14.56) 44.89 (14.77) 35.68 (20.06) 42.45 (20.52) 
Diagnostic Knowledge  73.26 (8.89) 75.83 (9.31) 67.75 (9.81) 69.37 (10.94) 70.91 (9.06) 
Conceptual  77.41 (13.16) 81.30 (9.28) 73.25 (12.24) 73.25 (12.90) 70.08 (10.71) 
Strategic  80.27 (10.89) 81.73 (8.41) 71.74 (10.62) 76.87 (11.91) 77.36 (11.56) 
Conditional  62.17 (14.53) 64.17 (19.36) 58.15 (19.52) 57.99 (22.89) 61.11 (18.78) 
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6.9.2 RQ 2 Effect of providing peer feedback and type of cognitive modeling 
examples on the acquisition of diagnostic competences 
A MANCOVA showed a significant main effect of providing peer feedback (Wilks λ 
= .856, p = .000) (see Table 2 for descriptives) on overall diagnostic competences. Yet, there 
was no main effect for type of cognitive modeling examples (Wilks λ = .933, p = .190). 
Learning time as covariate was non-significant (Wilks λ = .940, p = .254). There was no 
multivariate interaction between provision of peer feedback and type of cognitive modeling 
examples (Wilks λ = 0.965, p = .535). Hence, in the remainder the univariate effects are 
reported. 
Effects of providing peer feedback 
Students who only watched the video without providing peer feedback acquired higher 
levels of conceptual knowledge, F(1,95) = 6.546, p = .012, ηp² = .07, and higher levels of 
strategic knowledge, F(1,95) = 8.827, p = .004, ηp² = .09, than students who were asked to 
provide peer feedback. For conditional knowledge there was no difference, F(1,95) = 1.377, p 
= .244. Providing peer feedback showed a negative effect on error detection skills, F(1,95) = 
5.066, p = .027, ηp² = .01. 
Effects of errors in cognitive modeling examples 
The main effect for erroneous versus correct cognitive modeling examples was not 
significant for all three types of diagnostic knowledge (conceptual knowledge: F(1,95) = .060, 
p = .807; strategic knowledge: F(1,95) = 1.236, p = .269; conditional knowledge: F(1,95) = 
.000, p = .995). However, students watching erroneous modeling examples acquired higher 
levels of error detection skills, F(1,95) = 4.290, p = .041, ηp² = .05. 
Interaction of providing peer feedback and erroneous modeling examples 
There was no significant univariate interaction between peer feedback provision and 
type of cognitive modeling examples for conceptual knowledge, F(1,95) = .663, p = .418, 
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strategic knowledge, F(1,95) = .809, p = .371, conditional knowledge, F(1,95) = .064, p = 
.809, and error detection skills, F(1,95) = 1.248, p = .267. 
6.9.3 RQ 3 Effect of providing peer feedback and type of cognitive modeling 
examples on mental effort 
A univariate two-way ANOVA revealed no interaction of peer feedback provision and 
cognitive modeling examples type on mental effort, F(1,95) = .485, p =.48. Yet, a main effect 
was observed for type of cognitive modeling examples, F(1,95) = 6.636, p = .012, ηp² = .07. 
Students learning with erroneous cognitive modeling examples (M = 3.91, SD = 0.72) 
reported more mental effort than students learning with correct cognitive modeling examples 
(M = 3.37, SD = 0.68). Likewise, a main effect was found for providing peer feedback, 
F(1,95) = 10.141, p = .002, ηp² = .10. Students providing peer feedback (M = 3.79, SD = 0.75) 
reported more mental effort than students just observing (M = 3.50, SD = 0.64). The control 
group reported mental effort with M = 3.07, SD = 0.99.  
6.9.4 RQ 4 Relationship between quality of provided peer feedback and 
acquisition of diagnostic competences 
The processes underlying peer feedback provision were further examined. Combined 
across both feedback provision conditions, the feedback was 79.3% on-topic and 20.7% off-
topic. The on-topic feedback consisted of 86% corrective feedback without explanation or 
deeper elaboration and 14% was coded as elaborated feedback with reasons and explanations 
provided for the statement.  
For the overall amount of propositional units of provided peer feedback (M = 20.5, SD 
= 5.80) the degree (percentage) of elaboration (M = 10.77, SD = 11.51) and off-topic 
percentage (M = 20.35, SD = 21.32) of these propositional units of peer feedback were 
calculated. Post-test diagnostic knowledge was not correlated with overall amount of provided 
peer feedback (r = .18, p = .24) and degree of elaboration of feedback (r = .11, p = .475). 
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There was a moderate negative correlation between off-topic statements and diagnostic 
knowledge, r = -.30, p = .041. Prior knowledge was uncorrelated with overall amount of 
feedback (r = .11, p = .46), off-topic statements (r = .03, p = .84) and degree of elaboration of 
feedback (r = .02, p = .91). In the group that worked on erroneous cognitive modeling 
examples, the amount of overall provided peer feedback revealed a medium positive 
correlation with posttest diagnostic knowledge, r = .43, p = .049, whereas this was not the 
case in the group with correct cognitive modeling examples (r = -.04, p = .86). Mental effort 
(M = 3.79, SD = .75) was correlated with degree of elaboration of provided peer feedback (r = 
.33, p = .027) but not with diagnostic knowledge (r = -.06, p = .55), overall amount of 
provided peer feedback (r = -.01, p = .98) and off-topic statements (r = -.23, p = .14). 
6.10 Conclusion and Discussion 
My aim was to examine the educational value of peer feedback provision on erroneous 
cognitive modeling examples to teach diagnostic competences. The first research question 
was if cognitive modeling examples are superior to textbook learning for acquiring diagnostic 
competences. The second research question aimed at the added value of providing peer 
feedback on cognitive modeling examples and incorporating errors in the cognitive modeling 
examples with a possible interaction of the factors. Research questions three and four were 
exploratory and closely examined the relationship of degree of elaboration of provided peer 
feedback and mental effort with learning gain. 
 Results show for research question one that cognitive modeling examples are a valid 
educational method with higher gains in conceptual knowledge for medical students learning 
with cognitive modeling examples. The first hypothesis of this study that cognitive modeling 
examples are superior for the acquisition of diagnostic competencies to learning without 
cognitive modeling examples could be partially accepted for the conceptual parts of 
diagnostic knowledge. 
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Research question two focused on the effects of erroneous versus correct cognitive 
modeling examples and provision of peer feedback as an intervention to enhance learning. 
Concerning hypothesis 2a about beneficial effects of erroneous examples on learning as stated 
by for example Renkl and Atkinson (2003), results were mixed for diagnostic knowledge 
acquisition and error detection skills: There was no positive influence of learning with 
erroneous cognitive modeling examples on diagnostic knowledge acquisition. An explanation 
might be that learners were already too advanced so that example based learning methods – 
with or without errors – made no difference. Stark et al. (2011) found that comparing low and 
high-performing students can reveal an influential interaction effect of prior knowledge on 
learning with erroneous or correct examples. Due to homogeneity of prior knowledge, a 
comparison of low and high-performing students when learning with erroneous versus correct 
cognitive modeling examples was not possible in this first empirical study. Contrary to no 
significant effect on acquiring diagnostic knowledge, learning with erroneous cognitive 
modeling examples had an effect on error detection skills. Erroneous cognitive modeling 
examples seem to foster distinct skills of error detection. Gartmeier et al. (2010) explain this 
with the construction and integration of negative knowledge to existing knowledge when 
someone is exposed to an error. The construction of negative knowledge might be a key 
component of building medical expertise to prevent diagnostic errors (Dror, 2011), which 
makes erroneous cognitive modeling examples a needed addition in medical education. Using 
erroneous examples in a long-term intervention with measurements to examine an effect of 
exposure to errors on long-term error detection skills might shed light on the question if the 
found significant effect of erroneous cognitive modeling examples on error detection skills 
was just a short time heightening of sensitivity for errors or if it persists longer. A persisting 
effect supports the idea that erroneous cognitive modeling examples help building negative 
knowledge. In sum, hypothesis 2a could partly be accepted for error detection skills but not 
for diagnostic knowledge acquisition. 
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Hypothesis 2b was that provision of peer feedback on cognitive modeling examples 
might lead to increased learning gain. This hypothesis is in line with studies by Li et al. 
(2010) and Rouhi and Azizian (2013) about beneficial effects of peer feedback provision. The 
results of this study indicate that students providing peer feedback performed worse on two 
types of diagnostic knowledge and error detection skills compared to students who just 
observed videos. Hypothesis 2b can be rejected. Also, an interaction between providing peer 
feedback and erroneous examples could not be found as assumed in hypothesis 2c.  
To explore the results further, research question three and four aimed at possible 
explanations for the negative effect of providing peer feedback with analyzing mental effort 
and degree of elaboration of provided peer feedback. The feedback provided was mostly 
corrective feedback and not elaborated. Detrimental effects on learning when providing 
shallow peer feedback are in line with findings by Y. H. Cho and Cho (2011). Degree of 
elaboration of provided peer feedback was related to mental effort, which might have 
interfered with learning effort. Unfortunately, different types of mental effort could not be 
differentiated. A positive relationship between providing peer feedback and knowledge 
acquisition was found in the group of students learning with erroneous cognitive modeling 
examples. This supports findings from Braaksma et al. (2002) and Y. H. Cho and Cho (2011) 
that explaining weak models helps students’ own learning by becoming a critical learner 
through self-monitoring and self-regulation.  
Even though no interaction of peer feedback provision on erroneous cognitive 
modeling examples was found, the amount of provided peer feedback on erroneous cognitive 
modeling examples was related to learning gain of diagnostic knowledge. This shows that 
under certain circumstances, providing peer feedback increases learning gain. 
Overall, the results do not offer an explanation for the decreased learning gain when 
students provided peer feedback. Possibly, students might not be used to providing peer 
feedback on a peer’s diagnoses as depicted by the lack of elaboration. The novelty of the 
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situation might have led to cognitive overload, which decreased their focus of attention and 
therefore their learning outcome. Further, the task to provide written peer feedback on a 
video-taped student might have not been authentically simulating real-life feedback situations. 
Hoogerheide, Deijkers, Loyens, Heijltjes, and van Gog (2016) suggest that incorporating 
speaking instead of writing explanation tasks for learning with videos leads to social presence 
and authenticity, which leads to more learning gain. 
If providing peer feedback is incorporated in medical education practices, the educator 
should make sure that students are not distracted by the peer feedback task and have sufficient 
knowledge about effective (peer) feedback provision. Providing them just-in-time guidance 
on how to provide peer feedback during observation might have increased the mental effort to 
solve the task. Training effective peer feedback provision might counteract this, decrease 
novelty and reduce mental effort by making the task to provide peer feedback more natural 
with less effort (Prins et al., 2006; Sluijsmans, Brand-Gruwel, & van Merriënboer, 2002). 
Similarly, receiving elaborated expert feedback as proposed by Heitzmann et al. (2015); Stark 
et al. (2011) on the cognitive modeling examples might reduce mental effort and increase 
learning gain. 
Further research is needed to entangle the beneficial and detrimental processes of 
providing peer feedback on observed performance for own learning gains. For example, the 
effects of feedback training on elaboration and mental effort could be examined for further 
advancing the knowledge about how to make providing peer feedback a learning opportunity. 
So far, under certain circumstances of prior knowledge, elaboration of peer feedback and 
characteristics of the observed performance, peer feedback provision might be a useful tool to 
foster learning. It is needed to find out more about the factors leading to positive and negative 
effects of peer feedback provision and consultation as it is part of everyday clinical practice. 
If used right, peer feedback could greatly contribute to clinical practice and therefore patient 
safety. 
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7 Study 2: The Voice is Mightier than the Pen 
How Communication Medium and Expert Feedback Influence Peer 
Feedback Provision and Learning 
Context: Teaching diagnostic competences is the key to diagnostic accuracy. 
Diagnostic competences rely on at least two individual-level capacities which are diagnostic 
knowledge and error detection skills. To teach these competences, observing erroneous 
cognitive modeling examples of peers performing a cognitive task like differential diagnosing 
has been shown to be effective. However, students’ engagement in the learning task needs to 
be fostered with instructional methods such as prompting self-explanations or explanations to 
others while providing peer feedback on the observed performance. How this task needs to be 
designed is open for discussion. There is evidence that medium of communication plays a 
crucial role. Further, receiving expert feedback might support the student with providing 
feedback, leading to better acquisition of diagnostic competences. 
Objectives: Due to negative effects of providing peer feedback as an engaging learning 
intervention in the first study, this study investigated (a) the influence of providing spoken or 
written peer feedback on observed examples on the providers’ elaboration and acquisition of 
diagnostic competences, and (b) the influence of expert feedback on the providers’ 
elaboration of the cognitive modeling examples and acquisition of diagnostic competences.  
Methods and Sample: In the context of differential diagnoses, students were asked to 
provide feedback on erroneous cognitive modeling examples of a peer (fellow medical 
student) diagnosing a patient with acute dyspnea. After observing the modeling examples, 
half of the students either provided written or spoken peer feedback. Additionally, they 
received elaborated expert feedback on the observed modeling example or did not. A control 
group did not provide or receive any feedback on the modeling examples. The sample 
consisted of advanced medical students (N = 134) randomly assigned across the four 
experimental conditions and a control condition that did not provide or receive any feedback.  
Study 2: The Voice is Mightier than the Pen 
 
74 
 
Results: Receiving expert feedback did not significantly influence the degree of 
elaboration or acquisition of diagnostic competencies when learning with erroneous cognitive 
modeling examples with Wilks λ = .335, p = .854. An indirect effect was found for spoken 
over written provision of peer feedback which was explained by the mediation of the degree 
of elaboration of provided peer feedback. 
7.1 Theoretical Framework 
7.1.1 Diagnostic competences – diagnostic knowledge and error detection skills 
Successful clinical reasoning refers to a decision-making process that relies on the 
ability to reason correctly, based on usable knowledge monitored by meta-cognition (Higgs et 
al., 2008). Usable knowledge is stored in illness scripts: complex mental representations of 
diseases based on experienced past cases by the physician (Schmidt et al., 1990). When 
encountering a new patient case, the physician compares the new case to his or her acquired 
illness scripts. The most likely explanatory illness script is selected and a working hypothesis 
of the disease causing the symptoms is set (Boshuizen & Schmidt, 2008). The diagnostic 
knowledge incorporated in illness scripts can be classified as conceptual knowledge about 
facts, strategic knowledge about procedures and strategies to secure a diagnosis, and 
conditional knowledge about the rationale and goal of these procedures (Stark et al., 2011; 
Van Gog et al., 2004). The decision process by which observed symptoms are matched to one 
or more illness scripts is crucial for diagnostic success and seems to be both conscious and 
(automated) unconscious (Croskerry, 2009). Selecting the correct illness script is a crucial 
moment in diagnosing, which is prone to errors with error-rates between 5 to 15% caused by a 
flawed clinical reasoning process (Berner & Graber, 2008; Graber et al., 2005; Singh et al., 
2014). To select the correct illness script, rich and complex knowledge is a necessity but not 
sufficient, since errors are not only based on knowledge gaps but also on shortcomings during 
the diagnostic process (Elstein, 2009). Also, meta-cognition that focusses on monitoring the 
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clinical reasoning process might play a crucial role for diagnostic accuracy (Mamede et al., 
2012). Meta-cognition consists of meta-cognitive knowledge and skills. Meta-cognitive 
knowledge is referred to as meta-cognitive declarative knowledge, whereas meta-cognitive 
skills are referred to as meta-cognitive procedural knowledge (Veenman, Van Hout-Wolters, 
& Afflerbach, 2006). Meta-cognition is driven by meta-cognitive knowledge, i.e. when to use 
meta-cognitive monitoring processes (Flavell, 1979; Pintrich, 2002). The use of meta-
cognitive skills has been hypothesized to be connected to diagnostic accuracy (Croskerry, 
2003; Sherbino et al., 2011). For example, a study by Sherbino et al. (2014) assumed that 
teaching cognitive forcing strategies was effective against errors. Their skill training included 
teaching medical students self-monitoring, knowledge and identification strategies to counter 
biases and promote deliberate reflection during diagnostic reasoning. Results showed that 
cognitive forcing strategies were not related to a reduction of diagnostic errors. 
Meta-cognitive knowledge might play a key role in the diagnostic process. The 
knowledge about when and how to use meta-cognitive skills is important for diagnostic 
success, i.e. it is important to know when to be cautious because an error is likely to happen or 
has already happened (Dror, 2011). Studies on medical expertise reveal that experts are more 
accurate in diagnosing (Schmidt & Boshuizen, 1992). This is not due to experts making less 
errors but about their ability to detect and correct errors (Patel et al., 2011). Medical experts 
show a higher ability to detect and correct their errors in diagnoses than novices (Nyssen & 
Blavier, 2006; Wilkinson et al., 2011). In fact, Oser and Spychiger (2005) and Gartmeier et al. 
(2010) consider the acquisition of negative knowledge essential to detect and correct errors. 
Assessing the outcome of learning interventions in terms of acquired diagnostic knowledge 
and error detection skills as parts of diagnostic competences is a promising approach to 
reduce errors. How to design interventions to increase diagnostic competences is examined in 
this study. 
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7.1.2 Fostering diagnostic competences with erroneous cognitive modeling 
examples 
To enable the construction of rich illness scripts, medical students need to acquire 
complex knowledge by exposure to clinical cases (Schmidt & Rikers, 2007). When expert 
physicians need to diagnose a new patient case, their clinical reasoning is based on past cases 
that they have been exposed to, which are compared to the new case (Aamodt & Plaza, 1994). 
Therefore, educational methods should focus on case-based learning. Cases can be presented 
effectively in written form as worked examples (Stark et al., 2011; Sweller, 2006) or video-
based as cognitive modeling examples. Cognitive modeling examples are examples of a (peer) 
agent, performing a certain task while explaining the rationale behind the approach to solve 
the task (Hoogerheide et al., 2014). They offer advantages over written worked examples in 
terms of focus of attention and authenticity, leading to better learning (Große & Renkl, 2007; 
Valmont, 1995; Van Gog & Rummel, 2010). The agent can be a peer or an expert (Van Gog 
& Rummel, 2010). Peer models should be used when experts’ and peers’ way of performing 
varies significantly in automatization, such as in clinical reasoning (Boshuizen & Schmidt, 
2008; Hoogerheide, van Wermeskerken, et al., 2016). Perceived similarity of competence 
between the observed peer model and the observer positively influences learning as well 
(Braaksma et al., 2002). Students observing a weak but coping peer model with erroneous 
performance show better reflection and elaboration of the learning content, higher learning 
gain and a decreased likelihood of making (or repeating) the observed error later-on if the 
error is recognized (Blandin & Proteau, 2000; Domuracki, Wong, Olivieri, & Grierson, 2015; 
Gartmeier et al., 2008; Große & Renkl, 2007; Siegler, 2002). To activate the students to 
observe the examples and engage in elaboration and recognition of the errors in the examples, 
(self-)explanation prompts were found to be useful (Renkl, 2002; Renkl & Atkinson, 2003).  
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7.1.3 Elaboration of cognitive modeling examples with peer feedback provision 
Fiorella and Mayer (2013) found that students who explain learning material to others 
gain a deeper understanding compared to students who self-explained. Explaining the learning 
material to peers by providing peer feedback on the observed example was found to enhance 
students’ reflection, stimulate metacognitive processes such as the detection of errors, 
elaboration and increase learning gain (K. Cho & MacArthur, 2011; Y. H. Cho & Cho, 2011; 
Topping, 2005). However, providing peer feedback does not automatically foster learning. 
The quality of provided peer feedback has a direct positive effect on learning gain (Y. H. Cho 
& Cho, 2011; Li et al., 2010). For example, in the study by Li et al. (2010) providing 
elaborated high-quality peer feedback had a positive effect on learning, while providing 
shallow corrective peer feedback had a negative effect. The presented Study 1 in Chapter 6 by 
Strobel, Heitzmann, Strijbos, Kollar, and Fischer (2016) found that when medical students 
provide peer feedback on observed diagnoses in a computer based learning environment, they 
may even learn less. A proposed explanation was that the task to provide peer feedback 
imposed too much mental effort on the students. Furthermore, providing shallow low-quality 
feedback without elaboration was found to have detrimental effects on their learning in other 
studies as well (Y. H. Cho & Cho, 2011; Li et al., 2010). 
In sum, providing peer feedback can be a useful learning tool if designed in a way that 
triggers enable students to provide elaborated feedback. The literature suggests different 
approaches to how such feedback activities can be designed, which are described in the 
following sections. 
7.1.4 Differences in providing written versus spoken peer feedback  
Wegerif (1998) points out that social relatedness is a key point in computer-supported 
communication. Results from a study by Hebert and Vorauer (2003) were that face-to-face 
communication increases provision of content relevant peer feedback and increases 
Study 2: The Voice is Mightier than the Pen 
 
78 
 
motivation to give qualitatively higher feedback as compared to written and computer-based 
settings. Krych-Appelbaum and Musial (2007) found that students explain more when they 
provide spoken face-to-face peer feedback than when they write in a computer-mediated 
setting.  
Even though computer-based learning environments offer strong advantages in terms 
of availability and productivity of learning material (Blomberg et al., 2013), they certainly 
also have disadvantages: Compared to face-to-face communication, social relatedness and 
interactivity falls short by missing social presence in computer-supported learning needs to be 
enhanced or simulated (Cyr, Hassanein, Head, & Ivanov, 2007; Litosseliti, Marttunen, 
Laurinen, & Salminen, 2005; Rice, 1993). To stimulate the beneficial effects of face-to-face 
communication on learning, oral communication and explanation tasks to fictitious others can 
be integrated in computer-supported learning environments to simulate social presence. 
Hoogerheide, Deijkers, et al. (2016) found that students learned complex content better when 
they explained it orally to a fictitious other than when they wrote it. An explanation on basis 
of these results stems from Fiorella and Mayer (2013, 2014) that explaining it orally simulates 
social presence of another person. This effect could also be valid for providing oral peer 
feedback on cognitive modeling examples. Nevertheless, providing oral peer feedback might 
yield positive effects on the degree of elaboration and it must be ensured that students 
recognize the mistakes in the observed performance and know how to provide elaborated 
feedback. Incorporating elaborated ‘perfect’ expert feedback on observed erroneous 
performances might be a way to do so (Stark et al., 2011). 
7.1.5 Incorporating expert feedback on cognitive modeling examples for 
learning 
Example-based learning with errors can be an effective tool – given the student detects 
the error and engages in elaboration (Renkl & Atkinson, 2003). Students need to have 
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additional support when the learning material becomes complex (Stark, Gruber, Mandl, & 
Hinkofer, 2001) but they seem to struggle sometimes when learning with erroneous examples 
and prompts for activities like explanation. Berthold and Renkl (2009) found that self-
explanation prompts fostered both correct and incorrect elaboration. To help students 
understand the content matter in the example and enable correct elaboration, instructional 
explanations can be given. However, interaction effects of active self-explanation and 
(teacher-based) expert instructional explanation are unclear (Berthold & Renkl, 2009; 
Heitzmann et al., 2015). For written worked examples, the integration of instructional 
explanation of expert feedback on the example has been found to have a positive effect on 
elaboration. For example, Stark et al. (2011) used elaborated expert feedback on erroneous 
worked examples to help students acquire diagnostic conceptual, strategic and conditional 
knowledge when learning with these examples. In their studies, a fictitious expert clinician 
provided elaborated feedback after each diagnostic step of the example about correct parts, 
erroneous parts, and what parts of the diagnosis could be improved. The content and structure 
of the feedback is important as it influences learning gain. A high degree of elaboration of 
feedback was found to lead to better learning gain compared to shallow corrective feedback 
(Gielen et al., 2010; Hattie & Timperley, 2007; Stark et al., 2011). In general, however, 
results on the impact of quality of received (expert) feedback on learning outcome are mixed 
(Kollar & Fischer, 2010). 
In summary, the findings of Stark et al. (2011) indicate that incorporating expert 
feedback on the observed performance to enhance elaboration, quality of own provided peer 
feedback and therefore learning might be transferred on to cognitive modeling examples. How 
this affects the quality of elaboration of own provided peer feedback is unclear and to my 
knowledge not yet examined. 
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7.2 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
This study investigated the effects of different types of medium of communication 
(written versus spoken) through which peer feedback is provided and incorporating expert 
feedback on erroneous cognitive modeling examples on the acquisition of diagnostic 
competence.  
The first research question investigates the influence of the communication medium of 
provided peer feedback and received expert feedback on degree of elaboration of peer 
feedback (RQ1). It was hypothesized that students providing spoken peer feedback on 
erroneous cognitive modeling examples have a higher degree of elaboration of peer feedback 
than students providing written peer feedback (hypothesis 1a). Furthermore, students that 
were presented with expert feedback after providing peer feedback on an erroneous cognitive 
modeling example are expected to elaborate more on the observed than the students who did 
not have expert feedback (hypothesis 1b). 
The second research question examines the influence of the communication medium 
of peer feedback provision and the reception of expert feedback on erroneous cognitive 
modeling examples on the acquisition of diagnostic competences (RQ2). It was hypothesized 
that students acquire more diagnostic competence when they provide spoken peer feedback on 
the observed cognitive modeling examples (hypothesis 2a). Moreover, students presented 
with expert feedback after providing peer feedback on erroneous cognitive modeling 
examples are expected to have higher learning outcomes for diagnostic competence 
(hypothesis 2b).  
A third research question aims to inspect the relationship between degree of 
elaboration of provided peer feedback and learning gain (RQ3). I assumed that the degree of 
elaboration of provided peer feedback is related to learning gain (hypothesis 3a). This 
relationship might mediate the effects of the medium of communication of peer feedback 
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provision, reception of expert feedback on diagnostic competence acquisition via the degree 
of elaboration of provided peer feedback (hypothesis 3b). 
7.3 Method 
7.3.1 Participants and design 
The conduction of this study was approved by the ethics committee of the LMU 
Medical Center in 2014. In all, 134 medical students participated voluntarily in the study. 
Three students were excluded as they did not have any prior diagnostic knowledge. Overall, 
131 valid cases could be used for this study of which 74 were female and 57 male, with a 
mean age of Mage = 24.19 (SD = 3.03). The mean study duration (in semesters studied) was 
7.48 (SD = 1.55), with a minimum of five and a maximum of eleven semesters. They were 
randomly assigned to one of five groups of a 2x2 factorial design with a control group. The 
four experimental groups (a) provided spoken peer feedback (n = 29) or (b) provided written 
peer feedback (n = 27) on cognitive modeling examples, and (c) provided spoken peer 
feedback while receiving expert feedback (n = 24) or (d) or provided written peer feedback 
while receiving expert feedback (n = 25). A control group (n = 26) did not provide peer 
feedback but just observed the cognitive modeling examples and received no expert feedback. 
7.3.2 Learning environment 
The learning environment for this study consisted of a pre-test for diagnostic 
knowledge, a short feedback training, three erroneous cognitive modeling examples followed 
by expert feedback in two of the four experimental groups and a post-test for mental effort, 
diagnostic knowledge and error detection skills. It was created as a complete learning unit 
about dyspnea in the CASUS online learning environment (M. Fischer, 2000), which is 
commonly used in medical education as an effective tool to create, monitor and evaluate 
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example-based learning interventions. The learning environment allows for various 
assessment methods, step-by-step case presentation and prompts. 
7.3.3 Materials 
The erroneous cognitive modeling examples were short video clips, between 5.43 and 
8.37 minutes in duration, and recorded with patient actors and physicians. The clips were 
based on the most common real-life cases of erroneous diagnoses of dyspnea in the 
emergency department of the Medical Center of the LMU Munich. Two expert clinicians 
created scripts for ten clips of which the five best were chosen by the non-author expert to be 
filmed. The five clips were used in a pilot study with twelve advanced medical students who 
rated them on a scale from 0 (not) to 5 (very high) for authenticity, difficulty, distractors and 
knowledge contained. The three best-scoring videos were used for this study. The content of 
the cognitive modeling examples included a fictional peer student who diagnosed dyspnea 
with special emphasis on leading causes of symptoms by pulmonary embolism, COPD, 
pneumonia, myocardial infarction and cardiac insufficiency. The error occurred during setting 
up a working hypothesis of the most likely diseases by wrongly weighting the symptoms and 
choosing the most obvious explanation. 
The feedback training material consisted of a short introduction about the scientific 
evidence that elaborated feedback is important for learning, followed by a written worked 
example of high-quality feedback on erroneous diagnoses explained step-by-step (see 
Appendix E). 
The written expert feedback was also presented in CASUS but only to two of the 
experimental groups after each erroneous cognitive modeling example. The expert feedback 
was created by two experts, and based on a correct diagnosis and the suggestions for 
elaborated feedback by Strijbos et al. (2010). See Appendix F for the example used. 
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7.4 Independent Variables 
7.4.1 Written versus spoken peer feedback 
The communication medium of provision of peer feedback was operationalized as 
written versus spoken. Overall, all experimental groups watched three erroneous cognitive 
modeling examples and provided peer feedback on the erroneous diagnostic reasoning of the 
observed (fictitious) peer student in the cognitive modeling example immediately after 
watching the videos. The students in the spoken peer feedback groups were presented with an 
instruction how to use a dictating machine to record their feedback for the fictitious peer 
student in the cognitive modeling example. The students in the experimental written peer 
feedback groups were presented with an instruction to write their peer feedback for the 
fictitious peer student in the cognitive modeling example in CASUS. All groups received a 
short reminder of the content of the feedback training. 
7.4.2 Incorporating expert feedback 
The expert feedback was provided after each erroneous diagnosis in the CASUS 
learning platform after the students provided peer feedback on the cognitive modeling 
examples. It follows the guideline structure of Hattie and Timperley (2007) (See Appendix A 
and F) used in the feedback training students received before working on the learning unit. It 
focusses on good aspects of the diagnosis, wrong aspects of the diagnosis and offers 
suggestions for improvement. Every aspect of good, bad and erroneous parts separately and 
elaborated on which is concluded in suggestions. See Appendix F for the example. 
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7.5 Dependent Variables 
The dependent variable of diagnostic competences was operationalized as diagnostic 
knowledge and error detection skills. Both were standardized on a scale from 0 to 100 and 
combined with equal weight (1/2 knowledge, 1/2 error detection skills) to reflect diagnostic 
competences. 
7.5.1 Diagnostic competences – diagnostic knowledge 
Diagnostic knowledge was tested as three distinct knowledge types as proposed by 
Stark et al. (2011) with conceptual, strategic and conditional knowledge. Conceptual 
knowledge was measured with seven multiple-choice questions with one out of five answers 
being correct (α = .50). The multiple-choice questions were designed to assess clinical 
interpretation, reasoning and justification. The answers were mutually exclusive. Twelve key-
feature questions with three questions about four central problems tested for strategic 
knowledge (α = .67). Six open problem-solving tasks measured conditional knowledge (α = 
.52). Cronbach’s alpha across the knowledge types was α = .76. They were z-transformed into 
a scale from 0 to 100 to depict percentage of correct answers. The three knowledge parts were 
then combined with equal weight of 1/3 to measure diagnostic knowledge as a whole. The 
rather low Cronbach’s alpha is due to the fact that several knowledge areas of dyspnea are 
tested across questions to depict a holistic concept of diagnostic knowledge and was found in 
other studies using this format as well (Heitzmann et al., 2015). Due to a high overall alpha, 
the alphas for the sub-scales could be accepted. For all questions, see Appendix B. 
7.5.2 Diagnostic competences – error detection skills 
Error detection skills were measured via two erroneous written worked examples of 
complex differential diagnoses of dyspnea (see Appendix B). The examples were created by 
two expert clinicians and validated in a pilot study. The method is based on the assessment of 
error detection of dialysis nurses by Wilkinson et al. (2011). The text-based examples 
Study 2: The Voice is Mightier than the Pen 
 
85 
 
depicted two patients with unspecific symptoms of dyspnea followed by an explained 
differential diagnostic rationale of a physician. In these rationales, 30 possible erroneous steps 
were highlighted. Out of the 30 steps, 15 were erroneous and 15 correct. The students had to 
recognize and remark on the erroneous steps. The examples were included in CASUS 
learning environment and student underlined the erroneous steps by clicking on them. The 
reliability for all 15 items was sufficient with α = .62. 
7.5.3 Degree of elaboration of provided peer feedback 
Degree of elaboration of provided peer feedback was analyzed in written form for both 
written and spoken peer feedback. Spoken peer feedback was first transcribed by trained 
student helpers. The coding of degree of elaboration of provided peer feedback was based on 
Strijbos et al. (2012). First, units of meaning were coded. These units of meaning were 
categorized in three distinct, mutually exclusive categories. The first category was corrective 
feedback, that is: statements aimed at the content but without an explanation, further 
elaboration or rationale, for example ‘The working diagnosis of pulmonary embolism is 
incorrect.’ The second category refers to elaborated feedback, which means units of meaning 
which targeted the content but offered further explanation, elaboration, further thoughts or a 
rationale. For example ‘The working diagnosis of pulmonary embolism is incorrect because 
Troponin is increased, which is a typical symptom for myocardial infarct’ The third category 
‘off-topic’ was coded if a unit of meaning did not target the content such as ‘She did not wear 
a pony tail’. See Appendix D for the coding scheme. 
7.5.4 Mental effort 
Mental effort was measured using a questionnaire with 8 items on basis of Paas and 
Kalyuga (2005), which were answered on a 5 point-Likert-scale (see Appendix C). The 
questions cover about how easy or hard the learning intervention was perceived ranging from 
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1(very easy) to 5 (very hard). Different types of mental effort could not be differentiated with 
this scale. The overall reliability was good (α = .80). 
7.5.5 Prior knowledge 
Prior knowledge was assessed with a pre-test that consisted of basic parts of the post-
test for diagnostic knowledge. Types of knowledge were not differentiated in the pre-test, 
since the aim was to depict an overall picture of diagnostic knowledge without imposing too 
much effort on the students or using too much time of the intervention. Prior knowledge was 
measured with six multiple-choice items, six key-feature items and two problem-solving 
items. Across all 14 items Cronbach’s alpha was .65. 
7.6 Procedure 
Students were randomly assigned to one of two equally sized computer rooms. They 
were shortly introduced to the study and completed a demographic questionnaire (5 min.) 
followed by a pre-test for diagnostic competences (20 min.). After completion, they received 
a short feedback training based on a written worked example (5 min.) and studied a guidance 
sheet on diagnosing dyspnea (5 min.) (see Appendix G). The intervention part (60 min.) 
consisted of watching three erroneous cognitive modeling examples and providing feedback 
on them. Afterwards, mental effort and diagnostic competences were assessed (45 min.). 
Overall, the study was designed to take 150 minutes in total and all students completed the 
unit within this time frame. 
7.7 Statistical Analysis 
A treatment check was performed by comparing the experimental groups to the control 
group with an independent sample t-test. A MANCOVA with prior knowledge as covariate 
was used to assess the effect of spoken (vs. written) and expert feedback (vs. no expert 
feedback) on the acquisition of diagnostic competences. For the effect of both factors on the 
Study 2: The Voice is Mightier than the Pen 
 
87 
 
degree of elaboration of provided peer feedback, a MANOVA analysis was performed. To 
determine the relationship between elaboration of provided peer feedback and diagnostic 
competence, spearman correlations between prior knowledge, elaboration of peer feedback, 
and all parts of diagnostic competences were computed. Based on these correlations, a 
MANCOVA was conducted for diagnostic competences with degree of elaboration of 
provided peer feedback. For further analysis, mediation analysis of the effects of written vs. 
spoken and expert feedback vs. no expert feedback on diagnostic competence – with 
elaboration of peer feedback as a mediator – was conducted. Hayes (2013) PROCESS macro 
2.16 for mediation, moderation and conditional process analysis was used to compute the 
mediation analyses in SPSS.  
7.8 Results 
7.8.1 Comparing experimental groups with a control group 
Table 3 
 Descriptives for feedback versus no feedback group comparison 
 Feedback groups 
N = 105 
Control group 
N = 26 
 M (SD) M (SD) 
Prior Knowledge 72.20 (13.61) 70.41 (13.86) 
Diagnostic Competences 57.11 (12.47) 56.05 (13.69) 
Diagnostic Knowledge 68.38 (12.33) 67.49 (13.09) 
Conceptual Knowledge 76.82 (14.89) 72.97 (17.52) 
Strategic Knowledge 70.38 (14.07) 75.16 (14.12) 
Conditional Knowledge  57.94 (17.46) 54.33 (15.07) 
Error Detection Skills 45.84 (17.97) 44.62 (18.64) 
Note. ‘Feedback groups’ refers to all four experimental groups that were compared to the control group which neither 
received expert feedback nor provided peer feedback on the erroneous cognitive modeling examples 
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The comparison of the four experimental groups providing peer feedback versus a 
control group that did not provide peer feedback on cognitive modeling examples did not 
reveal a significant difference for prior knowledge t(37.87) = -.594, p = .556, diagnostic 
competences, t(35.96) = -.360, p = .721, or any of the subcategories of diagnostic knowledge, 
t(36.77) = -.316, p = 754, or error detection skills, t(37.35) = -.302, p = .764, of diagnostic 
competences. See Table 3 for descriptives. 
7.8.2  RQ1 - Effects of medium of communication and expert feedback on 
elaboration 
To answer hypotheses 1a and 1b (effects of the varied factors on elaboration of 
provided peer feedback), a MANCOVA was performed which revealed the following results: 
Table 4 
Standardized degree of elaboration of feedback provided (percentage) 
 SF SFEx WF WFEx Total 
N 24 22 27 24 97 
 M 
(SD) 
M 
(SD) 
M 
(SD) 
M 
(SD) 
M 
(SD) 
 
Elaborated Feedback 
48.10 
(21.72) 
53.93 
(16.19) 
39.11 
(16.70) 
39.76 
(21.28) 
44.92 
(19.81) 
 
Corrective  
Feedback 
50.67 
(19.9) 
45.82 
(16.50) 
59.73 
(16.69) 
59.02 
(21.16) 
54.10 
(19.27) 
 
Off-topic 
1.23 
(5.15) 
0.24 
(.80) 
1.12 
(3.04) 
1.23 
(6.00) 
0.98 
(4.22) 
Note. SF: Spoken Feedback, SFEx: Spoken Feedback plus Expert Feedback, WF: Written Feedback, WFEx: Written 
Feedback plus Expert Feedback  
Prior knowledge was not significantly correlated with degree of corrective feedback (rs 
= -.053, p = .611) degree of elaboration of feedback (rs = .079, p = .444) or off-topic (rs = -
.07, p = .496) and was excluded as covariate. MANOVA analysis showed (a) a multivariate 
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significant main effect of medium of communication of provision of peer feedback with 
Wilks λ = .913, p = .016, ηp² = .09 (b) no significant multivariate main effect of whether 
students received expert feedback or not, Wilks λ = .401, p = .671 and (c) no multivariate 
interaction main effect, Wilks λ = .322, p = .725. Between-subject effects showed a univariate 
main effect of medium of peer feedback provision for degree of corrective feedback, F(1,95) 
= 8.49, p =.004, ηp² = .08 and degree of elaborated feedback, F(1,95) = 8.75, p = .004, ηp² = 
.09. Off-topic was not influenced by the medium, F(1,95) = .27, p = .603. 
7.8.3 RQ2 - Effects of medium and expert feedback on learning gain 
To answer hypothesis 2a and 2b (effects of the varied factors in diagnostic 
competences acquisition), a conducted MANCOVA analysis revealed the following results: 
Table 5 
Descriptives across all experimental groups of Study 2 
 Control SF SFEx WF WFEx Total 
N 26 29 24 27 25 131 
 M 
(SD) 
M 
(SD) 
M 
(SD) 
M 
(SD) 
M 
(SD) 
M 
(SD) 
Diagnostic 
competences 
56.02 
(15.28) 
55.38 
(12.60) 
56.78 
(12.06) 
60.39 
(8.71) 
57.11 
(12.47) 
56.90 
(12.67) 
Diagnostic 
knowledge 
69.75 
(14.68) 
67.43 
(13.37) 
67.15 
(11.00) 
69.04 
(10.00) 
68.20 
(12.44) 
68.20 
(12.44) 
Conceptual 
Knowledge 
72.97 
(17.52) 
77.64 
(14.88) 
76.15 
(14.96) 
76.37 
(17.01) 
77.03 
(13.14) 
76.06 
(15.45) 
Strategic 
Knowledge 
75.16 
(14.12) 
70.69 
(17.72) 
69.36 
(12.06) 
69.83 
(14.05) 
71.58 
(11.61) 
71.33 
(14.15) 
Conditional 
Knowledge 
54.33 
(15.07) 
60.92 
(18.14) 
56.77 
(20.29) 
55.25 
(16.08) 
58.50 
(15.57) 
57.22 
(17.02) 
Error Detection 
Skills 
44.62 
(18.64) 
42.30 
(21.40) 
43.33 
(18.44) 
46.42 
(16.89) 
51.73 
(13.09) 
45.60 
(18.04) 
Note. SF: Spoken feedback, SFEx: Spoken feedback plus expert feedback, WF: written feedback, WFEx: Written feedback 
plus expert feedback, Control: Control group 
Study 2: The Voice is Mightier than the Pen 
 
90 
 
The MANCOVA showed (a) a multivariate main effect of prior knowledge, Wilks λ = 
.508, p = .000, but (b) not for medium of provided peer feedback, Wilks λ = .947, p = .259 or 
(c) received expert peer feedback, Wilks λ = .335, p = .854. There was also no multivariate 
interaction main effect, Wilks λ = .289, p = .885 on any parts of diagnostic competences. No 
significant between-subjects effects were found. 
7.8.4  RQ3 Relationship between medium of communication, expert feedback, 
elaboration of feedback, and acquisition of diagnostic competences 
First, correlations between degree of elaboration of provided peer feedback, mental 
effort and diagnostic competences, as well as prior knowledge were computed. 
Table 6 
Correlations between prior knowledge, post-test diagnostic competences, elaboration, and 
mental effort 
  
Prior 
Knowledge 
 
Diagnostic 
Competences 
 
Conceptual 
Knowledge 
 
Strategic 
Knowledge 
 
Conditional 
Knowledge 
 
Error 
Detection 
Skills 
 
Mental 
Effort 
 
Corrective 
Feedback 
 
-.05 
 
-.26 * 
 
-.17 
 
-.10 
 
-.16 
 
-.21 * 
 
-.03 
Elaborated 
Feedback 
.08 .28 * .17 .12 .18 .24 * .04 
Off-topic 
Feedback 
-.08 -.01 .00 -.13 -.05 .01 .07 
Mental 
Effort 
-.03 -.11 -.07 -.01 -.13 -.13  
* = p ≤ .05 
Based on the positive correlations between degree of elaboration of provided peer 
feedback and diagnostic competences acquisition, a MANCOVA with degree of elaboration 
and prior knowledge as covariates was conducted: 
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Prior knowledge, Wilks λ = .545, p = .000, ηp² = .47, and degree of elaboration, Wilks 
λ = .863, p = .011, ηp² = .14, showed multivariate effects on the acquisition of diagnostic 
competences. Medium of feedback provision, Wilks λ = .914, p = .094, and reception of 
expert feedback, Wilks λ = .227, p = .923, were not significant. There was also no main 
interaction effect of medium of feedback provision and receiving expert feedback, Wilks λ = 
.310, p = .871. Univariate between-subjects effects showed a significant influence of degree 
of elaboration on overall diagnostic competences, F(1,95) = 13.42 p = .000, ηp² =  .13, and 
error detection skills, F(1,95) = 9.98, p = .002, ηp² =  .10, but not on conceptual, F(1,95) = 
2.83, p = .096, strategic, F(1,95) = .61, p = .436, or conditional knowledge, F(1,95) = 3.91, p 
= .051. Although the multivariate main effect was not significant, medium of feedback 
provision showed significant univariate between-subject effects for overall diagnostic 
competences, F(1,95) = 8.04, p = .006, ηp² = .08 and error detection skills, F(1,95) = 7.36, p = 
.008, ηp² = .08. No significant effect was found for conceptual, F(1,95) = .515, p = .475, 
strategic, F(1,95) = 1.22, p = .272, or conditional, F(1,95) = .683, p = .411) knowledge parts 
of diagnostic competences. 
A mediation analysis was conducted to determine whether degree of elaboration of 
peer feedback mediates the relationship between medium of peer feedback provision and 
diagnostic competences. An indirect-only mediation effect was found with a completely 
standardized indirect effect of .09, with a 95% confidence interval ranging from .02, .19.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Model of mediation analysis between medium of communication, elaboration and 
diagnostic competences.  
.26** 
Medium of 
Feedback 
Provision 
Feedback 
Elaboration 
Diagnostic 
Competences  
.29** 
-.10 (-.05) 
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7.9 Discussion 
The results depict that providing peer feedback on erroneous cognitive modeling 
examples does not per se enhance learning. This could be shown by the treatment check: 
having the task to provide peer feedback on observed performances alone does not foster 
learning.  
The first research question investigated if there is a difference in the degree of 
elaboration of provided peer feedback on erroneous cognitive modeling examples if expert 
feedback is received during the task of providing peer feedback and if the variation of 
medium (spoken vs. written) influences the degree of elaboration as well. The medium of 
provided peer feedback influenced the degree of elaboration of peer feedback positively: the 
degree of elaboration of provided peer feedback was higher and corrective feedback was 
lower when spoken peer feedback was provided. Hypothesis 1a could be accepted. 
Hypothesis 1b about a positive influence of expert feedback on the degree of elaboration of 
provided peer feedback could be rejected, as no positive influence was found. 
The second research question examined how medium of provided peer feedback and 
receiving expert feedback on erroneous cognitive modeling examples influence the acqusition 
of diagnostic competences. The results show that providing spoken or written peer feedback 
did not automatically lead to a higher learning outcome, which contradicts Hypothesis 2a 
about a positive influence of providing spoken peer feedback on erroneous cognitive 
modeling examples on acuqisition of diagnostic competences. Further, results show that the 
reception of expert feedback during learning with erroneous cognitive modeling examples did 
not influence the students’ acqusition of diagnostic competences; hypothesis 2b could be 
rejected as well.  
The third research question focussed on the relationship of medium of peer feedback, 
elaboration and learning gain. It was shown that elaboration of provided peer feedback was 
positively correlated with learning gain of diagnostic competences (and error detection skills 
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in particular) while the percentage of corrective feedback was negatively correlated with 
diagnostic competences, especially error detection skills. There was no relationship between 
prior knowledge and degree elaboration of provided peer feedback or percentage of corrective 
feedback. Hypothesis 3a about a relationship between medium of providing peer feedback, 
degree of elaboration and acquisition of diagnostic competences could be accepted. A 
mediation analysis showed that there was an indirect-only mediation effect of medium of 
provided peer feedback on acqusition of diagnostic competences by the degree of elaboration 
of provided peer feedback as a mediator. Hypothesis 3b about the degree of elaboration of 
peer feedback mediating the effect of medium of peer feedback provision on acquisition of 
diagnostic competences could be partially accepted with an indirect-only mediation.  
Overall, the reception of expert feedback did not positively influence the acquisition of 
diagnostic competences when learning with erroneous cognitive modeling examples. This is 
not in line with research highlighting the positive effect of elaborated expert feedback when 
learning with erroneous written worked examples as found by Heitzmann et al. (2015) and 
Stark et al. (2011). A possible explanation could be that the operationalization of the expert 
feedback was written in CASUS and not included in the cases. It might have been hard to 
properly connect the content of the erroneous cognitive modeling examples with the expert 
feedback due to the absence of such integration. Kolodner, Cox, and González-Calero (2005) 
argue that in order to be an effective means for learning from errors, feedback must be 
presented immediately after observing the error. Furthermore, as pointed out by Heitzmann et 
al. (2015), when reaching a certain point of expertise in a field, elaborated expert feedback 
might lead to an expertise reversal effect. This means that received expert elaboration may be 
redundant and students do not learn from it anymore (Kalyuga et al., 2003). Finally, students’ 
high prior knowledge might be evidence that they were already too advanced to profit from 
the expert feedback in the present study. 
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The positive direct effect of spoken peer feedback compared to written peer feedback 
on the acquisition of diagnostic competences due to increased social presence when speaking 
– which was assumed based on the studies by Fiorella and Mayer (2013); Hoogerheide, 
Deijkers, et al. (2016); Hoogerheide, van Wermeskerken, et al. (2016) – was not found. 
However, by considering and analysing the mediating effect of the degree of elaboration of 
the provided peer feedback, the possible influence of medium of feedback provision could be 
demonstrated on acuqisition of diagnostic competences when feedback is elaborated. This is 
in line with studies on learning from providing elaborated peer feedback: Results show that 
only when students elaborate deeply on what they observed, they profit from providing peer 
feedback and acquire knowledge (Y. H. Cho & Cho, 2011; Li et al., 2010).  
 Hoogerheide, Deijkers, et al. (2016) argue that social presence plays a major role in 
the positive effect of spoken medium over written when explaining it to others. When 
engaged in spoken and face-to-face communication, students feel more personally involved 
and therefore engage more in elaboration of the learning material. Based on the findings, I 
also want to highlight another possibile explanation. Krych-Appelbaum and Musial (2007) 
suggested that students who write comments to fictitious others, estimate the recipient to be 
knowledgeable and have difficulties judging the (fictitious) recipient’s competence level – as 
results students tend to explain less. Apart from this maljudgement of recepient expertise, 
student reviewers were found to provide more spoken feedback (compared to written) because 
it is simply a more efficient, familiar way of communcation (Reynolds & Russell, 2008), 
which might lead to increased motivation to elaborate on the observed performance, leading 
to more learning gain due to less mental and physical effort involved in speaking than in 
writing. 
Finally, the findings of this second study highlight the importance of examining the 
effect of the characteristics of the task to provide (and receive) peer feedback. It can be 
suggested that researchers and educators determine what works concerning medium, style and 
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circumstances of feedback rounds as they play a crucial role. The present study already 
demonstrated that the communucation medium influences elaboration and learning. A 
thorough meta-analysis or empricial literature review of existing peer feedback intervention 
studies across domains might uncover additional factors that mediate and moderate possible 
benefical or detrimental effects of feedback provision and reception.  
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8 Summary and Comparison of the two Empirical Studies 
8.1  Summary of Study 1 
In Study 1, theoretical assumptions were outlined for why a framework of diagnostic 
competences composed of diagnostic knowledge types of conceptual, strategic and 
conditional knowledge proposed by Stark et al. (2011) should be expanded by an inclusion of 
error detection skills. This proposed expansion was based on the nature of the clinical 
reasoning process as both deliberate and intuitive (Kahnemann, 2011). To teach diagnostic 
competences, the beneficial effects of cognitive modeling examples for skill acquisition in 
other domains might be transferred to medical education (Van Gog & Rummel, 2010). Based 
on the literature on cognitive modeling examples, research gaps were identified regarding 
how these examples may be effectively utilized for teaching diagnostic competences. It was 
unclear whether errors should be incorporated in the cognitive modeling examples and if the 
task to provide peer feedback can serve as an interactive learning component which triggers 
engagement, elaboration and ultimately foster the acquisition of diagnostic competences. 
Therefore, four research questions were formulated: The first research question was if 
cognitive modeling examples are a more effective approach of acquiring diagnostic 
competences compared to reading a textbook chapter for diagnosing dyspnea. A second 
research question targeted the beneficial effect of providing peer feedback (versus just 
observing) on erroneous cognitive modeling examples (versus correct modeling examples) on 
the acquisition of diagnostic competences. A third research question examined the effect of 
both factors on mental effort. A forth research question focused on the relationship between 
the quality of provided peer feedback on acquisition of diagnostic competences. 
The results indicated that cognitive modeling examples can be used as a possible 
approach to teach diagnostic competences and are better for teaching conceptual knowledge 
than a textbook. Positive effects of errors in cognitive modeling examples on error detection 
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skills were found. However, the assumed beneficial effects of errors in cognitive modeling 
examples on the three types of diagnostic knowledge could not be found. In sum, the results 
by Stark et al. (2011) about beneficial effects of errors in written worked examples on the 
acquisition of diagnostic knowledge could not completely be transferred to erroneous 
cognitive modeling examples. Contrary to the assumptions of positive effects on learning gain 
of the task to provide peer feedback as reported by Li et al. (2010) or Y. H. Cho and Cho 
(2011) a negative effect was found. However, in the group providing peer feedback on 
erroneous cognitive modeling examples, degree elaboration of provided peer feedback was 
related to learning gain. Further exploration of the potential processes that might explain the 
negative effect did not yield clear results: Mental effort was positively correlated with 
elaboration of provided peer feedback while there was no significant correlation between the 
acquisition of diagnostic competences and neither elaboration nor mental effort. 
In sum, the results did not offer clear explanations why providing peer feedback was 
negatively influencing the acquisition of diagnostic competences for the providing student. 
Given the degree of elaboration of provided peer feedback was correlated with mental effort, 
the positive correlation of mental effort, incorporating a feedback training and providing the 
students with expert feedback in the learning intervention may lead to a reduction of mental 
effort. Further, a change in medium of peer feedback provision from written to spoken was 
suggested which may increase social presence, elaboration and therefore learning gain. Due to 
these inconclusive results, it was important to examine these possible influential variables of 
the task to provide peer feedback, which might influence the effects on learning in a 
consecutive study (Study 2). Using feedback training, incorporating expert feedback and 
identifying positive influential factors for providing peer feedback were suggested for a future 
research design to ensure elaboration and decrease mental effort. 
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8.2 Summary of Study 2 
Based on the results of Study 1 and additional review of literature, incorporating a 
feedback training, providing students with expert feedback and comparison of medium of 
feedback provision were identified as factors that could improve student learning from 
providing peer feedback on cognitive modeling examples. First of all, according to Y. H. Cho 
and Cho (2011) and Li et al. (2010), providing peer feedback needs to lead to elaboration in 
order to be beneficial for learning. The assumption that stimulating social presence, which in 
turn increases elaboration and ultimately learning outcome when providing spoken peer 
feedback, was based on studies by Hoogerheide, Deijkers, et al. (2016) and Fiorella and 
Mayer (2013, 2014), who found that spoken explanations for another fictitious person of 
learning materials are better for learning compared to writing. Further, incorporating expert 
feedback was assumed to help elaboration on the content of the examples and increase 
learning gain as demonstrated by Stark et al. (2011). Due to the importance of degree of 
elaboration of peer feedback for learning and these findings on beneficial effects of spoken 
over written peer feedback and fruitful incorporation of expert feedback on erroneous 
examples, two main research questions were formulated: The first research question targeted 
how (a) written versus spoken peer feedback provision and (b) expert feedback versus no 
expert feedback as well as (c) their different combinations influence the degree of elaboration 
of provided peer feedback. The second research question focused on the influence of both 
varied factors on the acquisition of diagnostic competences. A third one examined the 
interplay of communication medium and expert feedback with a possible mediation by the 
degree of elaboration and acquisition of diagnostic competences. Results indicate that while 
there was no effect of medium of peer feedback provision or reception of expert peer 
feedback on the acquisition of diagnostic competences, there was an effect of the medium of 
peer feedback provision on degree of elaboration. More specifically, a mediation analysis 
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showed a positive indirect mediating effect of spoken peer feedback provision on degree of 
elaboration, which influenced the acquisition of diagnostic competences.  
In conclusion, the beneficial effect of the task to provide peer feedback is strongly 
influenced by the degree of elaboration of the provided peer feedback. It could be shown that 
this elaboration is influenced by the medium of communication: Students providing spoken 
peer feedback elaborated more on the observed cognitive modeling examples, which led to 
more acquisition of diagnostic competences. It was assumed that mainly perceived social 
presence induced by speaking – similar to the findings of Fiorella and Mayer (2013, 2014) or 
Hoogerheide, Deijkers, et al. (2016) – was responsible for this positive effect. An explanation 
for the non-significant effects of expert feedback on elaboration and acquisition of diagnostic 
competences was given based on assumed incorrect timing: The incorporated expert feedback 
was not placed right after the error in the modeling example happened, but after providing 
peer feedback. Kolodner, Owensby, and Guzdial (2004) propose immediate expert feedback 
on errors in case-based learning methods so that the student can relate the feedback to the 
error in order to influence learning positively. 
The design of Study 2 was based on that of Study 1. Due to similarities in measured 
variables, samples and design, an empirical comparison is possible to some extent. Therefore, 
the next sub-chapter aims to compare both studies. 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary and Comparison of the two Empirical Studies 
 
100 
 
8.3 Comparison of Study 1 and Study 2 
Table 7  
Age and Semester for the samples of Study 1 (N = 121) and Study 2 (N = 131) 
 Study 1 
M(SD) 
Study 2 
M(SD) 
Age 24.38 (2.80). 24.19 (3.03) 
Semester 7.00 (0.00) 7.48 (1.55) 
Note. Samples depicted include the experimental and control groups 
 In terms of demographics, the samples were similar concerning age or sex ratio (56% 
female in Study 1 versus 58% female in Study 2). However, the sample of the first study 
consisted of medical students of the LMU Medical Center in the seventh semester only, 
whereas the sample of the second study was more diverse in terms of study semester ranging 
from a minimum of 5 to a maximum of 11 semesters, making the sample more heterogeneous 
in terms of prior knowledge. The sample size of Study 2 was also larger with ten more 
participants. 
8.3.1  Diagnostic competences – differences in operationalization and empirical 
comparison 
The knowledge test used for prior knowledge was the same for both studies in terms of 
conceptual (7 multiple choice items) and strategic knowledge (6 key-feature questions). For 
prior knowledge in Study 2, two problem-solving tasks were integrated to also assess 
conditional knowledge. The post-test for diagnostic competences was shortened from Study 1 
to Study 2: The conceptual knowledge test was reduced by five multiple-choice items (from 
15 to 10), and the test for strategic knowledge by three key-feature question items (from 15 to 
12) to make the intervention more compact based on criticism by the students about the 
length. Conditional knowledge remained unchanged with six open-ended question items. The 
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error detection test was also not changed. Since the control group in Study 1 only read a 
textbook chapter, 97 participants (out of 121) inform the experimental groups could be 
included. Study 2 remained unchanged in terms of participants that qualify for direct 
comparison (N = 131). Based on these limitations, the studies can be compared regarding (a) 
prior knowledge consisting of conceptual and strategic knowledge and (b) identical items of 
the post-test for diagnostic competences (N = 226). A t-test for independent samples was 
conducted for these comparisons. Requirements for this were met. 
There was a significant difference in prior knowledge between the experimental 
groups of Study 1 (M = 54.1, SD = 9.3) performing lower than those ofStudy 2 (M = 70.7, SD 
= 11.4) in the pre-test, t(226) = 12.049, p = .00, d = 1.60. 
There was also a significant difference in conceptual knowledge gain between the 
experimental groups of Study 1 (M = 79.2, SD = 13.8) and Study 2 (M = 74.3, SD = 13.8), 
t(226) = -2.637, p = .009, d = .35. No significant difference was found for strategic knowledge 
between Study 1 (M = 73.5, SD = 11.5) and Study 2 (M = 71.3, SD = 14.1), t(226) = -1.275, p 
= .204, or for conditional knowledge between Study 1 (M = 60.9, SD = 19.1) and Study 2 (M 
= 57.2, SD = 17.0), t(226) = -1.420, p = .157. Comparing error detection skills between Study 
1 (M = 44.2, SD = 18.0) and Study 2 (M = 44.2, SD = 16.4) revealed no significant difference, 
t(226) = .602, p = .548. Overall diagnostic competence acquisition did not differ significantly, 
t(226) = -1.723, p = .086, between Study 1 (M = 64.6, SD = 9.9) and Study 2 (M = 62.1, SD = 
11.4). 
In sum, participants in Study 1 had less prior knowledge than participants in Study 2. 
An explanation might be that study semesters were more heterogeneous in Study 2. 
Participants in Study 1 were only in the seventh semester. Participants in Study 2 were mixed, 
ranging from fifth to eleventh semester. The prior knowledge test consisted of easy, medium 
and hard questions of different complexity. It might be that even though the mean of 
semesters was similar in Study 1 and 2, knowledge from seventh to eleventh semester does 
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not increase just linear but rather exponentially, leading to an overall higher score in prior 
knowledge in Study 2 even though both means of semesters are similar (Tomic, Martins, 
Lotufo, & Benseñor, 2005). A spearman correlation revealed a medium correlation between 
semester and prior knowledge in Study 2 with rs = .389, p = .00. 
8.3.2 Differences in degree of elaboration of provided peer feedback 
Concerning the degree of elaboration of provided peer feedback, participants in Study 
1 provided significantly less elaborated feedback (M = 11.0, SD = 10.3)  (and therefore more 
(general) corrective feedback) than participants in Study 2 (M = 45.8, , SD = 19.8) , t(140) = 
15.309, p = .001: 
 
Figure 6. Comparison of degree of elaboration between Study 1 and Study 2 
 
One explanation might be that just erroneous examples were used in Study 2, leading 
to a higher possibility to elaborate on the observed cognitive modeling examples: This is 
supported by the finding that participants in Study 1 provided significantly more elaborated 
peer feedback on erroneous cognitive modeling examples (M = 15.6, SD = 13.4) than correct 
cognitive modeling examples (M = 6.4, SD = 7.2), t(44) = 2.86, p = .005.  
However, there was still a significant increase in degree of elaboration when 
comparing providing peer feedback on erroneous examples from Study 1 (M = 15.6, SD = 
86% 
14% 
Study 1 
Corrective
Elaborated
54% 
46% 
Study 2 
Corrective
Elaborated
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13.4) and Study 2 (M = 45.8, SD = 19.8), t(48.5) = 8.68, p = .000. Therefore, the increased 
degree of elaboration could not only be explained by the errors in cognitive modeling 
examples. Prior knowledge could not have been responsible for the difference in degree of 
elaboration as no correlation was found between prior knowledge and elaboration in Study 2 
(rs = .08, p = n.s.). Therefore, as another explanation for the difference in degree of 
elaboration it seems plausible that the increase in elaboration might be due to the short 
feedback training integrated in Study 2. Training medical students to provide effective peer 
feedback for learning was advised by Prins et al. (2006) after finding that general practitioners 
in training lack the ability to provide adequate feedback in other domains such as teacher 
training. Training peer revision skills has been found to be effective to teach feedback 
provision skills, that is after short trainings, students’ quality of provided peer feedback 
significantly improved (Min, 2005; Rahimi, 2013; Sluijsmans et al., 2002).  
Overall, the comparison of Study 1 and Study 2 highlights two important added 
findings: First, more prior knowledge does not lead to providing more elaborated peer 
feedback. Second, students who received a short feedback provision training prior to the task 
provided more elaborated peer feedback than students who did not. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
General Discussion 
 
104 
 
9 General Discussion 
In the following general discussion, section 9.1 provides interpretations, a discussion 
and implications of the findings. Section 9.2 focusses on conclusive answers to the main 
research questions of this thesis. Limitations and a future outlook are outlined in section 9.3. 
9.1 Interpretation, Discussion and Implications of the Findings 
9.1.1 Acquiring parts of diagnostic competences with cognitive modeling 
examples 
In Study 1, cognitive modeling examples were found to be significantly superior for 
learning conceptual knowledge compared to textbook learning. No significant difference for 
strategic or conditional knowledge or error detection skills was found. While cognitive 
modeling examples were assumed to be effective for acquiring conceptual and procedural 
(strategic and conditional) knowledge parts of diagnostic competences (Braaksma et al., 2002; 
Custers, Regehr, McCulloch, Peniston, & Reznick, 1999; Van Gog & Rummel, 2010), Nokes-
Malach, VanLehn, Belenky, Lichtenstein, and Cox (2013) found that written worked 
examples focus learners’ attention on conceptual knowledge acquisition rather than fostering 
problem-solving skills. Their results showed that students acquired more conceptual 
knowledge when learning with worked examples compared to learning with textbooks. No 
difference was found for problem-solving skills. The results of Nokes-Malach et al. (2013) are 
in line with the results of Study 1, supporting the hypothesis of Hoogerheide et al. (2014) that 
the effects of written worked examples on learning could be similar and transferred to 
learning settings with cognitive modeling examples. Overall, the non-significant results of 
cognitive modeling examples for other parts of diagnostic competences found in Study 1 
question the effectiveness of cognitive modeling examples for learning diagnostic 
competences because of high effort involved in creating, piloting and incorporating such 
examples into learning environments for a limited advantage over learning with a textbook. 
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However, the learning material chosen for the control group was a text book chapter medical 
students normally use to prepare for their exams (Füeßl & Middeke, 2010). This book was 
also used to create and validate several questions of the diagnostic knowledge post-test. It 
covered a holistic and detailed knowledge base about the illnesses that were target of the 
knowledge test questions. This might have led to an advantage for the control group 
concerning correctly answering the post-test knowledge questions, outweighing possible 
advantageous effects on learning with cognitive modeling examples in comparison. 
Furthermore, the students are familiar with learning with such textbooks for exams. Even 
though students were familiar with CASUS, the learning environment was specifically 
designed and differed significantly to other environments in CASUS. A familiarization task 
for the specifically designed learning environment may have been useful to counter the 
possible influential difference of familiarity to learning materials (Wegerif, 1998). Both the 
detailed content and the familiarity of the learning material of the control group might have 
led to the rather high results of the control group in the post-test, which might have led to 
small non-significant differences in strategic and conditional knowledge parts compared to the 
experimental groups. 
The findings that cognitive modeling examples are suitable for learning conceptual 
knowledge parts of diagnostic competences add to the theoretical foundations. Cognitive 
modeling examples have been proven effective in different, less structured domains such as 
writing (Braaksma et al., 2002) or more across-domain skills like collaboration, 
communication of self-regulative skills (Baldwin, 1992; Rummel & Spada, 2005; 
Zimmerman & Kitsantas, 2002). They were also found to be effective in medical education, 
but for procedural (not cognitive) skills like surgical skills or digital rectal examination 
(Custers et al., 1999; Stegmann, Pilz, Siebeck, & Fischer, 2012). The findings of Study 1 
however advance this body of literature by finding benefits of cognitive modeling examples 
for conceptual diagnostic knowledge. 
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The presented results highlight that cognitive modeling examples should be 
incorporated into medical education practice for teaching medical students conceptual parts of 
diagnostic competences. One way to overcome the high effort to create cognitive modeling 
example would be to use OSCE settings, which are objective structured clinical examination 
tests in simulations where students’ performance in a simulation is rated, to create cognitive 
modeling examples. OSCE are reliable and valid but very expensive in terms of manpower, 
time and costs (Carraccio & Englander, 2000; Petrusa, Blackwell, & Ainsworth, 1990; 
Zayyan, 2011). Creating and validating (erroneous) cognitive modeling examples of students’ 
performances during the OSCE simulations should increase the accessibility of the 
performance to other students and therefore make the high expenses worthwhile.  
9.1.2 Effects of errors in cognitive modeling examples on error detection skills 
In Study 1, the effect of erroneous versus correct cognitive modeling examples was 
examined on acquiring diagnostic competences. To my knowledge, erroneous cognitive 
modeling examples have been used either in studies where they were presented 
simultaneously with correct ones for comparison as analogic reasoning task for psycho-/motor 
learning (Domuracki et al., 2015; Renkl, 2014) or alone in relation to increased attention and 
motivation (Renkl & Atkinson, 2003). The specific added benefits of only erroneous 
modeling examples on diagnostic competences and especially error detection skills – to my 
knowledge –has not been examined so far. In this respect, the first study of this thesis 
strengthens the suggestion to integrate errors into cognitive modeling examples to teach error 
related knowledge and skills that might lead to greater accuracy: The suggestion by Gartmeier 
et al. (2008, 2010) to expose learners to erroneous performances to teach error detection and 
error avoidance is applicable for erroneous cognitive modeling examples, even in a short 
learning intervention. The added benefit of using erroneous examples to teach error avoidance 
instead of real-life situations with actual patients can increase patient safety. However, results 
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indicated that while erroneous cognitive modeling examples were superior for acquiring error 
detection skills when compared to correct cognitive modeling examples, there was no 
significant difference in conceptual, strategic or conditional knowledge acquisition. First and 
foremost, this might have been due to the content of the erroneous and correct examples being 
largely identical in all three knowledge parts included. The errors incorporated were not 
knowledge-based, but based on decision making biases. Therefore, they might have been 
engaging and motivating as proposed by Van Gog and Rummel (2010), but might have led 
the students’ to focus on where and how the error during the diagnoses occurred, which led to 
increased error detection skills, but not increased knowledge.  
The beneficial effect of erroneous cognitive modeling on error detection skills could 
be transferred into medical education practice. Critics of use of errors in medical education 
might claim that erroneous learning material is detrimental for learning when the error is left 
uncommented. However, as highlighted by Renkl and Atkinson (2003), erroneous examples 
are fruitful for intermediate and advanced learners when the error is highlighted and therefore 
found. The results indicate that errors in medical education settings are beneficial for error 
detection, which is, according to Gartmeier et al. (2010) and Dror (2011), an important part of 
medical expertise. So far, the approach in medical education to handle errors leans towards 
the attitude to “deny the mistakes that happened and vigorously defend against malpractice 
claims” (Rocke & Lee, 2013, p. 550). However, Study 1 showed that being exposed to errors 
in diagnosing seems to be beneficial for a distinct set of skills connected to mistakes. This 
adds to the findings from Domuracki et al. (2015), Gartmeier et al. (2010) and Ziv et al. 
(2005) about the importance of being exposed to errors in medical education.  
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9.1.3 Effects of (elaborated) peer feedback provision on the acquisition of 
diagnostic competences 
So far, isolated effects of peer feedback provision on the provider’s knowledge 
acquisition have been examined in a limited number of studies in different domains such as 
writing (K. Cho & MacArthur, 2011; Y. H. Cho & Cho, 2011) or technology education (Li et 
al., 2010). To my knowledge, both of the empirical studies of this thesis are the first to 
examine how providing peer feedback on videotaped peer diagnostic reasoning via different 
communication media affects the acquisition of diagnostic competences.  
In Study 1, detrimental effects of providing peer feedback on cognitive modeling 
examples were found. A possible explanation for the negative effect of the task to provide 
peer feedback was that students were unfamiliar with providing peer feedback and mental 
overload led to negative effects on the acquisition of diagnostic competences. Analysis of 
quality of provided peer feedback in Study 1 showed that it was mostly corrective and not 
elaborated, which is in line with literature about the inability of students to provide ad-hoc 
adequate peer feedback without training (Min, 2005; Prins et al., 2006; Rahimi, 2013). This 
training for elaborated feedback was implemented to familiarize and enable students to 
provide elaborated peer feedback, which in turn should lead to a positive effect of peer 
feedback provision on learning as proposed by Y. H. Cho and Cho (2011) and Li et al. (2010). 
Therefore, a short training was included that emphasized why it is important and how to 
provide elaborated peer feedback at the beginning of the intervention of Study 2 to increase 
elaboration and decrease mental effort. 
In comparison to Study 1, students in Study 2 provided more elaborated peer feedback 
on the diagnoses of the cognitive modeling examples than students in Study 1. The advanced 
prior knowledge of students in Study 2 did not reveal a significant effect on the degree of 
elaboration. Therefore, the increase of degree of elaboration of provided peer feedback may 
be caused by the feedback training as suggested by Prins et al. (2006) and Sluijsmans et al. 
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(2002). However, no significant differences in acquisition of diagnostic competences were 
found in direct comparison of Study 1 and Study 2. A relationship of degree of elaboration 
with acquisition of diagnostic competences however can be assumed due to the negative 
effect of corrective feedback in Study 1 and the positive effect of elaborated peer feedback in 
Study 2 on the acquisition of diagnostic competences.  
First, the depicted results advance the literature on the impact of providing peer 
feedback on the provider for learning as depicted by Y. H. Cho and Cho (2011), K. Cho and 
MacArthur (2011) and Li et al. (2010). Peer feedback provision can be used as interactive 
learning method when learning with cognitive modeling examples, given the students 
elaborate on the observed performances. The presented results could be translated into 
medical education practice. 
When medical educators use peer feedback tasks for learning, they should be aware of 
the difficulties that arise with this. Medical students seem to have problems with providing 
elaborated peer feedback, which might be detrimental for learning. Therefore, training 
students how to effectively provide peer feedback should be considered before peer feedback 
for learning is utilized. Furthermore, integrating guidance in form of feedback prompts (Baker 
& Lund, 1997; Gielen et al., 2010) or feedback training (Sluijsmans et al., 2002) should be 
provided. Just providing peer feedback without any guidance might be detrimental for 
learning. In reference to the example of OSCE settings earlier, observing students can be 
either trained beforehand or instructed during the task to provide elaborated peer feedback on 
the peer in the simulation to increase acquisition if diagnostic competences. 
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9.1.4 Medium of peer feedback provision on elaboration and acquisition of 
diagnostic competences 
In Study 2, the difference between spoken versus written peer feedback provision on 
elaboration and acquisition of diagnostic competences was examined. Providing spoken peer 
feedback increased the degree of elaboration, which led to increased acquisition of diagnostic 
competences. These results advance the results of Hoogerheide, Deijkers, et al. (2016) of the 
advantage of the task to provide spoken over written explanations to a fictitious other when 
learning syllogistic reasoning tasks with examples: The results revealed that their findings can 
be transferred to the task of providing spoken peer feedback on diagnostic reasoning of 
cognitive modeling examples in medicine. A possible explanation for the positive effect of 
providing spoken peer feedback on the degree of elaboration and therefore learning gain were 
given: First, social presence was assumed to be influential when speaking versus writing. 
Social presence was assessed with a short form of the temple inventory for presence 
(Lombard, Ditton, & Weinstein, 2009), which was translated into German but was too short to 
yield reliable results. Hoogerheide, Deijkers, et al. (2016) measured social presence by coding 
the content of the given explanations. The presence and absence of pronouns was used as 
indicator for perceived social presence. A similar approach could have been used in my study 
as well. This method is based on suggestions and assumptions that pronouns might be seen as 
a rather weak indicator for social presence (Rourke, Anderson, Garrison, & Archer, 2007) 
unlike humor or emotions – which were not coded in the case of Hoogerheide, Deijkers, et al. 
(2016), and not reliably coded in the study by Rourke et al. (2007). Because I assumed that 
the learning setting (critical patient cases) was not an appropriate place for humor and 
emotions, this was neither expected nor yielded in the results. Thus, this was not pursued in 
the assessment. For practice use, this means that educators must choose the medium with 
which students provide each other feedback adequately and with care. Influential indicators 
could be the familiarity of the students or possibly the social presence this medium provides. 
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9.1.5 Ineffectiveness of expert feedback for acquisition of diagnostic 
competences 
Unlike the beneficial effects of incorporating expert feedback when learning with 
written worked examples as found by Stark et al. (2011), no such benefits were found for 
cognitive modeling examples. A possible explanation for this might be that the expert 
feedback was not presented directly after watching the erroneous cognitive modeling 
examples. In order to have a beneficial effect on learning outcome, expert feedback needs to 
be presented shortly after the error was observed so that students can relate the feedback to 
the error and make sense of it (Kolodner et al., 2004). A timely delay might have led to a non-
significant effect of incorporating expert feedback due to the students not being able to 
properly relate the expert feedback to the prior observed performance. 
Furthermore, students in Study 2 were on an advanced level of prior diagnostic 
knowledge, which could have led to the expertise reversal effect: Presented expert feedback 
was conflicting with an already existing constructed explanation of the errors based on the 
students’ prior knowledge, making it ineffective for learning (Heitzmann et al., 2015; Kalyuga 
et al., 2003). To counter this effect, incorporating adaptable feedback that could be adjusted to 
the learners’ needs was proven to be effective when learning with worked examples 
(Heitzmann et al., 2015). 
Contrary to other findings of worked example research (i.e. about feasibility for 
learning conceptual knowledge, see section 9.1.1), results of studies on expert feedback on 
written worked examples (Stark et al., 2011) could not be transferred to learning with expert 
feedback on cognitive modeling examples as the findings in Study 2 indicate. Therefore, it is 
to question if students profit from expert feedback under all circumstances. Adequate and 
well-timed expert feedback that is tailored on the students’ needs is suggested for practice use 
(Heitzmann et al., 2015; Kolodner et al., 2005; Kolodner et al., 2004). 
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9.2 Conclusions 
The first main research question focused on how medical students acquire diagnostic 
competences from providing peer feedback on erroneous or correct cognitive modeling 
examples of clinical reasoning: Study 1 showed that cognitive modeling examples are a valid 
alternative to learning with textbooks for acquiring diagnostic competences as they were 
superior to textbook learning for conceptual parts of diagnostic knowledge. Study 1 also 
highlights the importance of errors integrated into them. Even though erroneous cognitive 
modeling examples were not per se more beneficial for learning diagnostic knowledge when 
compared to correct ones, they offered advantages for students by increasing error detection 
skills. This is in line with my expectations that being exposed to erroneous behavior may 
increase meta-cognitive knowledge about where an error might happen or has happened in 
consecutive performance (Dror, 2011; Gartmeier et al., 2008). Providing corrective peer 
feedback was found to be detrimental for learning. Students should be familiarized and 
trained how to give elaborated peer feedback, which is beneficial for learning. 
Concerning the effect of providing peer feedback on the cognitive modeling examples 
on learning, the results of Study 1 were at first contrary to the hypothesis: Students acquired 
less diagnostic competences when they provided peer feedback on cognitive modeling 
examples compared to just observing. This was due to the superficial nature of the corrective 
peer feedback they provided. Studies highlight the importance of the degree of elaboration of 
students’ peer feedback in order for it to be fruitful for learning (K. Cho & MacArthur, 2011; 
Y. H. Cho & Cho, 2011). In response to the results of Study 1 which emphasized the 
importance of the degree of elaboration when providing peer feedback for learning, a training 
why and how to provide elaborated peer feedback was implemented in Study 2, which 
increased elaboration. In Study 2, there was a positive effect of degree of elaboration of peer 
feedback on learning gain. The assumed negative effect of corrective feedback in Study 1 
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found support in these results of Study 2. The novelty of the task to provide peer feedback 
was hypothesized to be responsible for a higher mental effort and less elaboration, which was 
assumed to be countered by the training. 
The second main question focused on the influence of expert feedback and the 
medium of communication of the task to provide peer feedback on erroneous cognitive 
modeling on elaboration and acquisition of diagnostic competences. The communication 
medium for providing peer feedback influenced the degree of elaboration further: Students 
who provided spoken peer feedback elaborated more than students providing written peer 
feedback, and this elaboration led to better learning of diagnostic competences. This is in line 
with Hoogerheide, Deijkers, et al. (2016) and Fiorella and Mayer (2013, 2014) examining the 
positive effect of spoken communication medium on learning gain when explaining. Contrary 
to the beneficial effect of communication medium, receiving expert feedback did not enhance 
elaboration or learning as assumed according to studies like Stark et al. (2011). 
To summarize, the results show that using erroneous cognitive modeling examples in 
medical education has beneficial effects on parts of diagnostic competences, which are 
conceptual knowledge and error detection skills. Students providing spoken, elaborated peer 
feedback learn most from erroneous cognitive modeling examples. This elaboration could be 
further enhanced with a short training about why and how to effectively provide elaborated 
peer feedback before the task to provide peer feedback. However, the results of both 
presented studies offer possibilities for criticism and additional future directions. The 
following section discusses possible limitations and an outlook for future research 
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9.3 Limitations and Outlook for Future Research 
The presented empirical studies can be critically discussed in terms of methodological 
limitations which are outlined in the following concerning instruments in section 9.3.1 and 
learning material in section 9.3.2. After this, a possible outlook in section 9.3.3 for future 
research based on this thesis is described. 
9.3.1 Instrument limitations 
A first limitation is the way diagnostic competences were assessed in both studies. 
Epstein and Hundert (2002) define professional competence in medicine as “the habitual and 
judicious use of communication, knowledge, technical skills, clinical reasoning, emotions, 
values, and reflection in daily practice for the benefit of the individual and community being 
served” (Epstein & Hundert, 2002, p. 226). Despite consisting of several knowledge 
component questions based on Stark et al. (2011) as well as error detection skill tasks, the pre- 
and post-test used might not fully depict the performance of the students in real diagnostic 
settings. This might decrease external validity, similar to for example objective structured 
clinical examination tests in simulations (OSCE) that simulate such a daily situation 
(Carraccio & Englander, 2000; Petrusa et al., 1990). A possible alternative that shows 
sufficient predictors for later clinical performance might be the script-concordance test (SCT) 
(Brailovsky, Charlin, Beausoleil, Cote, & Van der Vleuten, 2001; Monnier, Bédard, Gagnon, 
& Charlin, 2011). However, it can be questioned if the SCT offers more validity and 
reliability than the test proposed by Stark et al. (2011), because it is similar to the test used in 
the empirical studies of this thesis in terms of creating, validation and rating by independent 
experts. Future research about how to assess diagnostic competences might tap into the 
question about a gold standard for the assessment of diagnostic competences by relating and 
comparing several assessment methods with each other by a multi-trait multi-method 
approach (Campbell & Fiske, 1959; Monnier et al., 2011). 
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Another limitation is the additional part of error detection skills to the three diagnostic 
knowledge parts of three components testing (Stark et al., 2011; Van Gog et al., 2004). While 
the error detection test has been used before in other studies (Nyssen & Blavier, 2006), and 
proven reliable in both studies of this thesis, the fit of the error-detection part relative to the 
knowledge parts constituting diagnostic competences was not empirically examined. One way 
to clarify the relationship between error detection skills with other performance measures 
would be to relate it to actual diagnostic reasoning accuracy and performance in a real life 
setting in similar and transfer cases. For both studies, a three-component concept of diagnostic 
competences was extended with a forth component of error detection skills. First, further 
research should address the concept of diagnostic competences as a three or four component 
concept by assessing conceptual, strategic and conditional knowledge and error detection 
skills with for example an exploratory factor analysis. Therefore, it is important to relate error 
detection skills to performance measurements and look for predictive validity of it for 
diagnostic accuracy and patient care. Such an approach was already made by Wilkinson et al. 
(2011) in exploring how expertise of dialysis technicians correlates with their error detection 
skills. To correlate error detection skills and the knowledge parts of the concept of diagnostic 
competences used for this thesis with the diagnostic accuracy of physicians in real-life or 
simulation settings could give further insight into how error detection skills, conceptual, 
strategic and conditional knowledge are related or even predicting to ‘actual competence’ and 
performance. 
Another limitation in terms of measurements of covariates is that overall mental effort 
was measured in both studies instead of two (intrinsic and extraneous) or three components of 
germane, intrinsic and extraneous cognitive load but as an overall score obtained with the 8-
item inventory by Paas and Kalyuga (2005). Even though the results of Study 1 showed a 
correlation of mental effort and providing peer feedback that indicate that different types of 
cognitive load might be related to providing peer feedback, the instrument to assess mental 
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effort was reused in Study 2. In order to see the relationship between provide peer feedback 
and different types of cognitive load, future studies could use the questionnaire proposed by 
Leppink et al. (2013). 
9.3.2 Learning material limitations 
Concerning external validity, a limitation arises from the use of video-based models in 
a computer-based learning environment. This approach was chosen as it is superior to real-life 
settings in terms of standardization of observed scripted performances and allowed for more 
control to investigate the isolated effects of feedback provision. It was ensured that every 
student observed the same performance by a fictional peer. However, the task to provide peer 
feedback on video-based cognitive modeling examples in a computer-based learning 
environment like CASUS might not be comparable to a peer feedback situation in real life or 
simulations because it might be perceived as unauthentic, which could have led to different 
behavior or changed the attitude of students compared to real-life settings. In my study 
designs, the model’s performance in the video was used as target for the task to provide peer 
feedback. The model could not react to the comments made by the providing student. This 
reaction and interaction between provider and recipient of peer feedback might lead to 
different processes and dynamics of providing peer feedback, influencing the effects on 
learning. For example, Liu and Carless (2006) highlight the importance of dialogue in peer 
feedback to be beneficial for learning. A study contrasting the effects of providing peer 
feedback on performance of cognitive modeling examples versus providing peer feedback on 
performance of a student in a simulation with and without the possibility of dialogue could 
give insights into the ecological validity of the task to provide peer feedback on cognitive 
modeling examples. The effects of peer feedback provision on learning as found in both 
studies might then give further insight on a possible generalizability to other settings of 
domains. 
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9.3.3 Future outlook 
The empirical studies presented in Chapters 6 and 7 shed light on the positive effects 
of using erroneous cognitive modeling examples of a peer’s diagnostic process to acquire  
Renkl (2014) highlights the beneficial effects of mixing erroneous and correct 
examples in analogic reasoning. Students exposed to both correct and erroneous examples 
need to compare and find out differences that could lead to errors. Future studies examining 
the effect on analogic reasoning (compared to erroneous and correct examples only) on the 
acquisition of complex cognitive skills like diagnostic competences might give insight into 
whether a combination of erroneous and correct examples, which is analogical reasoning, can 
be used in medical education and if it is advantageous over showing just correct or erroneous 
examples. Also, the external validity of cognitive modeling examples could be the target of 
future research, for example by contrasting the effects of cognitive modeling examples on 
learning with the effects of observing real-life diagnostic reasoning and diagnostic reasoning 
in simulations. 
The ‘hidden’ cognitive processes of the students during providing peer feedback were 
not explicitly examined in the empirical studies of this thesis. Future research could tackle 
unveiling these processes. Verbalizing the reasoning processes during providing peer 
feedback or just observing cognitive modeling examples with think-aloud method (Cotton & 
Gresty, 2006; Fonteyn & Fisher, 1995) might interfere too much. Therefore, retrospective 
judgement and analysis as proposed by Van Den Haak, De Jong, and Jan Schellens (2003) of 
the peer feedback recorded with the dictation machine by the student may be starting point for 
further insight into the reasoning of students during providing peer feedback and what factors 
influenced their provision process.  
Furthermore, the feedback provision training in Study 2 was short but effective. As 
results of Study 1 indicate, exposing students to a guidance sheet of which parts are important 
to keep in mind (see Appendix G) while providing peer feedback on examples was not 
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effective and did not lead to elaboration of the provided peer feedback. Contrasting different 
degrees of elaboration, length and detail of the feedback training might be a next step and 
clarify what leads to beneficial effects of feedback provision training on elaboration of 
provided peer feedback. 
Another possibility for future research regarding the effectiveness of learning with 
cognitive modeling examples may be to incorporate practice phases after watching cognitive 
modeling examples. In the empirical studies of this thesis, providing peer feedback was used 
as interactive learning activity. However, a body of research on vicarious (or observational) 
learning highlights the importance of a rehearsal of the observed with a practice phase after 
observing (Bandura & Jeffrey, 1973; Fryling, Johnston, & Hayes, 2011; Stegmann et al., 
2012). Exploring if, how and when incorporating training phases after (or before) observing 
cognitive modeling examples and relating and comparing this effect to providing peer 
feedback could be object of investigations for further studies. 
9.4 In closing 
This thesis advances the knowledge about positive effects of providing peer feedback on 
peers’ performances on the provider and how watching erroneous examples positively affects 
learning. 
When peer feedback provision tasks are used for learning, educators need to carefully 
design these tasks to make them beneficial for both the recipient and the provider of the 
feedback. Especially the degree of elaboration of the provided peer feedback influences the 
learning gain and must be ensured. Further research on the influential factors that determine 
elaboration is highly needed. 
In response to a body of research that suggests that errors can be used for learning 
diagnostic competences – with often just theoretical assumptions how this might be possible – 
the results of this thesis highlight that using erroneous examples in medical education helps 
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acquiring error-detection skills. The distinct value of learning from errors for students and 
educators should gain more attention in empirical research. Exposing medical students to 
errors during learning might create a more holistic diagnostic skill and knowledge repertoire 
of young physicians, leading to better patient care with better diagnostic accuracy. Maybe, 
accepting and learning from our errors is essential for experiencing the full picture. 
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Appendix 
 
APPENDIX A 
Feedback Guidelines 
Bitte notiere dir hier Notizen zu folgenden Punkten: 
Was war gut am diagnostischen Prozess des Medizinstudenten im Video? 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Was würdest du am Diagnoseprozess des Medizinstudenten im Video kritisieren?  
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Hast du Fehler im Diagnoseprozess bemerkt? Wenn ja, wo war(en) diese? 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Was würdest du gegebenenfalls anders machen? 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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APPENDIX B 
Diagnostic Competences Tests 
Example Knowledge Test –Conceptual Knowledge 
MC1 
Ein 68 jähriger Patient leidet seit 15 Tagen unter zunehmender Dyspnoe.  
Vorerkrankungen: langjährige arterielle Hypertonie und Zigarettenabusus.  
Untersuchungsbefund: Deutliche Fußrücken- und Unterschenkelödeme und vergrößerte 
Leber.  
Lunge: feuchte inspiratorische Rasselgeräusche beidseits. Blutdruck 164/92 mmHg;  
Labor: Serumelektrolyte und -lipide normal. Serumkreatinin 2,2 mg/dl.  
 
Welches ist die wahrscheinlichste Diagnose?  
A: Akutes Nierenversagen 
B: Dekompensierte Herzinsuffizienz 
C: Infektexazerbierte Bronchitis 
D: Dekompensierte Nierenarterienstenose 
E: Nephrotisches Syndrom 
MC2 
Eine 40-jährige Raucherin stellt sich mit einem geschwollenen linken Bein und plötzlichem 
Thoraxschmerz mit Husten in der Notaufnahme vor.  
  
Welche Diagnose ist am wahrscheinlichsten?  
A: Dekompensierte Herzinsuffizienz 
B: Infektexazerbierte COPD 
C: Lungenarterienembolie 
D: Embolie der Arteria femoralis communis 
E: Pneumothorax 
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Example Knowledge Test – Strategic Knowledge 
KF 1-1 
In die Notaufnahme wird ein 56 jähriger Patient von Zuhause mit Notarztbegleitung 
transportiert. Er berichtet über seit 3 Stunden bestehende und zunehmende Atemnot und 
Druck auf der Brust. 
 Im Rahmen Ihrer differentialdiagnostischen Überlegungen möchten Sie ein akutes 
Koronarsyndrom ausschließen. 
Welche Schritte führen Sie hierfür als erstes durch? Nennen Sie mind. 2.  
 
KF 1-2 
Sie denken bei Ihrem Patienten auch an muskuloskelettale Beschwerden 
Frage 2: Welche Patienten haben hierfür ein besonderes Risiko? Nennen Sie mind. 2.  
 
KF 1-3 
Sie wollen außerdem ausschließen, dass bei dem Patienten eine Lungenembolie vorliegt. 
Welche weiteren diagnostischen Schritte (mind. 2) sowie akute und langfristige 
therapeutische Maßnahmen (mind. 2) führen Sie nun durch?  
 
 
Example Knowledge Test - Conditional Knowledge 
PL 1-1 
Herr Meier bekommt seit einigen Stunden immer schlechter Luft und berichtet zusätzlich 
über ein Stechen auf der Brust; die Beschwerden nahmen nun so zu, dass er den Notarzt 
gerufen hat. Sie veranlassen eine Röntgen Untersuchung des Thorax. 
 
Welche Verdachtsdiagnosen können Sie bei diesem Patienten mit einer Röntgen 
Untersuchung des Thorax ausschließen? Bitte begründen Sie Ihre Aussage 
 
PL 1-2 
Warum ist die Frage nach dem Nikotinkonsum für beides von Bedeutung? 
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Example Error Detection Test 
ED1 
Hier ein Beispiel einer Situation aus dem klinischen Alltag mit einigen Fehlern. Bitte 
markieren Sie, wenn Ihnen ein Fehler in der Diagnose des Arztes auffällt die Zahl vor der 
Stelle durch Unterstreichen: 
Beispiel: Die Erde (1) hat Kontinente und (2) ist eine Scheibe 
 
Frau Anton, 45 jährige Patientin mit metastasiertem Lungenkarzinom, wird mit 
Chemotherapie behandelt. Vor einem Tag hat sie Luftnot entwickelt, die unter Belastung 
stärker wird. Vitalparameter: Tachykard – Herzfrequenz: 111/min, Sauerstoffsättigung bei 4 l 
Sauerstoff bei 91%, Temperatur: 37,3°C EKG: Sinustachykardie BGA: pO2: 54 mmHg, 
pCO2: 26 mmHg, pH: 7,50 Labor: Anämie mit Hb 8,5 g/dl, LDH-Erhöhung und CRP-
Erhöhung auf 6 mg/dl. D-Dimere deutlich erhöht. Bei der körperlichen Untersuchung 
ergaben die Auskultation der Lunge sowie des Herzens keine Auffälligkeiten. Am Bein 
wurden beidseits deutlich eindrückbare Unterschenkelödeme festgestellt. Die Jugularvene 
war prominent. Die diensthabende Ärztin hält eine (1) Pneumonie für die wahrscheinlichste 
Diagnose, da (2) Entzündungszeichen sowie (3) subfebrile Temperaturen in Verbindung mit 
der (4) plötzlich aufgetretenen Atemnot dafürsprechen. Auch der (5) unauffällige 
Auskultationsbefund der Lunge passt hierzu. Eine Lungenembolie hält sie für (6) weniger 
wahrscheinlich, da zwar die (7) erhöhten D-Dimere bei dieser Patientin einen Hinweis darauf 
geben, aber keine für eine Lungenembolie typische (8) ST-Hebung und ein (9) S1-Q3 Typ im 
EKG zu sehen waren. Bei der körperlichen Untersuchung war auch kein (10) prominenter 
Jugularvenenpuls zu fühlen oder eine (11) einseitige Schwellung oder (12) Schmerzen am 
Bein zu sehen. Um eine Pneumonie nachzuweisen, veranlasst die Ärztin (13) ein CT sowie 
eine (14) Bestimmung von Troponin und CK. Durch das CT kann so das (15) 
Lungenparenchym bez. entzündlicher oder tumoröser Infiltrationen beurteilt werden, um so 
eine Pneumonie zu bestätigen oder auszuschließen. 
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APPENDIX C 
Example: Mental Effort 
Bitte kreuzen Sie die für Sie zutreffende Antwortalternative an (von „sehr leicht“ bis „sehr schwer“) 
 sehr 
leicht  
leicht eher 
leicht 
weder 
leicht 
noch 
schwe
r 
eher 
schwe
r 
schwe
r 
sehr 
schwe
r 
Wie leicht oder schwer finden Sie das Thema 
„Dyspnoe“? 
       
Wie leicht oder schwer fällt es Ihnen, mit dieser 
Lernumgebung zu arbeiten? 
       
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APPENDIX D 
Feedback Coding Scheme 
Level  Erklärung  Beispiel  Kürzel  
 
General 
Feedback  
 
Allgemeinwissen, allgemeines Fakten- 
oder Lehrbuchwissen, unspezifische 
Bewertungen, Feedback ohne jegliche 
Angabe von Gründen, Beschränkungen, 
Erklärungen etc.  
-> Beschreibungen (statt Begründungen) 
  
 
“Hat es gut gemacht.”  
"Ist strukturiert 
vorgegangen."  
"Troponin Erhöhung 
spricht für 
Myokardinfarkt."  
 
G_F  
 
Elaborated 
Feedback  
 
Feedback auf spezifische Fakten unter 
Angabe von  
Gründen, Beschränkungen,  
Alternativen, Erklärungen o.ä.  
Prozedurales Wissen, konkretes 
Fehlerwissen  
Hinweiswörter können sein: obwohl, 
statt dessen, aber, weil, trotz, sondern  
 
 
„Lungenembolie ist es 
nicht, weil Troponin 
erhöht, was eher für 
Myokardinfarkt spricht."  
 
E_F  
 
Off-Topic  
 
Feedback auf all die Dinge, die nichts 
mit den Krankheitsbildern oder der 
Diagnostik im Video zu tun haben, z.B.:  
Feedback auf die Durchführung der 
Anamnese und körperlichen 
Untersuchung oder hinsichtlich der 
(weiteren) Therapie, da nicht auf die 
Diagnostik bezogen; Feedback 
bezüglich der Patientenvorstellung  
 
 
"Gutes Eingehen auf 
Patient, gute Fragen 
gestellt."  
"Sie hatte die Haare 
offen."  
 
Off  
Fehler-
erkennung  
Ja / Nein:  
Fehler erkannt, wenn Premature Closure 
(= vorzeitiges Abschließen einer 
Diagnose bzw.  
Festlegen auf eine Diagnose) erkannt  
„Evtl weniger auf eine 
möglicherweise sichere 
Verdachtsdiagnose 
versteifen.“  
„Nicht abgewartet.“  
“Keine weiteren 
Differenzialdiagnosen in 
Betracht gezogen.”  
“Weitere Diagnostik nicht 
beachtet, weitere Tests 
nötig um eine 
Arbeitsdiagnose zu 
verfolgen.”  
 
ERR  
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APPENDIX E 
Feedback Training 
Hier ein Beispiel, wie gutes Feedback aussehen könnte. Bitte lies es dir ganz kurz durch. 
Herr Hartl, 43-jähriger Patient, der angibt sich seit einer Erkältung vor 5 Wochen müde und 
erschöpft zu fühlen. Er bekäme Atemnot schon nach dem Steigen von ca. 10 Stufen. Weder 
Angina noch Vorerkrankungen. Er ist Raucher seitdem er 16 ist (15 Packyears). 
AZ akut reduziert 
RR 170/130mmHG rechts, 173/126mmHG links, P 90/min, Größe 1,84m, Gewicht 95kg 
Corrhythmisch, keine pathologischen Geräusche.  
Pulmo mit leichter Spastik und basalen Rasselgeräuschen 
Orthopnoe 
Abdomen unauffällig  
Diskrete Knöchelödeme bds. 
Ein Famulant stellt aufgrund der unauffälligen Befunde die Diagnose auf, dass Herr Hartl 
durch das Rauchen eine leichte Atemnot und die Spastik entwickelt hat, ihm aber sonst nichts 
Gravierendes fehlt. Er rät dem Patienten zu mehr Sport, gesünderer Ernährung und mit dem 
Rauchen aufzuhören. Er veranlasst zur Sicherheit noch ein Röntgenbild der Lunge und plant 
bereits die Einleitung einer bronchodilatatorischen Therapie 
Gutes Feedback könnte so aussehen: 
Der Famulant hat durchaus richtige Teilbefunde erhoben und richtige Konsequenzen gezogen 
(Guter Punkt), da die Befunde größtenteils unauffällig sind (Erklärung)  
Die Diagnose, dass die Symptome durch das langjährige Rauchen ausgelöst werden, ist als 
endgültige Entscheidung aber zu früh (schlechter Punkt), da andere Krankheiten wie COPD 
oder Asthma bei solchen Patienten durchaus eine hohe Prävalenz haben können (Erklärung).  
Er sollte aber die Beinödeme, die Orthopnoe und die Blutdruckwerte berücksichtigen (was 
könnte man besser machen), da Beinödeme und Atemnot bei Belastung Anzeichen für eine 
Herzerkrankung wie die Herzinsuffizienz sein können (Erklärung). 
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APPENDIX F 
Model Expert Feedback 
 
Das folgende, sehr elaborierte Feedback hat ein Mitstudent auf die Diagnose gegeben. Bitte lies es 
dir einmal sorgfältig durch.  
 
Was war gut? Der Peer liefert relativ viele und z.T. auch seltene Differentialdiagnosen. Dies lässt 
breite differential-diagnostische Überlegungen zu.  
 
Was war schlecht? Der Famulus äußert im ersten Abschnitt nicht eine Differentialdiagnose 
sondern formuliert mit einiger Gewissheit: " Ich gehe angesichts ....von... aus....", somit priorisiert 
er eine mögliche Diagnose zu stark. Die Bewertung, dass eine LE weniger wahrscheinlich sei, ist 
angesichts der uneindeutigen Befunde und ausstehender Diagnostik zu früh. Die LE ist das 
Chamäleon der Inneren..... Ebenso scheint die Schlussfolgerung der Herzinsuffizienz nach MI 
durch die erhöhte AF und erniedrigtem PO2 nachvollziehbar und doch unvollständig, da in der 
körperlichen Untersuchung die typischen Zeichen (Rasselgeräusche usw., gestaute Halsvenen) 
fehlen. Gleichzeitig wird das geschwollene Bein nicht erwähnt, was zum einen den MI 
unwahrscheinlicher macht und gleichzeitig in der Argumentation für die LE fehlt. Ebenso ist der 
weitere diagnostische Schritt übereilt. Zuerst sollte man versuchen nicht-invasiv die Diagnose zu 
stellen oder zu präzisieren. Außerdem ist die vorgeschlagene Diagnostik zu limitiert, um 
Anhaltspunkte für oder gegen die anderen Differentialdiagnosen zu bekommen.  
 
Wo war der Fehler? Der Peer hat z.T. Fakten außer Acht gelassen und hat sich scheinbar zu 
schnell festgelegt. Die weitere Diagnostik ist zu eingeschränkt.  
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Was könnte man besser machen? Der Student könnte eine offenere Darstellung der 
Möglichkeiten wählen. Dies würde das differential-diagnostische Denken eher befördern, als 
einschränken. Gleichzeitig könnte er alle relevanten Fakten, die für oder gegen eine 
Differentialdiagnose sprechen nennen, um größere Argumentationsketten aufzubauen und eine 
bessere Abschätzung der Wahrscheinlichkeiten zu ermöglichen.  
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APPENDIX G 
Guidance Sheet on Diagnosing Dyspnea 
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